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Introduction 
Can we know what might have been? l'viost people probably 
would say that we cannot. We know facts and universal generaliza-
tions derived inductively from our observation of facts: that 
Thomas Jefferson was the third President of the United States; that 
Lincoln is the capital of Nebraska; and that water bo~ls at 100 de-
grees centigrade and freezes at 0 degrees under certain conditions 
that we can specify. 1 However, when we talk about what might have 
been but did not happen, we leave the domain of facts. We are talk-
ing, instead, about fictions. Whatever status we give to these imagi-
native creations, we are certain that they differ in kind from facts. 2 
Facts are "hard," "solid," and "substantial like physical matter."3 
They possess "definite shape, and [a] clear persistent outline-like 
bricks," and we may "pile them up" for use.4 They are verifiable, or 
amenable to empirical testing. Might-have-beens, on the other 
hand, are "pure conjecture,"5 "mere guess and speculation,"6 
"fanc[i]ful suppositions,"7 "fictional constructs,"8 or "figments."9 
1. Knowledge of facts or of generalizations derived from facts is not the only kind 
of knowledge we may have. We also have "practical knowledge" or knowledge "how." 
See GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 25-61 (1949). 
2. "It is simply impossible for a singular statement to be both counter-factual and 
factual at the same time." DAVID H. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC 
OF HISTORICAL THOUGHT 16 (1970). 
3. Cad L. Becker, What are Historical Facts? in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN OuR 
TIME 120 (Hans Meyerhoff ed., 1959). 
4. Jd. at 120-21. 
5. New York Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920). 
6. Taylor v. City of Yonkers, 11 N.E. 642, 644 (N.Y. 1887). 
7. Reynolds v. Texas & P. Ry., 37 .La. Ann. 694, 698 (1885). 
8. FISCHER, supra note 2, at 16. 
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They are the antithesis of facts; they are counterfactual. We cannot 
look them up in an authoritative source, as we can the name of the 
capital of Nebraska, nor verify them experimentally, as we can our 
assertions about the boiling point and freezing point of water. 10 
Yet we often talk as if we can know what might have been. One 
can imagine saying or hearing any of the following: 
If Paul had dropped the crystal on the floor, it would have 
shattered. 
I wish you had come to Phyllis' party. You would have had a won-
derful time. _ 
Had it not rained on Saturday, I would have mowed the lawn. 
We pepper our thoughts and our discourse with statements about 
what might have been. Usually, we do not stumble over such state-
ments, or even notice that they may differ in kind from much of what 
we say or think. 11 That we typically do not think of such statements 
as unusual or problematic suggests that most of the statements we 
make about what might have been are uncontroversial and readily 
accepted by the listener or reader. 12 Perhaps, then, we should re-
vise our intuition about our ability to know what might have been. 
In that case, what should we make of the following statements: 
r 
My doctors incorrectly told me that polycystic kidney disease was 
not hereditary and that the chances of my having a second child 
afflicted. with the disease were practically nil. If they had not mis-
informed me, I would not have borne another child who suffers 
from this disease.I 3 
My son would not have drowned in defendants' swimming pool if 
they had stationed a lifeguard there. 14 
9. Fritz Redlich, "Nw" and Traditional Approaches to Economic History and Their Interde-
pendence, 25 J. EcoN. HIST. 480, 484 (1965). 
10. See NELSON GooDMAN, FAcT, FICTION, AND FoRECAST 3-27 (4th ed. 1983); see also 
Redlich, supra note 9, !lt 484 (descrbing counterfactuals as "neither verifiable nor 
falsifiable"). 
II, With regard to counterfactuals, we are much like Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain 
who learns that he has been "speaking prose for more than forty years without knowing 
it." MoLIERE, THE SELF-MADE GENTLEMEN (LE BouRGOIS GENTILHOMME) act 2, sc. 4, in 
Six PROSE CoMEDIES OF MoLIERE 253 (George Graveley trans., 1956). Douglas Hof-
stadter writes that counterfactuals "are common currency, they are daily bread, they are 
the meat and potatoes of communication." DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER, METAMAGICAL 
THEMAS: QUESTING FOR THE ESSENCE OF MIND AND PATTERN 258 (1985). 
12. Of course such statements might be uncontroversial simply because they are 
about unimportant things, and the listener does not bother to evaluate them. Undoubt-
edly, listener indifference accounts for the acceptance of some counterfactual state-
ments, but it hardly seems possible that none of these statements ever matter enough to 
stand the scrutiny of the hearer. Moreover, they usually must at least matter to the 
speaker. So, unless many of these statements are non problematic at least to their mak-
ers, we need to explain why we persist in speaking nonsense. 
13. See Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
14. See Rovegno v. San jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 291 P. 848 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1930); cf. New York Cent. R.R. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920) (failure 
to equip barge with life preservers or life buoys); Collins v. Riverside Amusement Park 
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We would have fired Sam for leaving his keys in the bus and tak-
ing unauthorized breaks even if he had not been soliciting his fel-
low drivers on behalf of the Teamsters Union. 15 
Had testator known that Amherst College would refuse to accept 
his bequest to establish a trust to provide scholarships for "Ameri-
can born, Protestant, Gentile boys of good moral repute," he 
would have given the gift without the offending restrictions, 
rather than give that portion of the estate to his heirs. 16 
Had the employer refrained from engaging in unfair labor prac-
tices during the union representation election, the union would 
have won the election, even though it cannot show that it had ob-
tained m;:Uority support prior to the employer's campaign of un-
fair labor practices. l7 
In law, as in the rest of life, we indulge, indeed, require, many 
speculations on what might have been. Although such counterfac-
tual thinking often remains disguised or implicit, we encounter it 
whenever we identify a cause, and quite often when we attempt to 
fashion a remedy. Ifthis kind of thinking often remains implicit and 
in the .background, it may be that most of these .statements are as 
unproblematic in law as they are in our ordinary discourse. 18 Yet, as 
the examples above suggest, troublesome might-have-beens abound 
Co., 145 P.2d 853 (Ariz. 1944) (no lifeguard when accident occurred); Hafl v. Lone Palm 
Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. !970) (failure to provide lifeguard, or to post warning sign). 
15. See NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). 
16. See Howard Sav. Inst. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39 (NJ. 1961). See generally Vanessa 
Laird, Note, Phantom Selves: The Search for a General Charitable Intent in the Application of the 
Cy Pres Doctrine, 40 STAN. L. REv. 973 (1988) (discussing courts' ability to apply cy pres 
doctrine to effectuate testators' charitable intent despite testators' defective gift). 
17. See Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 
1241 (1984); United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980). 
18. But-for causation, and its more sophisticated variants, is an example of a large 
body oflaw where the courtterfactual usually remains implicit and untroublesome. If we 
say that the defendant's negligent conduct (or that the negligent aspect of the defend-
ant's conduct) caused the plaintiff's harm, we usually mean that in an imagined world in 
which the defendant had not conducted himself negligently the harm does not occur. 
We acknowledge this meaning in our discussion of factual causation, but in the ordinary 
tort case (or criminal case) we are content to say that X caused Y, without more. This 
analysis, admittedly, gets more complicated, and the hard cases are so called with good 
reason. For a discussion of more sophisticated models of causation, see infra notes 8 I-
85 and accompanying text. My point here is simply that in the run-of-the-mill case, 
courts get along fine with their primitive m!Jdel of causation, and with the coumerfactual 
left implicit and unexplored. 
The relative ease with which courts decide these issues every day should make us cau-
tious about complicating matters. I proceed mindful of the following poem attributed to 
Mrs. Edward Craster: 
The centipede was happy quite, 
Until a Toad in fun 
Said "Pray which leg goes after which?" 
That worked her mind to such a pitch, 
She lay distracted in the ditch, 
Considering how to run. 
BARTELETT's FAMILIAR QuoTATIONS 1046 (Christopher Morley ed., 12th ed. 1951); cj 
MAX WEBER, Critical Studies in the Logic of the Cultural Sciences, in MAX WEBER ON THE METH-
ODOLOGY OF THE SociAL SciENCES 115 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 
1949) (cautioning not to overestimate the significance of methodological studies for the 
practice of history and noting that methodological study "is no more the precondition of 
fruitful intellectual work than the knowledge of anatomy is the precondition for 'correct' 
walking"). 
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in legal disputes. We find ourselves stumbling over them in a vari-
ety of situations and responding to them in inconsistent ways rang-
ing from brazen self-confidence to paralysis in the face of the task. 
When we recognize the exercise·for what it is, however, our self-
confidence tends to erode, and we become discomforted, perplexed, 
and skeptical about the whole endeavor. 19 
This Article considers some of the uses of counterfactuals in the 
law. Counterfactuals are a type of conditional statement.2° Condi-
tional statements express the idea that something is or will be the 
case (the cemsequent), provided that some othersituation is realized 
(the antecedent).21 Conditionals often take the form "if p then q " 22 
Counterfactuals are conditionals in which the author expresses the 
knowledge or belief that the antecedent is false. 23 
If we hope to use counterfactuals sensibly in the law, we need to 
clarify our thinking about them. We must decide when it is appro-
priate to think counterfactually. Some situations may resist mean-
ingful consideration of what might have been, or render 
counterfactual thought unnecessary. Some counterfactuals may be 
plausible but irrelevant because their antecedents lack legal signifi-
cance. Thus, we must take care in defining the thought experiment 
19. See, e.g., Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REv. 
543, 559 (1962) (contending that "what would have happened had defendant performed 
his duty" is a question "that can seldom, if ever, be answered"); John Leubsdorf, Reme-
dies for Uncertainty, 61 B.U. L. REv. 132 (1981) (questioning ability of remedies to fit 
uncertain might-have-beens); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. 
REv. 60, 64-72 ( 1956) (discussing role of judge in limiting use of conjecture in jury's 
assessment oflegalliability); E. Wayne Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case 
to Determine Cause in Fact, 46 TEX. L. REv. 423 (1968) (arguing that use of speculation in 
determining liability is erroneous and contending that court should focus on what actu-
ally happened). Professor Leubsdorf writes, for example: 
How can we talk of a world that never existed and never will exist as if it 
were real? It does not seem unthinkable to conclude that, had the defend-
ant's explosives not gone off, the plaintiff's building would still be standing. 
But saying that, had it not been for constitutional violations, a given school 
would have had 158 white students and ll 0 black ones is hard to distinguish 
from writing a treatise on the habits of unicorns. 
Leubsdorf, supra, at 135. 
20. On the relationship between counterfactuals and conditionals, see GooDMAN, 
supra note 10, at 4-5;j.L. MACKIE, TRUTH PROBABILITY AND PARADOX: STUDIES IN PHILO-
SOPHICAL LoGIC 64-66, 70-71 (1973); R.S. Walters, Contrary-to-Fact Conditional, in 2 ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 212 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967). 
21. A DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 70 (Anthony Flew ed., 2d ed. 1984). 
22. Although conditionals often are expressed as "if" sentences, they need not be 
written that way. Such statements as: "I will come to the party, provided that I find a 
ride"; "Had he come, he would have enjoyed himself"; or "One step closer, and I 
shoot," all express conditionals. See MACKIE, supra note 20, at 73-74. 
23. A statement is no less a counterfactual if the author holds a mistaken belief that 
the antecedent is false. One can imagine a person waking up on the morning after the 
presidential election of 1948 and saying: "What a pity Dewey won. If Truman had won, 
we would have something to celebrate this morning." Our imagined political analyst 
has spoken counterfactually, even though her antecedent has been realized. See MACKIE, 
supra note 20, at 71. 
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to be expressed by a counterfactual and be mindful of questions of 
legal relevance in uafting the antecedent. Even when it. is appropri-
ate to think counterfactuaHy, how can we distinguish a valid, or plau-
sible counte:rfactual, from an invalid, implausible, or downright silly 
one? fo:r every statement that begins "if p then ... ," there is an 
infinite number of possible consequents. ].f we are unable to evalu-
ate competing counterfactuals using some standard of plausibility, 
we had best abandon the enterprise. Yet, given the pervasiveness of 
counterfactuals in our thinking about law, v,re cannot avoid :relying 
on them, at least under current legal doctrine. 
This Article assumes that legal decisionmakers cannot avoid 
counterfactual questions. 24 BecaUse such questions are necessary, 
we should think carefully about when and how to pose them, and 
how to distinguish good answers from poor ones. 
Part I of this Article identifies and analyzes some uses of 
counterfactuals in current legal practice. Taking as an example an 
actiori in tort, it first shows how peryasive and essential counterfac-
tual thinking is in om legal decisionmaking. Next, it considers the 
disturbingly extreme responses of bravado oF dread that courts have 
often adopted when confronted with the demands of counterfactual 
inquiry. finally, it broadly maps the ways courts deal with, or at-
tempt to avoid, the question of what might have been. This sec-
tion's survey is deliberately broad, both to uncover and make 
coherent the rich range of responses to the problem of counterf3.c-
tuals in the law, and to show that several seemingly unrelated 
problems in law can be understood and analyzed fruitfully as in-
stances of that problem. 
Among legal scholars there is a widespread sense of the exhaus-
tion of doctrinal analysis and the need to look beyond the bounda-
ries of cases.25 This mood binds such diverse approaches to law as 
law and economics, law and literature, legal anthropology, legal his-
to:ry, feminist legal theory, and critical race theory, as well as their 
predecessor, legal realism. These approaches share the idea that 
24. I do not mean to suggest, however, that coumerfactuals are never avoidable. 
Professor Leubsdorf has suggested a variety of strategies for avoiding counterfactuals 
and othe:r sources of uncertainty in remedial decisionmaking. fviost of his suggestions, 
however, require a revision of our basic premises regarding remedies. See Leubsdorf, 
supra note 19, at 141-72. 
25. I am aware that proclamations of the end of particular ideas, ideologies, meth-
ods, or theories often prove to be embarrassingly premature. In the late 1950s, Daniel 
Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset announced the "end of ideology" and the "exhaustion 
of political ideas." DANIEL BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLIT-
ICAL IDEAS IN THE fiFTIES 17, 409 (1988 ed.); SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE 
SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 403-17 (1960); see also JoB DITTBERNER, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 
AND AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT: 1930-1960, at 147-251 {1976) (discussing Bell's and 
Lipset's contributions to the end of ideology debate). Events quickly showed their claim 
to be unprescient, although recently we have heard it echoed in the proclamation of the 
end of history. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 NAT'L INTEREST 3 (1989). 
For a fiLLing rejoinder to Fukuyama, see Josh Brown, Osbome at the End of History, 50 
RADICAL HIST. REv. 243 (1991); Josh Brown, Osbome at the End of History, 49 RADICAL 
HIST. REV. 167 (1991). 
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law has little method of its own and must instead draw on the theo-
ries, insights, and methods of other disciplines. Their disagreement 
is over which discipline to borrow from. 
This Article similarly reflects the belief that legal discourse must 
go beyond the cases, and that we must infuse that discourse with 
methods and ideas found elsewhere. Because my focus is on how 
legal factfinders should and do reconstruct the past and construct 
alternative counterfactual pasts, the most promising discipline to 
tum to is history.26 Historians have produced some of our most 
elaborate examples of counterfactual thinking.27 Part II examines 
some of this literature to see what it can tell us about using 
counterfactuals and standards for evaluating them as plausible or 
implausible. 
Finally, Part III examines how we might better use counterfactuals 
in legal decisionmaking. Drawing on Parts I and II, it considers how 
and when we should construct counterfactuals in the law. It then 
categorizes and analyzes the kinds of arguments that will sustain 
counterfactuals so that we may better evaluate them when used in 
the law. 
/. Counteifactuals in Law 
A. The Peroasiveness of the Counterfactual Inquiry 
Counterfactual considerations intrude at many stages in legal 
factfinding and decisionmaking. Sometimes we acknowledge their 
presence, but other times we remain unaware of them. Sometimes 
counterfactuals help focus our inquiry, but other times they lead us 
astray. Nevertheless, whether express or implicit, helpful or mis-
leading, they are there. 
Take, for example, an action in tort. Most obviously, counterfac-
tual considerations loom in the determination of factual causation 
and remedy. The factual causation, or cause-in-fact, inquiry re-
quires that the factfinder determine whether the defendant's tor-
tious conduct, or defective product, causally contributed to the 
plaintiff's injury.28 Traditionally, courts have understood this re-
quirement in terms of causal necessity and have applied a but-for 
test to determine causation.29 Under this test, the defendant's con-
duct or defective product will only be described as a cause of the 
26. For a discussion of the limited usefulness of economic modeling for legal deci-
sionmakers faced with the problem of counterfactuals, see infra note 164. 
27. See infra notes 157,162 & 166-67 (citing examples). 
28. As Professor Wright shows, a better statement of the factual causation require-
ment is that the tortious aspect of the defendant's conduct (or product) must be a cause 
of the injury. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1759-74 
(1985). 
29. See H.L.A. HART & ToNY HoNORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAw 110 (2d ed. 1985); W. 
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injury if, but for that conduct or pmduct, the injury would not have 
occuHedl. The test instructs the facdinder to recreate an imagina-
tive past, in which the factfindler eliminates the tortious act and plays 
out an alternative (counterfactual) history. 
To be sure, there are severe critics of this account of causation. 
Kndeed, much criticism of the but-for test stems from particular in-
stances where resolution of the counterfactual question is difficult, 
or appears to lead to counterintuitive results. 30 Nevertheless, the 
but-for test remains the predominant approach to factual causation 
in tort. 31 Moreover, as K argue below, attempts to replace the but-
for test inescapably pose counterfactual questions of their own.32 
The resort to counterlactual inquiry is less controversial and more 
explicit in the determination of money damages for the tort plaintiff. 
At bottom, all determinations of tort damages imply a comparison 
between the actual world and a counterlactual one in which the de-
fendant had not injured the plaintiff. Often that comparison gives 
the trier of fact little pause. For example, if the factfinder concludes 
that the defendant broke the plaintiff's leg, it should have little 
trouble deciding that the medical costs of mending the leg are at-
tributable to the defendant and should be included iri the damage 
award. 33 Yet often we require the factfinder to engage in much 
more uncertain inquiries to establish the damage award. for exam-
ple, in a wrongful death action, the factfinder probably will be asked 
to determine: the job history that the decedent v:ould have had and 
the stream of income that she would have generated; the value of 
the services that she would have rendered and of the goods that she 
would have produced for her family; the self-maintenance costs that 
she would have incurred; and her probable life expectancy, all i.n a 
counterfactual world in which the accident that took her life had not 
occurred. 34 
Other elements of a tort action also raise counterlactual ques-
tions. In deciding whether a defendant has been negligent, the 
factfinder must compare the defendant's conduct to some standard 
of nonnegligent (or reasonable) conduct. Typically, the court in-
structs the factfinder to measure the defendant's conduct by the rea-
sonable person standard. Although this standard calls for a 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTS 265-66 (5th ed. 1984); 
Wright, supra note 28, at 1775. 
30. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text. 
31. 4 FowLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAw OF ToRTs 91 (1986) (2d ed.). 
32. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text. 
33. It should have little trouble unless the defendant can argue that the plaintiff 
aggravated the injury by, for instance, needless delay in obtaining medical care. See infra 
note 36 and accompanying text. 
34. The factfinder also will be asked to predict the rate of inflation for the additional 
years that she would have lived. See generally STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONG-
FUL DEATH & INJURY (3d ed. 1988) (explaining how economic and statistical principles, 
based on federal government publications and scholarly works by expert economists, are 
used in appraising gross and net loss earnings). 
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normative judgment about the community's sense ofreasonable be-
havior, it also asks the factfinder to substitute a hypothetical reason-
able person for the defendant in the account of events and to decide 
whether under the circumstances a reasonable person would have 
behaved better than the defendant did.35 Similarly, the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences, which denies a plaintiff recovery for that 
portion of her harm that she could have avoided by acting reason-
ably after the accident had occurred, necessitates counterfactual 
thinking.36 
Hidden and unwelcome counterfactual considerations may also 
play a role in the factfinder's decision in a tort action. In a recent 
study, two psychologists found that test subjects varied the amount 
of compensation they would award to accident victims according to 
the ease with which they could imagine a counterfactual alternative 
scenario in which the harm did not occur.37 
Counterfactual questions also abound beyond the law of torts. 38 
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 ( 1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, at 
173-75; see also JoN ELSTER, LoGIC AND SOCIETY: CONTRADICTIONS AND POSSIBLE WORLDS 
180 (1978) (noting the counterfactual nature of reasonable person inquiry). 
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 918 (1965); 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 31, 
at 511-20. The question of avoidable consequences, which seeks to identify that portion 
of a plaintiff's injury that is attributable to her post-accident conduct, is, of course, at 
heart a question of causation. Similar notions underlie the principle of mitigation of 
damages in cases of contract breach and in claims for recovery of back pay for unlawful 
discharge in labor and employment discrimination law. 
37. Dale T. Miller & Cathy McFarland, Counteifactual Thinking and Victim Compensation: 
A Test of Norm Theory, 12 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsYCHOL. BuLL. 513, 515-16 (1986). For 
example, in one experiment subjects were given one of two variants on a scenario in-
volving the crash of a small plane in a remote area. !d. at516-17. In both variants the 
victim sustained only minor injuries from the crash itself and decided to walk to the 
nearest town. In the first variant the victim died of exposure 75 miles from help, but in 
the second, he died only a quarter mile from help. Subjects responding to the second 
variant of this scenario made substantially larger awards than did subjects responding to 
the first. /d. 
38. Questions of causation and remedy outside of the area of tort similarly raise 
counterfactual considerations. So too do a number of other legal issues. For example, 
under the Erie doctrine, a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must decide state 
law issues in terms of the appropriate state law. If there is no state law on the question, 
and the jurisdiction does not provide for certification of such questions to its courts, the 
federal court must predict how a court of the particular jurisdiction would decide the 
question. See, e.g., Alfonso v. Lund, 783 F.2d 958, 964 (lOth Cir. 1986) (predicting that 
New Mexico would not allow recovery for loss of chance malpractice claim). Moreover, 
as Judge Patricia M. Wald has noted: 'Judges of lower courts like mine not only follow 
Supreme Court precedent as best we can, but rule on the basis of our predictions as to 
how the Supreme Court will act in a particular situation." Patricia M. Wald, Government 
Benefits: A New Look at an Old Gifthorse, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 247, 264 (1990). The cy pres 
doctrine requires the court to determine what the testator would have desired had she 
known that circumstances would frustrate her bequest. See supra note 16 and accompa-
nying text. The Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure require that courts apply 
a harmless error standard in determining whether a verdict or judgment should be set 
aside. FED. R. Civ. P. 61; FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); see also infra note 54. See generally II 
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2881-
2883 ( 1971) (detailing the history, purpose, and application of the harmless error rule). 
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They are an inevitable part of our attempt to adjudicate legal 
disputes. 
B. Counterfactual Bravado and Counterfactual Dread 
Courts often fail to recognize that they are dealing with 
counterfactuals. When they do recognize the counterfactual nature 
of their inquiry, they fail to relate it to other counterfactual inquiries 
in the law. Lacking a general understanding of counterfactuals and 
their place in legal decisionmaking, courts' treatment of legal 
counterfactuals is ad hoc, localized, and inconsistent. 
We see this inC:onsisTericf iri the wide 'array of responses by legal 
decisionmakers to the invitation to think counterfactually. At the 
extremes are their responses of counterfactual bravado and 
counterfactual dread. Sometimes their bravado is so great that th~y 
assume extravagant epistemological possibilities; sometimes their 
?rea? is so great that they deny the possibility of any counterfactual 
mqmry. 
Thus, the United States Com:t of Appeals for the S.eventh Circuit 
has instructed the agency that administers the Black Lung Benefits 
Act, 39 to determine whether a totally disabled coal miner who suf-
fers from black lung disease would have become totally disabled as a 
result of his heavy cigarette smoking, or any other cause, even if he 
had not worked in a coal mine.40 Indeed, the court further indicated 
that if an administrative law judge determined that the miner would 
have become totally disabled as a result of causes other than mining, 
she still would have to consider whether exposure to coal dust has-
tened the onset oftotal disability.41 Presumably, if she determined 
that it did, she then would have to decide how much later total disa-
bility would have occurred but for the coal dust exposure. 
The Seventh Circuit .engages in vicarious counterfactual bravado. 
The court does not claim to know the answer to its counterfactual 
questions; it just assumes that an administrative law judge will. 
However, one can easily find instances of equally bold assertions by 
legal factfinders regarding such uncertain might-have-beens. Some 
of the boldest examples of counterfactual bravado arise, of neces-
sity, in the realm of remedies. There the factfinder may find itself 
. tracing hypothetical commercial ventures or life histories. The 
The concept of discri~ination in labor and employment law entails comparison between 
how the person subject to discrimination was treated, and how he would have been 
treated but for the activity or characteristic that marked him for different treatment. See 
BARBARA L. ScHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 13 (2d ed. 
1983) (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977));Julius G. 
Getman, Section 8( a)( 3) of the NLRA and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, 32 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 735, 737 (1965). 
39. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1988). 
40. Shelton v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 899 F.2d 690, 
693 (7th Cir. 1990). It must, in other words, determine that exposure to coal dust was a 
necessary, although not necessarily sufficient, cause of the miner's total disability. 
41. /d. . 
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problem is especially perplexing in cases involving young tort vic-
tims who have no career history.42 In one case involving the death 
of a young woman, for instance, the court as trier of fact took great 
pains to describe the likely net earnings of the decedent.43 Among 
other things, the court found that she would have chosen a career as 
a legislative analyst in preference to enrolling in law school.44 It 
determined what job she would have taken at what entry salary 
level.45 It further determined her rate of promotions, when she 
would have had children, the amount of time she would have taken 
off from full-time work to care for those children, and, having deter-
mined that she would have worked part-time during that period, her 
earnings until she returned to full-time work.46 
Sometimes courts disguise their counterfactual bravado as 
counterfactual dread. In Reynolds v. Texas and Pacific Railway, 47 the 
corpulent48 Mrs. Reynolds hurried out of a lighted waiting room 
onto the defendant's unlighted steps, where she made a misstep and 
fell. The defendant argued that Mrs. Reynolds had not shown that 
its negligence had caused her accident, which might have occurred 
"even had it been broad daylight."49 The court, however, assumed 
the cauSal connection because the railroad's negligence was ''of a 
42. The valuation of children for purposes of tort damages, as well as for other 
purposes, has long been a source of considerable conceptual difficulty. For a fascinating 
history of this issue, see generally VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: 
THE CHANGING SoCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985). For a discussion of how changes in 
the valuation of children and in the conception of the maternal relationship altered tort 
law's treatment of bystander claims for injury resulting from witnessing the injury of a 
loved one, see Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: 
A History, 88 MICH. L. REv. 814, 837-41, 851-62 (1990). 
43. Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 1271, 1281-88 (D. Conn. 
1974), aff'd in part and rev 'din part, 524 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1975). 
44. /d. at 1283. 
45. Id. at 1284. 
46. /d. at 1281-88. The court was keenly aware of the speculative nature of its in-
quiry, as it indicated by quoting the following statement of the Connecticut Supreme 
Court: 
"Suffice it to say that, except for the special expenses allowable under the 
statute, all of these elements are, of necessity, imponderable and largely 
speculative. No one can place a definite value upon them, nor can one do 
more than conjecture as to what the future course of any life, if continued, 
would have been. At best, the trier must take the evidence and make an 
intelligent estimate." 
/d. at 1282 (quoting Fairbanks v. State, 124 A.2d 893, 897 (Conn. 1956)). The Feldman 
court recognized the difficulty of its task and made a serious attempt at resolving the 
coumerfactual questions through a careful consideration of the available evidence re-
garding the decedent's likely choices and prospects. 
47. 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885). 
48. /d. at 697. Although I understand the relevance of Mrs. Reynolds' haste, the 
relevance of her size to her sense of balance is not obvious to me. It is clear, however, 
that defendant considered this to be a significant fact, as do the torts casebooks that 
discuss Reynolds. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 369 (5th 
ed. 1990). 
49. Reynolds, 37 La. Ann. at 698. 
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character natu:raHy leading to [the accident's] occu:r:rence."50 The 
court, having decided the counterfactual by virtue of attributing cau-
sation to the defendant's failure to light its steps, cast the defend-
ant's argument that Mrs. Reynolds' size and haste may have caused 
the accident as a "mere possibility" and a "fanciful supposition[]," 
which the court need not indulge.51 Not surprisingly, there a:re sim-
ilar slip and fall cases where the court reaches the opposite conclu-
sion and dismisses a plaintiff's arguments about causation as too 
speculative and hypothetical.52 
Not aH assertions of counterfactual dread are mere rhetorical 
stratagems employed to foreclose consideration of all possible reso-
lutions of the counterfactual question other than the one that the 
court adopts implicidy.53 In some instances, courts deliberately cast 
their analyses in a manner intended to avoid difficult 
counterfactuals. 54 
As with counterfactual bravado, some of the strongest expres-
sions of counterfactual d:read appear in discussions of remedies. 
Thus, courts historically have required proof of contract damages 
with far greater certainty than proof of tort damages.55 Further-
more, distrust of their ability to resolve counterfactual questions has 
50. Jd. 
51. !d. 
52. See, e.g., Mdnturffv. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 243 N.E.2d 657, 662 (lll. App. 
! 968) (holding that "[d]amages cannot be asse~sed on mere surmise or conjecture as to 
what probably happened to cause his injury and death" where decedent fell down dan-
gerously steep and worn stairway that had no handrail); Wolf v. Kaufmann, 237 N.Y.S. 
550, 551 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929) (stating that in context of unwitnessed fall down un-
lighted staircase "it would be solely a conjecture for a jury to draw the conclusion that 
the deceased fell down the stairs because of the absence of light"). 
53. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; see also Elsroth v. Johnson &John-
son, 700 F. Supp. 151, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (rejecting plaintiff's theory that use of gela-
tin capsules rather than tablets or caplets more impervious to tampering constituted 
defective design because "plaintiff cannot demonstrate that had the manufacturer elimi-
nated gelatin capsules these criminals (who apparently prefer Tylenol products) would 
not have poisoned tablets or caplets. Anyone capable of such sophisticated package 
tampering would have little difficulty in contaminating the product."). 
54. Occasionally, substantive law also causes courts' analyses to have the effect of 
counterfactual dread. One example is the harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard for certain types of error in criminal trials. Under that standard, appellate 
courts will not accept the counterfactual statement that had the trial error not occurred 
the trial outcome would have been the same, if they can imagine even remotely possible 
counterfactual scenarios where the trial outcome would have changed. See II WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note 38, § 2883, at 280. The rationale for the harmless error beyond a 
reasonable doubt standard has more to do \Vith substantive values than '.vith skepticism 
about our ability to resolve the counterfactuals. There is no reason to be more acutely 
skeptical regarding our counterfactual resolving skills in these kinds of cases in particu-
lar. Rather, we say that because of what is at stake in effectively excusing the trial error, 
we will not tolerate the same degree of uncertainty, or chance of mistake, that we will in 
engaging in other counterfactua! inquiries. 
A similar example of predictive, though not counterfactual, dread is the rule of remote 
possibilities in applying the rule against perpetuities. THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. 
HASKELL, ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 187-90 (2d ed. 1984) ("Probabilities 
are irrelevant; all that matters is what conceivably can happen, no matter how far-
fetched."). Again, it appears that the rationale for such things as the fertile octogenarian 
rule is something other than our lack of confidence in our ability to predict that she will 
bear no more children. See id. at 179. 
55. The tendency in recent years has been to relax the stringent contract damages 
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sometimes led legal decisionmakers to reject certain types of reme-
dies as too speculative. For example, the National Labor Relations 
Board will order an employer to bargain with a union as the repre-
sentative of its employees (a "Gissel bargaining order") even though 
the union has not been chosen by those employees in a representa-
tion election, if employer misconduct has undermined the union's 
strength and destroyed the opportunity for a fair election, and if the 
union can demonstrate that at some point it held majority sup-
port.56 If the union cannot demonstrate prior majority support, 
however, the NLRB will not issue a bargaining order, no matter how 
"outrageous" and "pervasive" the employer's unfair labor practices, 
and without regard to the union's evidence that it would have won 
an untainted election. 57 The NLRB's rejection of the bargaining or-
der remedy in these so-called Gissel I cases rests largely on its doubt 
about its ability to make valid counterfactualjudgments.58 Similarly, 
in cases of employer bad faith refusal to bargain, the NLRB has re-
jected the argument that employees are entitled to a make-whole 
remedy for the loss of the benefits of the bargain they would have 
attained had the employer bargained in good faith. 59 
The academic literature mirrors judicial responses of bravado and 
dread. Professor Richard Wright optimistically writes: 
[I]n most cases there is little difficulty [in analyzing the 
counterfactual], for example, when the change is removing the ex-
plosive character of a substance or the act of firing a gun. The 
analysis becomes more complicated when human reactions to the 
changed situation must be estimated. Again, however, the analy-
sis is usually fairly easy and not too speculative. People's reac-
tions generally will be fairly predictable using causal 
generalizations in which there is a high degree of confidence. 5° 
Professor James Henderson, on the other hand, writes that: 
[C]ourts must try to avoid hypothetical "what would have hap-
pened if ... ?" questions in the course of resolving tort disputes. 
When such hypotheticals are addressed in adjudication, attention 
focuses on events that never occurred and circumstances that 
never existed. If liability rules require answers to such questions, 
proof gives way to speculation. Of course, to some extent these 
requirements. DAN B. DoBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw oF REMEDIES 150-57 (1973); E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS 881-88 (1982). 
56. The United States Supreme Court approved of the NLRB's practice of issuing 
such bargaining order.s in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 610 (1969). 
57. /d. at 613-15. 
58. See Gourmet Foods Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. 578, 586 (1984); see also id. at 588 (Mem-
ber Dennis, concurring) (quoting Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 
1983)). For the tripartite categorization of employer election interference, see Gissel, 
395 U.S. at 613-15. See also cases cited supra note 17. 
59. For a discussion of these decisions, see irifra text accompanying notes 107-22. 
60. Wright, supra note 28, at 1806-07. 
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questions are unavoidable in connection with such issues as proxi-
mate cause and damages. But the verifiability constraint requires 
that liability rules avoid raising such questions whenever 
possible.61 
C. Coping with Counteifactual Questions 
As previously noted, the law's response to counterfactuals is ad 
hoc and inconsistent. Furthermore, its response to counterfactual 
questions is generally localized, without regard for what those ques-
tions share with similar questions in other kinds of cases or substan-
tive areas of the law. U we step back from a localized view to look 
more broadly at decisions involving counterfactual questions, how-
ever, we can discern certain patterns of responses. 
If we hope to better use legal counterfactuals, we must first iden-
tify and analyze the law's cuJrTent repertoire of techniques for re-
sponding to them. This Section critically examines the primary 
techniques that legal decisionmake~s use either to avoid or to re-
solve counterfactual questions. 
1. Techniques of Avoidance 
Most instances of counterfactua~ avoidance are not really a matter 
of "technique" because they involve no conscious decision to avoid 
the counterfactual. In determining causation we usually leave the 
counterfactual implicit and unnoticed. For instance, in ou:r everyday 
discourse if we say that Billy got a stomach ache because he ate too 
many snacks, we do not stop to recognize that implicitly we are say-
ing that, under the circumstances, had ht.. not eaten so many snacks 
he would not have gotten the stomach ache. We certainly do not 
play out an imaginative alternative history in which we correct Billy's 
eating habits and see what happens as a consequence. Usually, the 
causation question for legal factfinders resembles the case of Billy's 
stomach ache.62 Hwe are called upon, for instance, not to explain a 
simple stomach ache, but to explain why Billy contracted salmo-
nella, we would try to identify the tainted food, and we could then 
announce that the food prepa:rer caused Billy's salmonella, much as 
we had described the cause of his stomach ache in the previous ex-
ample. In such a case our factfinding proceeds adequately without 
mention of might-have-beens. 
V/hen "vill the implicit counterfactual emerge as an issue in the 
61. James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CoRNELL L. REV. 901,914 
( 1982) (footnotes omitted); see also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctri-
nal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 
308 ( 1990) (stating that "resolution of the causation question in failure-to-warn cases 
frequently depends on variables that cannot be resolved coherently in the courtroom"); 
Morris G. Shanker, A Retreat to Progress: A Proposal to Eliminate Damage Awards for Loss of 
Business Profits, 85 Co MM. LJ. 83, 87 (1980) ("In trying to figure out the extent of future 
lost business profits . . . we permit our courts to pretend to know what really is 
unknowable."). 
62. Cf Malone, supra note 19, at 67 ("At times this determination [of what would 
have happened had defendant acted differently] is made so automatically that the cause 
issue is little more than a bit of formalism in the tria!."). 
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discussion of causation? Typically, it emerges in cases of causal 
overdetermination or of causal uncertainty. In such cases the de-
fendant is likely to argue that the plaintiff cannot show that she 
would not have suffered the injury but for defendant's conduct.63 
a. Avoidance by Reframing the Q:l,estions Asked 
z. Substantialfactor Causation 
As noted above, we typically describe causation in the counterfac-
tual terms of the but-for test.64 That test works in most instances. 
The test's assumption of causal necessity conforms to our intuitive 
notion of causation,65 and under its guidance courts and juries typi-
cally determine factual causation without stumbling.66 
Nevertheless, this account of causation has severe critics. Courts 
and commentators have long noted that in certain kinds of cases 
"there are good reasons both for saying that some given event was 
caused by some action and also that it would still have happened 
without this action."67 In these cases of causal overdetermination 
there are tv.ro or more sets of conditions present, each of which 
alone would suffice to cause the same harm. The harm in these 
cases is causally overdetermined either because the causal candidate 
acts concurrently with a duplicate sufficient cause, as in the cases of 
two merging fires, either of which singly could have destroyed the 
plaintiff's property,68 or because it preempts another sufficient 
63. Professor Henderson argues that this issue will be raised by the defendant: "In 
spite of the fact that theoretically, 'but for' is part of the plaintiff's case, in practice it 
enters the case as a defense that the defendant must prove." James A. Henderson, Jr., A 
Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causation Issue-The Need for an Ex-
panded, Rather than a Contracted, Analysis, 47 TEx. L. REV. 183, 200 (1969). Contra E. 
Wayne Thode, A Reply to the Defense of the Use of the Hypothetical Case to Resolve the Causation 
Issue, 47 TEX. L. REv. 1344, 1352-53 (1969) (expressing skepticism of Henderson's as-
sertion as an empirical matter). 
64. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying Lexl. 
65. But see Judith]. Thompson, Causality and Rights: Some Preliminaries, 63 Cm.-KENT 
L. REV. 471,481-84 (1987) (rejecting necessary condition account of causation and as-
serting that her position conforms to philosophical mainstream). Many legal economists 
also reject but-for causation. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD PosNER, THE Eco-
NOMIC STRUCTURE OF ToRT LAw 229 (1987) (arguing that notion of causation itself is 
largely dispensible in an economic analysis of torts); Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cawe 
and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 85-87 (1975) 
(questioning importance of but-for test). 
66. Malone, supra note 19, at 71 & n.25 (quoting LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXI-
MATE CAUSE 132 (1927)); Wright, supra note 28, at 1775. Cecil A. Wright, a Canadian 
torts scholar, estimated that fewer than one case in a thousand presents troublesome 
factual causation questions. Cecil Wright, The Law of Torts: 1923-1947, 26 CAN. B. REv. 
46, 58 (1948), cited in Willard H. Pedrick, Causation, the "Who Done It" Issue, and Amo Becht, 
1978 WASH. U. L.Q 645, 646 (1978). 
67. HART & HoNORE, supra note 29, at 123. 
68. Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927); Anderson v. Minne-
apolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920), overruled by Borsheim v. Great 
N. Ry., 183 N.W. 519 (Minn. 1921); Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 74 
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cause that is waiting in the wings to accomplish the same effect, as in 
the familiar hypothetical of A who shoots and kills B just as B is 
about to drink tea that has been poisoned by C. 69 Because there are 
at least two sets of sufficient conditions to bring about a harm in 
these instances of duplicative or preemptive causation, the usual 
but-for test does not help us identify the cause of the harm.70 In-
deed, strict application of the but-for test would absolve each causal 
candidate, an intuitively untenable result in most instances. 
The problem of counterintuitive results yielded by the counterfac-
tual but-for test in cases ofcausal overdetermination has led some 
commentators to advocate its abandonment,7 1 and others to advo-
cate substitution of an alternative test in instances of causal overde-
termination.72 Typically, proponents of total or partial 
abandonment of the but-for test have championed a substantial-fac-
tor formula in its place, under which the defendant's conduct is a 
cause of the harm if it is a substantial factor in producing that 
harm.73 They have heralded the substantial-factor approach for its 
avoidance of counterfactual inquiry. Leon Green, for t:xample, ad-
vocated the substantial-factor formula primarily to avoid counterfac-
tual inquiry, which Green believed "take[s] the eye off the ball" by 
focusing on what would have happened, instead of on what did hap-
pen.74 Of course, to the .extent that these advocates of the substan-
tial-factor formula have retained the but-for test for cases that are 
N.W. 561 (Wis. 1898); cf Corey v. Havener, 65 N.E. 69 (Mass. 1902) (involving two 
noisy motorcycles, either of which alone could have frightened the plaintiff's horse). 
69. E.g., Wright, supra note 28, at 1775. Preemptive causes can also beat the pre-
empted cause to the punch by overtaking it and neutralizing it. For instance, in a much-
discussed variant of the poisoning hypothetical, A puts poison in B's canteen before B 
sets out for a trip through the desert. C, thinking that the canteen contains pure water, 
steals it from Bin the desert. B dies of thirst. E.g., id. at 1802. The original source of 
this hypothetical is found in james A. McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REv. 149, 
155 n.25 (1925). 
70. In describing these as cases of duplicative causation and preemptive causation, I 
have adopted Professor Wright's terminology in lieu of such other labels as concurrent 
causes, additional causes, or alternative causes. See Wright, supra note 28, at 1775-76. 
71. See, e.g., LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE, 137-41 (1927). 
72. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS,§ 41, at 239-40 
(4th ed. 1971); William L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REv. 369, 375-
79 (1950). 
73. See supra notes 71-72. Leon Green ultimately became disenchanted with the sub-
stantial-factor test, although he was not willing to substitute the but-for test for it. See 
Green, supra note 19, at 553-58. The originator of the substantial-factor formula, Jer-
emiah Smith, intended it as a guide to rationalizing decisions relating to proximate 
cause. Smith considered the but-for test to be an appropriate test for factual causation 
except in certain causally overdetermined cases. Jerimiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions in 
Tort, 25 HARV. L. REv. 103, 108-10 (1911); see also Wright, supra note 28, at 1781. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts' treatment is particularly muddled. It adopts a 
substantial-factor formula, but it also requires that an actor's conduct be a necessary 
cause of the harm to qualifY· as a substantial factor, except in cases of two active forces 
operating concurrently where each is sufficient to cause the harm. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF ToRTS §§ 431-432 (1965). The Restatement also notes that even when the 
definition of legal cause includes the idea of but-for causation, a but-for cause may be 
deemed insufficiently substantial, and hence not a legal cause. /d. § 431 cmt. a. More-
over, the substantial-factor test, as describ~d by the Restatement, blurs the lines be-
tween factual causation and legal or proximate cause. See id. § 433. 
74. Green, supra note 19, at 556, 559-60. For similar criticism of the but-for test, see 
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not causally overdetermined, they have not eliminated a counterfac-
tual test of causation in most tort cases. 75 
More important, the substantial-factor approach is an inadequate 
solution to the causal overdetermination problem. First, it smug-
gles noncausal policy considerations, which normally are confined 
to the duty or proximate cause analysis, into the analysis of factual 
causation. 76 Second, the formula is either con tentless, or it rein-
troduces and complicates counterfactual inquiry. It directs the 
factfinder to measure the significance or substantiality of a particular 
cause against an unspecified yardstick. 77 To the extent that the de-
termination of substantiality is causal at all, the factfinder must mea-
sure substantiality of a cause either relative to an unexpressed 
(indeed, Deans Prosser and Green tell us an inexpressible) thresh-
old that divides substantial from insubstantial causes, or relative to 
other causes of the event. 
The first possibility suggests a quantitative approach under which 
we would designate as substantial any cause whose importance quo-
tient exceeded some agreed upon minimum. 78 But, if we cannot ar-
ticulate the idea of causal substantiality with some specificity, how 
can we expect to quantify it? 
generally Thode, supra note 19; Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A 
New Approach to Mixed Motive Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REv. 495 (1990). 
7 5. Indeed, the substantial-factor formula and its close kin, the dominant-motive 
test, which surface in a variety of settings including intentional interference with con-
tractual relations, malicious prosecution, and retaliatory eviction, do not escape the 
need for counterfactual analysis. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of applications of the two tests, see Weber, supra note 74, at 507-13. Obviously, I 
disagree with Professor Weber's conclusion that under these tests the "court's question 
[is] purely factual, not counterfactual." !d. at 513. 
76. The substantial-factor approach authorizes selection or ranking among neces-
sary causes on the basis of noncausal criteria. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS 
§ 433 (1965). The factfinder must determine not only that the conduct in question 
caused the harm, but also that it "played an appreciable part in the result." GREEN, supra 
note 71, at 134. For a critique of Green's approach, see HART & HoNORE, supra note 29, 
at 293-95; Wright, supra note 28, at 1782-84. Wright notes the irony of Green, who 
argued vigorously for the insulation of the factual causation issue from the policy issues 
that lurked behind the proximate cause analysis, readmitting noncausal policy consider-
ations into the determination of factual causation by use of the substantial-factor 
formula. !d. at 1782. 
77. Indeed, proponents of the substantial-factor formula acknowledge, sometimes 
even applaud, the formula's irreducibility to more definite terms. Leon Geen argued 
that the formula "cannot be reduced to any lower terms; it has no multiples." GREEN, 
supra note 71, at 137. Presumably, Green intended "factors" instead of "multiples." 
William Prosser contended that "[t]he phrase is sufficiently intelligble to any layman to 
furnish an adequate guide to the jury." Prosser, supra note 72, at 379. Green eventually 
concluded that the value of the substantial factor formula "is slight." Green, supra note 
19,at554. 
78. Inclusion in or exclusion from the community of substantial causes would oper-
ate much like the process of determining whether a child can ride on the go-karts at a 
carnival. We would, in effect, make a cause stand against the wall to see whether it 
reached some prescribed size. One might imagine a different, nonquantitative tech-
nique based on ideal types of substantial and insubstantial causes. Conceivably, we 
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The second approach suggests that we can rank contributing 
causes by importance. Because it is not obvious that there can be 
degrees of causal necessity, some scholars have argued that any talk 
of one necessary cause being more important than another is mean-
ingless. 79 Others contend that it . is possible to compare causal 
weight, but only by making counterfactual comparisons. They ar-
gue that to show that A was a more important cause of P than was B, 
we must show that "had B not occurred, something would have oc-
curred which more closely approximates P than had A not oc-
curred. " 80 As we multiply the number of causes to be compared, we 
also increase the complexity of the counterfactual task inhering in 
the effort to identify substantial ca1fses. Thus, unless the substan-
tial-factor formula is merely a means for using non causal criteria to 
select legally responsible causes,. it requires greater reliance on 
counterfactual inquiry than does the but-for test. Consequently, if 
the substantiality inquiry is to be causal at all, it must be so at the 
expense of expanding the counterfactual inquiry required by the 
but-for test. · 
We are thus thrown back onto a necessity notion,-of causation. 
Friends of this approach take either. of two tacks in response to the 
causal overdeterminatiori problem. Some, like the English philoso-
pher J.L. Mackie, attempt to refine, and thereby salvage, the but-for 
test. 81 
could compare causal candidates to ideal type substantial and insubstantial causes and 
determine substantiality by the strength of the analogy between the causal candidates 
and our ideal types. It is doubtful that factfinders use either technique in determining 
whether something was a substantial cause. 
79. See, e.g., Roy J. Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Negligence-Problems of Theory and 
Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ., L. REv. 293, 296 (1970); John Borgo, Causal Para-
digms in Tort Law, 8]. LEGAL STUD. 419,449-51 (1979); Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth 
of Objective Causation judgments in Liberal Political Theory, '63 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 579, 579 
(1987). 
80. See, e.g., RAYMOND MARTIN, THE PAST WITHIN Us: AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO 
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 78 (1989); Michael Hammond, Weighting Causes in Historical Ex-
planation, 43 THEORIA 103, 110-27; Andrus Pork, Assessing Relative Causal Importance in 
History, 24 HIST. & THEORY 62, 63-69 (1985). 
81. Mackie explains, in the case of causal preemption, that although neither the pre-
emptive nor the preempted cause may'.be said to be a but-for cause of the result "de-
scribed in some broad way," the preemptive cause is a necessary cause of the result "as it 
came about." j.L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 46 
(1974); see a/so ROLUNS M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 689 (2d ed. 1969). Thus, to use the 
example of A who shoots and kills B just as B is about to drink poisoned tea, Mackie 
would have us look for a completed causal story to determine the cause of B 's death. 
We can complete the causal story that includes the shooting of B using conditions that 
actually occurred-a bullet entering B's body and his subsequent death. We cannot sim-
ilarly trace the causal story that includes the poisoning of B's tea to its completion using 
conditions that actually occurred. Therefore, Mackie would conclude that A's act, but 
not the poisoner C's, was a but-for cause of B's death as it came about. MACKIE, supra, at 
46. 
Mackie must adopt a different strategy to deal with duplicative causes. In such cases, 
because "even a detailed causal story fails to discriminate between the rival candidates 
for the role of cause, we cannot say that one rather than the other was necessary in the 
circumstances even for the effect as it came about." /d. at 4 7. Instead, Mackie concludes 
that neither causal candidate singly was a cause of the event, but that the conjunction of 
the duplicative causes was a but-for cause. !d. For a similar treatment of causal overde-
termination, see C. BEHAN McCULLAGH, JUSTIFYING HISTORICAL DESCRIPTIONS 178-81 
(1984). 
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Alternatively, some have salvaged the notion of causal necessity 
by subordinating it to the requirement of causal sufficiency. Profes-
sor Richard Wright has articulated this approach most fully and 
clearly. 82 Following the suggestion ofHart and Honore, he adopts 
a "necessary element of a sufficient set" (NESS) test of causation.83 
Under this approach a condition is a cause of some outcome "if and 
only if it was a necessary element of a set of antecedent actual conditions that 
was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence. " 84 
To examine these attempts by proponents of the substantial-fac-
tor test to avoid counterfactual questions, we need not decide be-
tween Mackie's and Wright's accounts of causation. The important 
points are that the substantial-factor test fails to avoid counterfac-
tual questions and that both Mackie's and Wright's accounts de~ 
scribe causation in terms of causal necessity and therefore, as each 
recognizes, in terms of counterfactual inquiry.s5 
zt. Informed Consent 
Another attempt at counterfactual avoidance by reframing a legal 
question appears in medical informed consent cases. An element of 
a plaintiff's medical informed consent case is the causal connection 
between the physician's nondisclosure of medical risks and the 
plaintiff's harm. The patient must prove not only that the proce-
dure consented to caused the harm, but also that had the physician 
82. See Wright, supra note 28. 
83. See id. at 1788; see also Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, 
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73 
IowA L. REV. 1001, 1019 (1988). Professor Wright credits H.L.A. Hart and Tony Ho-
" nore as the originators of the necessary element of a sufficient set (NESS) test of factual 
causation. HART & HoNORE, supra note 29, at 111-17, 122-25, 128-29. J.L. Mackie sub-
sequently formulated a similar test, the insufficient but necessary element of an unneces-
sary but sufficient set (INUS) test. MACKIE, supra note 81, at 60-63. As described above, 
however, Mackie's approach actually is to apply a revised version of the but-for test to 
solve the problem of causal overdetermination. See supra note 81 and accompanying 
text. 
84. Wright, supra note 28, at 1790. The NESS test resolves the problem of causal 
preemption by requiring that the causal candidate be a member of a set of actual antece-
dent conditions that was sufficient for the injury. For example, in the case of A who 
shoots and kills B just as B is about to drink tea poisoned by C, A's act was a necessary 
element of a set of actual antecedent conditions that was sufficient to cause B's death. 
C's poisoning of the tea, however, was not a necessary element of a sufficient set of 
actual antecedent conditions because B did not drink the tea; it was not an actual condi-
tion. /d. at 1794-95. C's poisoning of the tea was not necessary for the sufficiency of the 
set of conditions that included A's shooting of B. 
The NESS test resolves the duplicative causation cases by requiring only that a cause 
be a necessary element of a sufficient set of actual antecedent conditions. It recognizes 
that there may be m·ore than one such set of actual antecedent conditions that is suffi-
cient to cause the consequence, and thus more than one cause that satisfies the NESS 
test. /d. at 1791-94. · 
85. Our counterfactual questions will look different, however, depending on whose 
account of causation we adopt. 
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disclosed the risk, he would have declined to undergo the proce-
dure.86 This second (counterfactual) element of proof has been 
termed "decision causation. " 87 Most courts facing this question of 
decision causation have decided that it should be determined under 
an objective standard-whether a prudent person in the patient's 
position would have submitted to the procedure if he had been in-
formed adequatdy.88 They have cast the question in these objective 
terms rather than in terms of the decision that the patient would 
have made because of the belief that the latter question requires the 
factfinde:r to decide whether to credit the plaintiff's "speculative an-
swer to a hypothetical question."89 These courts recognize that the 
plaintiff's resolution of the counterfactual question will be tinged 
with regret that the undisclosed hazard has materialized, and with 
self-interest in the result of the litigation.9° Consequently, these 
courts fear that the factfinder will be unable to evaluate the question 
of causation posed in subjective terms.91 Of course, the shift from a 
subjective to an objective standard alters, but does not eliminate, 
the counterfactual.92 
b. Avoidance by Burden Shifting 
In cases of causal uncertainty93 it is difficult, and sometimes im-
possible, to decide which among two or more rival causal candidates 
actually caused the harm.94 Courts sometimes resolve the causal 
uncertainty dilemma by shifting the burden of proof to the defend-
ant to negate a presumption of causation. Sometimes courts shift 
86. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d I, 11-12 (Cal. 1972). 
87. Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of 
Recent Legislation, 41 U. PnT. L REv. 407, 438-39 (1980); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. 
Cohen, lnfonned Decision Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 
U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 617. 
88. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787. 
89. !d. at 791. 
90. See, e.g., id. at 790-91; Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 11-12. Most courts that have faced the 
issue have adopted an objective test. Twerksi & Cohen, supra note 87, at 614 n.28 8c 615 
n.3 L But see Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979). 
91. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at II. 
92. The subjective and the objective tests are both "but-for" tests. Meisel 8c 
Kabnick, supra note 87, at 440. Thus, the move from a subjective to an objective test 
recasts the counterfactual, but does not avoid it. Professors Twerski and Cohen propose 
another avoidance strategy. They would reframe the informed choice action from one 
centering on personal injury to one focusing on the deprivation of the right to partici-
pate in the decisionmaking process. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 87, at 648-65; cf 
Gouse v. Cassel, 561 A.2d 797 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), (holding that physician's failure to 
obtain informed consent constitutes a baHery requiring no proof that patient would not 
have consented had he been informed of the risks), petition to appeal granted, 569 A.2d 
1367 (1990). 
93. Although causal overdetermination creates uncertainty as to the actual cause of 
an event, I intend the phrase "causal uncertainty" to describe instances where it is diffi-
cult to determine which causal candidate caused the harm, but where there is no reason 
to suspect causal overdetermination. Cases of causal overdetermination, as we have 
seen above, involve either duplicative causes or causal preemption. See supra notes 67-69 
and accompanying text. 
94. We experience causal uncertainty when it is as likely as not that the causal candi-
date advanced in litigation was not a cause pf the harm even if we cannot describe its 
causal rival beyond denominating it "cause unknovv'n." 
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the burden of proof to undo the normal consequences of the plain-
tiff's inability to identify the cause of his harm. In a second line of 
cases, however, courts shift the burden of proof to avoid an individ-
ualized counterfactual inquiry by substituting in its stead a genera-
lized solution to the counterfactual. 
A classic example of the first kind of burden shifting is Summers v. 
Tice. 95 There, two hunters, both using the same gauge shotgun and 
same size shot, both negligently fired in the direction of the plaintiff. 
A shotgun pellet, fired by one of the hunters, lodged in the plain-
tiff's eye.96 The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that both 
defendants were negligent and, unable to determine whose shot hit 
the plaintiff, awarded judgment against both of them.97 The Cali-
fomia Supreme Court, holding that under the circumstances the 
burden of proof properly shifted to the defendants to disprove cau-
sation, affirmed the judgment.98 
Informed choice claims grounded in the defendant's nondisclo-
sure of a material fact and misrepresentation claims often share with 
cases like Summers this characteristic of causal uncertainty. In such 
cases, the factfinder must select between two (or sometimes more) 
rival explanations for the harm: the defendant's nondisclosure (or 
misrepresentation) and the plaintiff's desire to undergo the proce-
dure (or to buy Florida swampland, or whatever), a desire that 
would not have· been deterred by an adequate and accurate disclo-
sure by the defendant. 
In some of these cases courts will impose a burden-shifting pre-
sumption of causation. For example, in products liability failure to 
wam cases, but not in medical informed consent cases, many courts 
will apply a rebuttable presumption "that the consumer would have 
re~d any warning provided by the manufacturer, and acted so as to 
minimize the risks."99 In effect, by assuming causation the court 
95. 199 P.2d I (Cal. 1948). 
96. /d. at 1-2. 
97. See id. at 2-3. 
98. /d. at 4; see also Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
912 (1980); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970); Malone, supra note 19, 
at 71. in Summers, the California Supreme Court did not try to resolve the counterfac-
tual, but rather tried to undo the consequences of the inability to determine causation. 
99. Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.) (applying Texas law), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); see also Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388 
N.E.2d 541, 555 & n.12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute 
First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 358 
N.E.2d 974 (1976); Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 376 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1978); Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 516-17 (N.D. 1989); Technical Chern. Co. v. 
Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972); Menard v. Newhall, 373 A.2d 505, 506 (Utah 
1977). But see Sheehan v. Pima County, 660 P.2d 486,489 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (refus-
ing to apply presumption in polio vaccine context because of remote chance of harmful 
effects and fact that vaccine had approval of federal government and National Academy 
of Pediatrics); Potthoffv. Alms, 583 P.2d 309, 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding plain-
tiff not entitled to presumption, at least in case where dangerousness of product, an 
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avoids, at least in the first instance, the need to make a particular-
ized counterfactual inquiry. Instead, particularly in the products lia-
bility failure to wam cases, the coun imposes a generalized finding 
on a class basis of how things would turn out in a counterfactual 
world. Of course, the presumption is rebuttable: particularized evi-
dence showing that it should not apply in an individual case win 
restore the particularized counterfactual inquiry. For instance, evi-
dence in warning cases that the plaintiff knew of the danger and 
nonetheless willingly encountered it will suffice to :rebut the pre-
sumption against the defendant on the issue of causation. 100 
Courts only sometimes resort to burden shifting. For every in-
stance where the court shifts the burden of proof regarding causa-
tion there are many instances where they let it remain with the 
plaintiff. Attempts to rationalize this decisional law are 
unpersuasive. 101 
c. Avoidance by Burying the Question: jury Questions and _Multifactor 
Analyses 
Courts often evade the counterfactual question by leaving it to the 
jury. 102 That strategy fails to avoid the counterfactual inquiry or to 
resolve the question of how to answer it. Instead, it merely hands 
the problem to the jury, which, as a "black box" decisionmaker, 
presents its judgment with little accountability fo:r its analysis of the 
counterfactua1. 103 Similarly, Professor Thode, an opponent of the 
but-for analysis of factual causation in tort, advocated that courts 
earth scraper, was obvious). For criticism of the read and heed presumption, see Hen-
derson & Twerski, supra note 61, at 278-79, 303-10, 325-26; Twerski & Cohen, supra 
note 87, at 624-26. For further discussion, see infra notes 149-50 and accompanying 
text. 
100. E.g., Thomas v, Baltimore & O.R.R., 310 A.2d 186 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) 
(finding presumption rebutted by evidence of plaintiff's knowledge of danger even in 
absence of warning signs). Similarly, evidence that plaintiff did not read the labels or 
materials that should have contained an adequate warning or instruction will suffice to 
rebut the presumption. E.g., Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 850-51 (La. 1987) 
(denying recovery to plaintiff who had not read automobile owner's manual, despite 
inadequate warning contained therein). 
101. In his classic discussion of factual causation, Professor Malone argued that 
courts base their decisions to lower or shift the burden of proof on causation on the 
policies underlying the substantive claims of the litigants. Malone, supra note 19, at 71-
88. Professor Wright shows that Malone's attempt to rationalize the cases in terms of 
underlying substantive law policies is unpersuasive. Instead, he argues that the courts in 
these cases typically are applying principies that underiie the actual causation require-
ment, rather than those underlying the substantive law in question. Wright supra note 
28, at 1809-13. 
102. E.g., Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 1487, 1496 (D.NJ. 1988) 
(Stating that whether habitual smoker who had heard, but discounted, information 
about the dangers of smoking would have altered her behavior had cigarette manufac-
turer warned of risks of smoking before 1966 was question for jury), a.ff'd in pm·t and rev 'd 
in part, 883 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 1386, restored to calender for 
reargument, 116 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1991). 
103. A. Leon Higginbotham,Jr.,juries and the Death Penalty, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 
1047, 1051 (1991) (describing jury decisions as a "collective hunch" and obscured from 
public view as "black box decisions"); cf. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIA-
BlLITY L\W I 06 (1980) ('Judicial deference to the jury does not solve the proof 
problems lurking in the causation issue [in failure to warn cases]; it only removes them 
from public view."). 
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consider the counterfactual question as part of a multifactor analysis 
of whether defendant owed a duty to plaintiff. 104 Thode's solution, 
like that of delegating responsibility to the jury, fails as an avoidance 
technique and offers no guidance regarding how to evaluate the 
counterfactual. It merely "allow[s] the dilemma to slip unseen and 
unnoticed into the great sea of 'duty,' " by making the but-for in-
quiry one of many factors for the judge to weigh in deciding 
whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. 105 
d. Avoidance by Denying "Speculative" Remedies 
Finally, legal decisionmakers sometimes recast substantive law to 
avoid counterfactual inquiries. Courts and other legal deci-
sionmakers deny certain remedies to avoid what they consider to be 
speculatiVe valuation of the harms suffered. Traditionally, courts 
have been reluctant to remedy contract claims for expected losses 
that are uncertain or speculative. 106 
A similar lack of confidence underlies the NLRB's refusal to grant 
make-whole remedies to compensate employees for employer bad-
faith bargaining in violation of the National Labor Relations Act of 
1935 (NLRA). 107 The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an 
employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives 
ofhis employees." 108 When the NLRB determines that an employer 
has refused to engage in good-faith bargaining, its conventional 
remedy is prospective-an order to bargain in good faith in the fu-
ture. The Board's remedial approach leaves employees without re-
dress for forgone bargaining gains, enriches the employer by her 
postponement of bargaining, and weakens the process of collective 
b(!rgaining. 109 It encourages employer violation of the NLRA to 
104. Thode, supra note 19, at 429-30. 
105. Henderson, supra note 63, at 196-97 & n.30. 
106. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
107. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). Counterfactual avoidance is not the only theme in 
the Board's decisions denying the availability of a make-whole remedy. The Board also 
believes that its decision is compelled by the logic ofH.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 
99 ( 1970), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Board cannot compel 
an employer to agree to a particular bargaining agreement clause as part of its remedy 
for the employer's bad-faith bargaining. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 107, 109-10 
(1970). 
108. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). 
109. See International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 
1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir.) [hereinafter Tiidee Prods.] (recognizing that the NLRB's prospec-
tive order to bargain allows an employer to benefit from the initial avoidance of collec-
tive bargaining), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 (1970); Stephen I. Schlossberg &John Silard, 
The Need for a Compensatory Remedy in Refusal-to-Bargain Cases, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1059, 
1063-67 (1968) (arguing that the NLRB's denial of compensation for damages causes 
real financial injury to the worker, rewards the employer for violating the NLRA, and 
invites other employers to commit similar violations); Theodore]. St. Antoine, A Touch-
stone for Labor Board Remedies, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 1039, 1042 (1968) (arguing that the 
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capture the value ofpostponed bargaining concessions and to dissi-
pate employee resolve and support for the union as their bargaining 
representative. 110 
In a series of decisions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, NLRB 
trial examiners, the Board, and the United States Court ofAppeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit confronted the questions of 
whether a make-whole remedy was appropriate and, if so, how it 
might be valued. 111 The trial examiners in two decisions concluded 
that a make-whole remedy was appropriate and calculable,112 as did 
the D.C. Circuit under the limited circumstances presented in Tiidee 
Products. II 3 · 
The Board, however, refused to order make-whole relief in these 
and similar cases in part because it believed that such relief called 
for an overly speculative inquiry into the bargain that the union and 
the employer would have made. The Board explained its position in 
Ex-Cell-O, stating: 
Who is to say in a specific case how much an employer is prepared 
to give andhow much a union is willing to take? Who is to say 
that a favorable contract would, in any event, result from the ne-
gotiations? ... To answer these questions the Board would be 
required to engage in the most general, if not entirely speculative, 
inferences to reach the conclusion that employees were deprived 
of specific benefits as a consequence of their employer's refusal to 
bargain. i 14 
NLRA should grant employees reimbursements for lost wages and benefits that would 
have been obtained by collective bargaining). 
llO. Tiidee Prods., 426 F.2d at 1249. Professor Paul Weiler estimates that unions 
forced to rely on a court order to compel bargaining by the employer will obtain a first 
contract less than twenty percent of the time. Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Free-
dom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 361 n.31 (1984). 
Professor Weiler further notes that many unions that do obtain a first contract will fail to 
obtain any significant gains for all of their efforts to compel good faith bargaining. Such 
unions may have won a contract, but will have lost the hearts and minds of their mem-
bers, and they will face a difficult task mustering the necessary support for the next 
round of bargaining. !d. at 361. 
Ill. Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 914 (1970); Zinke's Foods, Inc., 185 
N.L.R.B. 901 (1970); Rasco Olympia, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 894 (1970); Ex-Cell-O Corp., 
185 N.L.R.B. 107 (1970), enj&rced, 449 F.2d 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Tiidee Prods., Inc., 
174 N.L.R.B. 705 (1969), enforced and remanded sub nom. International Union of Elec., 
Radio and Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1243 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 950 
(1970). 
112. Zinke's, 185 N.L.R.B. at 909-11; Ex-Cell-O, 185 N.L.R.B. at 124-29. The trial ex-
aminers in both cases ruled that the amount of damages should be determined in a 
supplemental hearing before the Board. Zinke's, 185 N.L.R.B. at 911-12; Ex-Cell-O, 185 
N.L.R.B. at 126-29. 
113. 426 F.2d at 1253. The court described Tiidee Products' refusal to bargain as "a 
clear and flagrant violation of the law," and its objections to the election in which its 
employees had selected the union as their bargaining representative as "patently frivo-
lous." !d. at 1248. By contrast, the court, in sustaining the Board's refusal to grant a 
monetary remedy in Ex-Cell-O, described the employer's objections to certification of the 
union·as "fairly debatable," rather than "frivolous" or in "bad faith." Ex-Cell-O Corp. 
v. NLRB, 449 F.2d 1058, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
114. Ex-Cell-O, 185 N.L.R.B. at 110; see also Tiidee Prods., 194 N.L.R.B. at 1235 ("We 
know of no way by which the Board could ascertain with even approximate accuracy ... 
what the parties 'would have agreed to' if they had bargained in good faith."). 
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By casting the substantive law of remedies this way, the Board 
avoided counterfactual inquiry. 
e. The "Problem of Relevant Conditi(Jns" 115 
Opponents of make-whole relief also question its proponents' fac-
tual assumptions about the counterfactual world in which the em-
ployer bargained with the union. The good-faith bargaining 
requirement does not entail a statutory obligation to agree to any 
proposed term or to reach agreement at all. 116 Thus, given em-
ployer hostility toward the union and collective bargaining, they 
question the assumption that the employer, had it complied with the 
statutory duty to bargain, would have made any bargaining conces-
sions. 'ln his Tiidee Products dissent, Judge MacKinnon wrote that 
"the history of this case seems to make it clear that the most realistic 
prediction would be that the parties would not have agreed to any-
thing. Any other conclusion is difficult to reach in light of the Com-
pany president's 'antiunion animus' and the 'patently frivolous' 
objections to the election. " 117 
Judge MacKinnon's dissent raises the problem of relevant condi-
tions-the question of what facts may we accepi: as i:rue about a 
counterfactual world. Seldom does the counterfactual's consequent 
follow from the antecedent alone as a matter of logical implication. 
Instead, in the counterfactual world, the antecedent implies the con-
sequent only in conjunction with other attendant circumstances. 
Thus, we evaluate counterfactuals in terms of whether the antece-
dent, coupled with our other true premises, leads by way of a valid 
argument to the consequent. 118 Yet a false antecedent will require 
other changes in our counterfactual world. Certain facts about the 
acfual world cannot be asserted once we introduce the counterfac-
tual antecedent. They are not, to use Nelson Goodman's term, 
"cotenable" with the antecedent. 119 
115. The phrase "the problem of relevant conditions" is Nelson Goodman's. 
GOODMAN, supra note 10, at 9-17, 36-37 & n.5. 
116. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 106-08 (1970). 
117. Tiidee Prods., 426 F .2d at 1256 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
118. GooDMAN, supra note 10, at 36-37; DAVID K. LEWIS, CouNTERFACTUALS 63, 68-69 
(1973). 
119. GooDMAN, supra note 10, at 14-17. David Lewis notes that if we consider the 
counterfactual "if kangaroos had no tails they would topple over": 
1992] 
We might think it best to confine our attention to worlds where kangaroos 
have no tails and everything else is as it actually is; but there are no such 
worlds. Are we to suppose that kangaroos have no tails but that their tracks 
in the sand are as they actually are? Then we shall have to suppose that 
these tracks are produced in a way quite different from the actual way. Are 
we to suppose that kangaroos have no tails but that their genetic makeup is 
as it is? Then we shall have to suppose that genes control growth in a way 
quite different from the actual way (or else that there is something, unlike 
anything there actually is, that removes the tails). And so it goes; respects of 
363 
Counterfactuals perplex us partly because of the problem of rele-
vant conditions, of deciding which background facts should be part 
of the counterfactual world. Unlike the proponents of make-whole 
relief,Judge MacKinnon would not assume away the employer's un-
willingness to reach agreement with the union on terms acceptable 
to it or its members under counterfactual good-faith bargaining. In-
stead, Judge MacKinnon concluded that the likeliest outcome in 
such a counterfactual world would be no contract, and hence no loss 
to make whole. A more optimistic prediction of what Tiidee Prod-
ucts "would have agreed to"120 could not be sustained by the con-
junction of the counterfactual antecedent and the background facts 
of the case, and must instead reflect a normative judgment of what 
the employer "should have agreed to." 121 But such a judgment is 
clearly an impermissible basis for a remedy under H.K. Porter. 122 
2. Attempts to Resolve the Counterfactual Qpestion 
Legal decisionmakers attempt to avoid only some counterfactual 
questions, and as described above,i 23 they sometimes sin;1ply substi-
tute one counterfactual question for another. Can we'draw on the 
cases in which courts squa:r:-ely confront counterfactual questions to 
analyze and criticize what courts do with them? 
Obviously, if counterfactuals (at least implicit ones) are as perva-
sive in legal decisions as I contend, there ought to be a wealth of 
decisions to draw upon. And there are cases that we might fruitfully 
analyze to sharpen our sense of how legal decisionmakers try to re-
solve counterfactual questions. Yet, the nature of the legal records 
that we typically study and of counterfactuals themselves limit our 
ability to generate a Restatement of Counterfactuals. 
There is at once too little and too much out there. To begin, the 
most readily available records of legal decisionmaking are appellate 
opinions. Although the task of resolving legal counterfactuals typi-
cally falls to the legal factfinder, rules of appellate review discourage 
exhaustive scrutiny of the factual findings .124 Furthermore, if 
similarity and difference trade off. If we try too hard for exact similarity to 
the actual world in one respect, we will get excessive differences in some 
other respect. 
LEWIS, supra note 118, at 9. 
120. Tiidee Prods., 426 F.2d at 1256 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting). 
121. /d. 
122. See id. Although Judge MacKinnon writes specifically of the circumstances of 
Tiidee Products, presumably he.would reach the same conclusion about any employer 
that met the conditions of Tiidee Products, i.e., where the employers resistance to bargain-
ing was based on "patently frivolous" objections to certification and constituted "a clear 
and flagrant violation of the law." /d. at 1248. 
123. See supra notes 73 & 80 and accompanying text. 
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("Findings offact [by a trial court] ... shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous."); see also 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2585, at 729 (1991) (stating that tria) court's findings of fact 
must be treated as "presumptively correct"). Often, where the reviewing court con-
fronts the counterfactual question, the trial court has granted a summary judgment mo-
tion or a motion to dismiss, and the factual context has not been developed by a full-
fledged trial. In other instances, the court's· decision may address the nature of the 
counterfactual question dictated by the substantive law, but not the question of how to 
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counterfactuals are condensed arguments, as J .L. Mackie argues, 125 
then there are as many plausible or implausible, successful or unsuc-
cessful resolutions of counterfactuals as there are plausible or im-
plausible and successful or unsuccessful kinds of arguments. There 
are, in other words, too many legal counterfactuals out there to cata-
logue by genus and species. Nevertheless, it is possible to glean 
something more modest than a restatement from some cases involv-
ing counterfactuals. 
a. Counteifactuals Implicating Scientific Knowledge 
We typically demonstrate our greatest confidence in our ability to 
resolve counterfactuals when they may be answered with reference 
to laws· of nature. We are apt to credit expert testimony that applies 
scientific knowledge to counterfactual questions without concern 
about the uncertainty of hypothetical events. We will credit, for ex-
ample, expert testimony that an alternative design of a car frame 
would have prevented a fixed pole from a penetrating plaintiff's car 
more than 9.9 inches, thereby preventing serious injury, 126 or that a 
defendants' eighteen-hour delay in procuring medical attention for 
plaintiff's decedent probably caused his pneumonia and eventual 
death. 127 
determine which of two competing accounts of the counterfactual ought to be believed. 
For example, in informed consent cases there are several decisions dealing with whether 
a subjective or objective standard applies in determining decision causation. See, e.g., 
supra notes 86 & 90. Those cases, in other words, decide whether part of the plaintiff's 
case is a showing that if the physician had adequately informed her of a particular mate-
rial risk she would have foregone the treatment that resulted in her injury, or a showing 
that a reasonable person under like circumstances would, if adequately informed, have 
foregone the treatment. There are almost no published cases that review a factfinder's 
resolution of either form of the informed consent decision causation counterfactual. But 
see Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 83 (Ariz. 1965) (overturning award of damages for 
informed consent claim growing out of cataract surgery where after initial medical mis-
hap the plaintiff consented to cataract operation on the other eye with another surgeon); 
Smith v. Auckland Hosp. 1965 N.Z.L.R. 191 (1964) (finding on appeal that plaintiff 
would not have consented to operation had he been informed of risk of loss ofleg). In 
one of the leading informed consent cases, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), the plaintiff alleged, among other things, that he 
had not given informed consent for his operation, a laminectomy. !d. at 778. Canter-
bury lost on retrial after the defendants showed that he had submitted to a subsequent 
laminectomy, despite the bad consequences of his first one. See LAw, SciENCE AND 
MEDICINE 383 Oudith Areen et al. eds., 1984). 
125. MACKIE, supra note 81, at 53-54; MACKIE, supra note 20, at 86-89. 
126. Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 958 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
959 (1981). 
127. Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 104 N.E.2d 872, 876 (N.Y. 1952); cJ. Barnett v. 
Chelsea & Kennington Hosp. 1 All E.R. 1068 (QB. 1967) (determining that doctor's 
negligent failure to admit patient was not cause of death by arsenic poisoning because 
poison would have killed patient before diagnosis and treatment could have occurred); 
see also Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Toomey, 521 So. 2d 971, 972-74 (Ala. 1988) (finding 
relevant expert testimony that alternative design of a motorcycle helmet face shield 
would not have clo.uded with condensation and obscured plaintiff's vision); Jackson v. 
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Of course, circumstances may undermine our confidence in ex-
pert medical or scientific testimony. The expert's conclusions may 
rest on questionable or unspecified factual assumptions, I28 or on 
statistical evidence relating to broad classes of events rather than on 
the specific circumstances underlying the case at hand.I 29 Opposing 
experts may dispute the condusions,I 30 or the conclusions simply 
may be highly speculative with little grounding in fact.I 31 Neverthe-
less, we often credit counterfactuals that rest on applications oflaws 
of science. 
Why are we more receptive to counterfactuals relating to laws of 
nature than to ones concerning human reactions and behavior? M-
ter all, few of us are scientists, and scientific explanations are often 
complex and beyond the ken of the layperson-hence the need for 
expert testimony (and translation). Moreover, each day we make 
many predictions drawn from our generalizations about human be-
havior, ranging from expectations about how other drivers will be-
have to predictions about what our bosses, coworkers, neighbors, 
spouse, or children will say or do in particular situations. 132 
Although we may make certain scientific predictions-we look to the 
East to see the sun rise, to the West to see it set-we doubtless feel 
more confident about our overall ability to generalize about and 
predict human behavior. 
Perhaps their inaccessibility is part of the appeal of counterfactu-
als that rely on scientific principles. If we must engage in this preca-
rious business of resolving counterfactuals, why not delegate the 
task, and the responsibility for error, to someone else (the expert), 
something we cannot do when we all have access to the knowledge 
Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Mo. 1986) (en bane) (finding relevant 
expert testimony that had landlord provided speed bump in its apartment building 
driveway, bicycle that hit plaintiff would have been traveling at a quantifiably slower 
speed at moment of impact); Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474, 475 
(Wash. 1983) (en bane) (involving expert testimony that had defendant diagnosed plain-
tiff's husband's lung cancer six months sooner he would have had a 39% change of a 
five-year survival, instead of the 25% chance that he had when he was diagnosed). 
128. See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 480 (Pearson, J., concurring) ("Dr. Ostrow testified 
that if the tumor was at Stage I in December 1974, the chance of survival was reduced 
from 39 percent to 25 percent. He did not, however, indicate the likelihood of the tu-
mor's being at Stage I in December 1974, either in terms of certainty, probability, or 
statistical chance."); see also Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d at 666 & n.I, 667-78 
(describing uncertain basis for assumptions relied upon by expert in calculating mini-
mum speed of bicycle that struck plaintiff). 
129. See, e.g., Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 475 (concerning testimony based on five-year 
survival rates for lung cancer patients with "stage I" and "stage 2" tumors). 
I30. See, e.g., id. (noting conflicting testimony of defendant physician). 
I31. See, e.g., Dunham, 104 N.E.2d at 876 (involving expert testimony that IS-hour 
delay before providing medical examination contributed to decedent's death of pneu-
monia seven days later). 
132. On prediction in everyday life, see j.H. HEXTER, THE HISTORY PRIMER 36-46, 
94-95 (1971). Others have commented similarly on the ability of participants in the 
legal process to predict the outcome of concrete cases. See HuGH STRETTON, THE PoLIT-
ICAL SciENCES 216-20 ( I969); Charles M. Yablon, The /ndetenninacy if the Law: Critical 
Legal Studies and the Problem of Legal Explanation, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 917,918-19 & n.6 
(1985). . 
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necessary to wrestle with the counterfactual question? 133 
Certainly, however, more than the instinct for evasion is at work 
here. The difference in our attitude stems largely from our belief 
that laws of nature, unlike other background facts, are not contin-
gent, and therefore escape the problem of relevant conditions or 
co tenability .134 We assume that laws of nature are unchanging and 
that they will operate in the usual way in a counterfactual world ex-
cept in those rare instances where the antecedent negates a law of 
nature. 135 Consequently, many philosophers give a special place to 
laws of nature in their accounts of counterfactuals. 136 They argue 
that what distinguishes laws from "accidental" generalizations of 
fact is qur willingness to accept the former as true not only for in-
stances where the law has been checked, but also for unverified in-
stances, including those instances where we apply the law to a 
counterfactual supposition. Thus, they argue, " 'accidental' univer-
sal propositions do not sustain counterfactuals in the way that causal 
laws do." 137 
Surely, however, the universe of causal laws is not restricted to 
laws of nature. We can make some lawlike statements about human 
conduct and behavior, at least if we frame them probabilistically. 
Yet we seem less willing to ground our counterfactuals in those 
133. On the modem tendency to abdicate decisionmaking responsibility, see gener-
ally JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE TYRANNY OF THE ExPERTS: How PROFESSIONALS ARE 
CLOSING THE OPEN SOCIETY (1970). 
134. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. 
135. "If pigs could fly ... " requires some revisions of our thinking about biology, for 
instance. Legal counterfactuals do not involve antecedents that negate laws of nature. 
136. E.g., GooDMAN, supra note 10, at 19-20, 37-38; MACKIE, supra note 20, at 114-19; 
J.L.-Maclr..ie, Counterfactuals and Causal Laws, in ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY 66-80 (R. J. But-
ler ed., 1962); Chisolm, Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference, in CAUSATION AND CoN-
DITIONALS 145-55 (Ernest R. Sosa ed., 1975); Mackie, supra note 81, at 196-203. But see 
Lewis, supra note 118, at 72-77 (arguing that under possible worlds approach to 
counterfactuals we will typically consider worlds with the same laws as those of an actual 
world i to be closer or more similar to i than are worlds in which i's laws are violated 
because of the considerable importance we place on laws, but arguing, further, that in 
some instances worlds in which i's laws are violated occasionally may be closest possible 
worlds to i). 
137. MACKIE, supra note 136, at 66. We know accidental generalizations of fact, such 
as "all the coins in my pocket are silver," to be .true only by testing all existing cases, and 
when we entertain a counterfactual supposition that alters the extension of the general-
ization, we undermine the evidence for believing the generalization. /d. at 70-74; see also 
GooDMAN, supra note 10, at 19-22, 37-38. Goodman gives the following example: 
It is true that every person now in this room is safe from freezing. ·It is also 
true that every person now in this room is English-speaking. Now consider a 
certain Eskimo who is at this moment nearly frozen to death somewhere in 
the Arctic. If he were now in this room he would be safe from freezing, but 
he would not be English-speaking. What makes the difference? We may say 
that the generalization about safety from freezing expresses a causal rela-
tionship or follows from a law, while the generalization about knowledge of 
English is only contingently or accidentally true .... 
GooDMAN, supra note 10, at 37-38. 
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terms, and less wnfident about them when we do. This dissimilar 
treatment results from more than an exaggerated faith in the physi-
cal sciences. 138 It reflects our hesitance to relegate human actions 
to the deterministic realm of causal laws. Our flight from the equa-
tion of physical laws and laws ofhuman behavior sometimes leads to 
an overconfidence in our abilityto resolve legal counterfactuals in-
volving scientific questions and a corresponding underconfidence in 
our ability to resolve those concerning human responses to altered 
circumstances. 139 Inevitably, however, we rimstplunge into the task 
of imaginatively exploring human responses to an altered past to 
help us decide cases. 
b. Predictions About Human Behavior: Safety Device and Warning 
Cases 
Cases posing counterfactual questions regarding human re-
sponses to changed circumstances abound in many comers of the 
law. Cases involving the failure to provide safety devices or to give 
adequate warnings are a useful model. 
z. Demonstrating an Alternative Cause 
In some instances the factfinder resolves the counterfactual by 
identifying an alternative to the causal candidate proposed by the 
plaintiff as the cause of her harm. The defendant persuasively re-
sponds to the plaintiff's assertion that "if the defendant had acted 
reasonably (by providing the safety device, or whatever) I would not 
have sustained an injury," with its negation that "even ifi [defend-
ant] had acted the way you say I should have, you would have sus-
tained the same i~ury."I40 
For example, in Thomas v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 141 the plain-
tiff's decedent was killed by an oncoming train after driving onto a 
railroad crossing where the defendant had failed to post a statutorily 
138. For the debate on the claims of scientific knowledge and scientific explanation, 
see generally THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIEN-
TIFIC TRADITION & CHANGE (1977); THOMAS S. KuHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SciENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (1962); CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (lmre Lakatos & Alan 
Musgrave eds., 1970); Ian Hackling, 18 HIST & THEORY 223 (1979) (reviewing THOMAS 
S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION & 
CHANGE (1977)). 
139. For examples of courts' overconfidence in our ability to resolve counterfactuals 
involving scientific questions, see cases discussed supra notes 128-31 and infra note 322. 
For a discussion of the problems of ':iunk science" and of the availability of scientific 
experts willing to testify to i~s claims, see Peter Huber,junk Science and the jury, 1990 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 273. By his choice of examples, Huber suggests that plaintiffs alone de-
ploy junk science. For a useful corrective, see PAUL BRoDEUR, OuTRAGEous MiscoN-
DUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 53, 225-31 (1985) (describing questionable 
medical testimony on behalf of defendants in asbestos cases); see also Robert Blomquist, 
Science, Toxic Tort Law, and Expert Evidence: A Reaction to Peter Huber, 44 ARK. L. REv. 629 
(1991). 
140. Nelson Goodman describes such negations of the counterfactual as semifactuals. 
GooDMAN, supra note 10, at 5-6. 
141. 310 A.2d 186 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973). 
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mandated warning sign. 142 The plaintiff argued that: (A) the de-
fendant's failure to warn; (B) caused the decedent's continuing lack 
of awareness of the possible danger of the crossing; (C) which 
caused him to venture onto the tracks without looking for a train; 
(D) which caused the collision and his death, or A > B > C > D. 
To test this hypothesis, the court had to consider the counterfactual 
statement that if defendant had posted the required sign, decedent 
would have stopped, looked, and listened, and seeing the oncoming 
train, would not have proc~eded onto th~ tra<2_ks. Qausation would 
be shown by showing that A (not A) > B > C > D. 
Thomas lost because he could not overcome the evidence that im-
plied B-that the decedent, who had crossed the tracks at that cross-
ing on several other occasions, including once ten to fifteen minutes 
before the accident, was aware of the danger-as the events actually 
unfolded. 143 By establishing B, the defendant broke the supposed 
causal chain between the failure to post the sign and the accident, 
and showed that even if it had posted the sign, the accident would 
have occurred. It did so by substituting an alternative causal expla-
nation, the decedent's owri carelessness and inattention, for the 
accident. 144 
n. Counterfactuals Based on Proof of Habit 
Workplace accident claims often allege that the employer failed to 
provide the injured worker with necessary safety equipment or pro-
tective clothing. These claims raise the often easy causal question of 
whether the called-for device would have prevented the accident. 
They also raise an often more difficult question of decision causa-
tion:_ would the worker have used the safety device if it had been 
available? 
In these cases, evidence of the victim's habits, as well as evidence 
of the customs of the trade, help to resolve the counterfactual ques-
tion. For example, in McWilliams v. Sir William Arrol & Co., 145 a steel 
erector fell to his death from a steel structure in a Glasgow ship 
yard. The employer had not supplied safety belts on the day of the 
accident, although it had done so sometimes in the past. The House 
142. /d. at 187-88. 
143. See id. at 189. 
144. The cases in which a hotel or boarding house failed to provide adequate fire 
escapes or fire extinguishers, but the victim did not attempt to make use of such safety 
devices or could not have done so, suggest a similar analysis. See, e.g., Weeks v. McNulty, 
48 S.W. 809 (Tenn. 1898); cf Matthews v. Hysler Co., 854 F.2d 1166, 1168 (9th Cir. 
1988) (upholding directed verdict for defendant where plaintiff alleged that defendant's 
forklift's braking system was defective, but where evidence showed that plaintiff did not 
attempt to brake). See generally Malone, supra note 19, at 77-79 (discussing fire escape 
cases). 
145. [1962] l W.L.R. 295 (H.L.). 
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of Lords rejected the plaintiff's argument that it would be impossi-
ble for her to prove what her husband would have done in a particu-
lar unrealized hypothetical situation. Instead, in affirming the lower 
courts' dismissal ofhe:r claim, the Lords concluded that the evidence 
established with a high degree of probability that the decedent 
would not have worn a safety belt if one had been available. In 
reaching this conclusion they relied on evidence that the decedent 
had not worn safety belts in the past when performing this sort of 
work, and that the decedent's past practice conformed to that of 
most steel erectors to reserve the use of safety belts for more dan-
gerous jobs than that in which the decedent was engaged. 146 
m. Class-based Predictions, or Presumptions 
As noted above, 147 many jurisdictions apply a read and heed pre-
sumption in products liability cases in which the asserted defect is 
an inadequate warning or the failure to warn at all. 148 In effect, by 
presuming causation in such cases, the courts impose a class-wide 
counterfactual determination of how the plaintiff probably would 
have acted had the product carried an adequate warning. Relying 
on a premise that most consumers read and follow adequate warn-
ings-a premise that also underlies the Restatement's position that a 
product that bears adequate directions for use is not defective 149-
these courts conclude that, subject to particularized rebuttal evi-
dence, the probabilities favo:r a finding of causation. 150 
146. Jd. at 299-300 (Viscount Kilmuir); id. at 302 (Viscount Simonds); id. at 304-05 
(Lord Reid); see also Wigley v. British Vinegars, Ltd., [1964] A.C. 307, 322-23, 325-26 
(Viscount Kilmuir) (no causation shown where past practice of decedent window washer 
and industry custom indicate that window washer would not have used safety belt when 
cleaning window from ladder even if defendant had supplied hooks or bars to which belt 
could be attached); cf. Bwl v. Slough Metals, Ltd., [1974] I All E.R. 262 (affirming judg-
ment for foundry worker partially blinded by molten metal on theory that employer 
should have insisted that employees use goggles provided by employer and rejected by 
employees because of tendency to fog quickly and accepting trial judge's finding that 
plaintiff "was not the type of man who would have disregarded instructions if they were 
given personally and in a reasonable and firm manner and were followed up by 
supervision"). 
14 7. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
148. For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to distinguish between those 
jurisdictions that hold that the failure to warn gives rise to a read and heed presumption 
and those that hold that the plaintiff is entitled only to an inference of causation. See, 
e.g., Raney v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 897 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff not entitled to 
causation presumption, but pennitted to get to jury with an inference of causation). 
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 102.~L1"" cmt. j {1965) ("Where '.Varning is 
given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product 
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condi-
tion, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."). 
150. See cases cited supra note 99. Professors Henderson and Twerski criticize as 
grounded in a "seriously flawed" logic the view that the plaintiff's read and heed pre-
sumption ought to be allowed as the "mirror image" of the presumption enjoyed by 
defendants under comment j to § 402A. Henderson & Twerski, supra note 61, at 278-
79. They argue that "[c]ommentj never addresses the causation issue, as such, nor does 
it create any presumption of individualized causation benefiting defendants." !d. at 279. 
Their argument's logic is elusive. To be sure, comment j does not address causation. 
It is, however, based on the premise that where a risk is not patent to a substantial 
number of consumers of a product, and where. properly infonned of the risk a consumer 
may use the product safely, the defendant owes a duty to provide adequate warnings, 
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Similarly, modern rules of intestate succession are intended to ef-
fectuate the distribution preferences that the intestate decedent 
would have expressed had she written a will. 151 Obviously, these 
rules cannot predict the distribution preference of any individual 
decedent, but they are meant to reflect the preferences of the aver-
age intestate decedent. To the extent that they succeed, these rules 
should give a reasonably good answer in most cases to the 
counterfactual question about the decedent's preferences. 15 2 
3. Summary 
The approach of legal decisionmakers towards counterfactual 
questions is typically ad hoc and often unreflective. Inconsistency 
abounds. Attempts to avoid counterfactual thinking often mask the 
and having done so has discharged its duty because "the seller may reasonably assume 
that [a warning] will be read and heeded." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A 
cmt.j (1965). In other words, commentj assumes the premise that most consumers of a 
product read and act on adequate warnings. If that premise is correct, it is no less cor-
rect when asserted by a plaintiff to show causation. 
What about their second point, that commentj proves nothing regarding the individ-
ual case? Is this less true of any other presumption? When we invoke res ipsa loquitur 
to give rise to a presumption or inference of negligence, for example, we are not certain 
that there was negligence in the individual case, only that the type of accident involved 
usually occurs due to somebody's negligence. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, at 
244. If we had conclusive individualized proof, we would have no need for presump-
tions, but where our premise is that warnings usually will be read and heeded, can we 
not say, absent contrary evidence, that the individual plaintiff has demonstrated causa-
tion by a balance of the probabilities? 
Professors Henderson and Twerski's ultimate conclusion about the read and heed 
presulJiption might, nonetheless, be right. Although the courts are on firm logical 
ground in speaking of comment j and the read and heed presumption in one breath, 
they may be on shakier factual ground. The read and heed presumption and the com-
ment j no defect rule rest equally on a questionable and untested assumption that con-
sumers usually read and act on adequate warnings. There is no indication in the 
Restatement or in the Reporter's notes to§ 402A of the basis for this premise. Nor does 
the comment draw any distinction by product type, although intuitively it seems likely 
that consumer sensitivity to instructions for use or warnings might vary with product 
type. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the commentj language first appeared in the 
first tentative draft of§ 402A (then in comment f), which applied only to the' sellers of 
food, and that the committee of advisers retained the original language virtually un-
changed ("carrying such a warning" became "bearing such a warning" and "unreasona-
ble dangerous," no doubt a typographical error, became "unreasonably dangerous") 
through subsequent drafts. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j 
(1965) witlz RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961). 
Of course, one could also decide, as a matter of policy, not to apply strict liability in 
cases where an adequate warning is given, rather than rely on the assumption that most 
consumers will read and heed. 
151. See jOHN RITCHIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' ESTATES AND 
TRUSTS 85-86 (7th ed. 1988); Mary L. Fellows et al., Public Attitudes about Property Distribu-
tion at Deatlz and Intestate Succession Laws in tlze United States, 1978 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 
319, 323-24. 
152. For a criticism of the method used to discern intestate preferences, see Fellows 
et al., supra note 151. 
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imposition of unexamined counterfactual judgments under the illu-
sion of avoiding speculation. At other times we avoid such ques-
tions by fiat, declaring that the task is too conjectural and uncertain, 
without taking measure of either the real nature of the counterfac-
tual inquiry or the price we pay in .restricting the law's remedial 
powers. Our attempts to resolve counterfactual questions posed by 
law are sometimes equally unreflective. We hastily take refuge in 
our reliance on scientific experts or in uncritically assumed rules of 
thumb. 
Our intuitions may be good ones most of the time, despite all of 
our shortcomings in dealing with counterfactual questions. Yet, 
surely we can do better if we pay closer attention to what we ask of 
ourselves when encountering legal counterfactuals and to what we 
do when attempting to resolve (or avoid) them. One way to develop 
a better sense of what it means to talk counterfactually, and how we 
might do it well, is to examine other examples of their use. With 
that purpose, it will be helpful to consider how some historians have 
used counterfactuals in their work. · 
II. Counterfactuals in History 
A. The Relevance of Historiographic Examples 
Legal factfinders must describe and evaluate past events. They 
must reconstruct the past to assess causal responsibility, and they 
must construct alternative pasts to measure historical, present, and 
future consequences of past acts. 
Predictably, many commentators have noted resemblances be-
tween the work of historians and of legal factfinders. 153 Without 
falling prey to superficial analogies, one may say that historians and 
legal factfinders both attempt to recapture the past and to give an 
accurate and meaningful account of its unfolding. 154 In so doing, 
both often consider issues of causation in similar ways. Both often 
153. Numerous commentators have noted a relationship between historical and legal 
thought. See, e.g., R.G. CoLLINGWOOD, THE IDEA OF HISTORY 259, 268 ( 1946 paperback 
ed. 1956); RoBERT W. FoGEL & G.R. ELTON, WHICH RoAD To THE PAsT? Two VIEws OF 
HISTORY 13-15 (1983); HART & HoNORE, supra note 29, at 9-10, 62-64; DoNALD R. KEL-
LEY, FouNDATIONS oF MoDERN HISTORICAL ScHOU\RSH!P: L4.NGUAGE, LAw, AND HISTORY 
IN THE FRENCH RENAISSANCE (1970); WEBER, supra note 18, at 168; jOHN H. WIGMORE, 
THE SciENCE OF juDICIAL PROOF 980-93 (3d ed. 1937); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or 
the Event? On judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1388-90 
(1985); Nicholas Rescher & Carey B. Joynt, Evidence in History and in the Law, 56 J. PHIL. 
561 (1959). 
154. G.R. Elton has warned against overdrawn analogies between legal method and 
historical method. See FoGEL & ELTON, supra note 153, at 90-95 (discussing OscAR 
HANDLIN ET AL., HARVARD GUIDE TO AMERICAN HISTORY (1954)). Nicholas Rescher and 
Carey Joynt focus primarily on historical and legal approaches to evidence. Although 
they note the obvious similarities between the use of evidence in history and law, their 
primary purpose is to explore and explain the limits of the analogy. They note, in par-
ticular, the differences in standards of proof, and the restrictions on admissibility of 
evidence in law that are unparalleled in historical inquiry. Reschq& Joynt, supra note 
153, at 566-77. rc 
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attempt to assign causal responsibility and to trace the conse-
quences of particular acts. 155 Inevitably, both also encounter 
counterfactual questions. Perhaps, then, lawyers can learn some-
thing from the historians' experience with counterfactuals. 
Speculations about unrealized possibilities are hardly a new fea-
ture ofhistorical writing. We see them in Tacitus. 156 More recently, 
some historians, particularly, but not exclusively, economic histori-
ans, have considered elaborate counterfactuals in their explorations 
of the past. 157 Concomitantly, they have sparked an intense debate 
about the historian's use of counterfactuals. 158 
155. See HART & HoNORE, supra note 29, at 63; WEBER, supra note 18, at 168. Both 
historians and lawyers tend to find the scientific model of explanation inapplicable to 
their work. See HART & HoNORE, supra note 29, at 9. 
156. Tacitus wrote of the death ofGermanicus Caesar: "'Had he been the sole arbi-
ter of events, had he held the powers and the title of King, he would have outstripped 
Alexander in military fame as far as he surpassed him in gentleness, in self-command, 
and in all other noble qualities.'" THE ANNALS OF TACITUS, BooKs I-VI, at 172 (G.G. 
Ramsay trans., 1904), quoted in J.D. Gould, Hypothetical History, 22 EcoN. HIST. REv. 195, 
195 (2d Ser. 1969). Germanicus, the adopted son ofTiberius and the father of Caligula, 
died, allegedly by poison, before succeeding his father to the throne. 
157. In addition to those discussed below, other examples of historical work that use 
counterfactual analysis include: PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FED-
ERALISM, AND COMITY (1981); ALBERT FISHLOW, AMERICAN RAILROADS AND THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF THE ANTE-BELLUM ECONOMY (1965); ROBERT W. FOGEL, RAILROADS AND 
EcoNOMIC GROWTH: EssAYS IN EcoNOMETRIC HISTORY (1964); BARRINGTON MooRE,jR., 
INJUSTICE: THE SociAL BAsEs oF OBEDIENCE AND REVOLT 376-97 (1978); James Axtell, 
Colonial America Without the Indians: Counterfactual Reflections, 73]. AM. HIST. 981 (1987); 
ALFRED H. CONRAD & jOHN R. MEYER, The Economics of Slavery in the Antebellum South, in 
THE ECONOMICS OF SLAVERY AND OTHER STUDIES IN ECONOMETRIC HISTORY 43 (1964) 
[hereinafter EcoNOMICS OF SLAVERY]; joHN R. MEYER, An Input-Output Approach to Evalu-
ating British Industrial Production in the Late Nineteenth Century, in ECONOMICS OF SLAVERY, 
supra, at 183 (1964); Hugh Neuberger & Houston H. Stokes, The Anglo-German Trade 
Rivalry, 1897-1913: A Counterfactual Outcome and Its Implications, 3 Soc. Sci. HisT. 187 
( 1979); Robert P. Thomas, A Quantitative Approach to the Study of the Effects of British Imperial 
Policy upon Colonial Welfare, 25]. EcoN. HIST. 615 (1965); C. VANN WooDWARD, Reconstruc-
tion: A Counterfactual Playback, in THE FUTURE OF THE PAST (1989). 
158. "Some economic historians have embraced counterfactual tests with a display of 
open arms, others with arms openly displayed." David]. Loschky, Counterfactuals in Logi-
cally Formed Economic Analysis, 2]. EuR. EcoN. HisT. 421, 423 (1973). I will not rehearse 
the debate here. 
In addition to works cited elsewhere in this Article, important discussions of histori-
ans' use of counterfactuals include: SIDNEY HooK, THE HERO IN HISTORY: A STUDY IN 
LIMITATIONS AND PossiBILITY 119-50, 184-228 (1943); PETER D. McCLELLAND, CAUSAL 
EXPLANATION AND MODEL BUILDING IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND THE NEW ECONOMIC 
HISTORY 146-68 (1975); T.A. Climo & P.G.A. Howells, Possible Worlds in Historical Expla-
nation, 15 HIST. & THEORY 1 (1976) [hereinafter Possible Worlds]; T.A. Climo & P.G.A. 
Howells, Cause and Counterfactuals, 27 EcoN. HIST. REV. 461 (1974); Alfred H. Conrad & 
John M. Meyer, Economic Theory, Statistical1nference, and Economic History, in EcoNOMICS OF 
SLAVERY, supra note 157, at 3; Stanley L. Engerman, Counterfactuals and the New Economic 
History, 23 INQUIRY 157 (1980); Stefano Fenoaltea, The Discipline and They: Notes on 
Counterfactual Methodology and the "New" Economic History, 2 ]. EuR. EcoN. HIST. 729 
(1973); R.W. Fogel, The New Economic History: Its Findings and Methods, 19 EcoN. HIST. 
REv. 655 (1965); David ]. Loschky, Are Counterfactuals Necessary to "The Discipline and 
They"?, 4]. EuR. EcoN. HIST. 481 (1975); Hugh R. Trevor-Roper, History and Imagination, 
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No matter the discomfort counterfactuals may cause, historical ex-
planations-statements that attempt to describe the causes of an 
historical event-imply counterfactual statements. 159 Historical ex-
planations imply counterfactuals in the same manner that any causal 
explanation does. 160 Take, for instance, Max Weber's rather 
homely example of the temperamental mother who slaps her misbe-
having child and who, upon reflection, explains that she would have 
used milder discipline had she not already been upset by an argu-
ment with the cook. 161 The mother has offered an explanation for 
hitting the child: "K hit him, :rather than reprimanding him, because 
I was already agitated by the cook." To give this explanation, she 
must imaginatively remove the antecedent, her argument with the 
cook, and infer that she would have acted differently without it. Kn 
Weber's example she does this expressly. However, whether or not 
the historian makes the negation of the antecedent express, her 
statement that p caused q necessarily warrants the companion state-
ment that had p not occurred, neither would have q. 162 
in HISTORY AND IMAGINATION: EssAYS IN HoNOUR oF H.R. TREVOR--RoPER 356 (Hugh 
Uoyd-Sones et al. eds., 1981). 
Historians' counterfactuals have also prompted parody. See jAMES THURBER, 1f Grant 
Ha_d Been Drinking at Appomattox, in THE MIDDLE-AGED MAN ON THE FLYING TRAPEZE 132 
(1935) (Grant surrenders). Some years ago the television program Saturday Night Live 
ran a series of skits in which an "expert .. considered such historical counterfactuals as: 
what would have happened if Eleanor Roosevelt could fly. Best I can recall, she would 
have played a major role in the allied victory in the European Theatre. 
!59. Historians do much more, of course, than explain the past. Allan Megill has 
argued that history has four intertwined aims: interpretation, description, explanation 
and argument, and justification, and that "every work of history embodies these aims 
.... in differing degrees." Allan Megill, R_ecounting the Past: "Description," Explanation, 
and Narrative in Historiography, 94 AM. HIST. REV. 627, 627 (1989). Nevertheless, as 
Megill acknowledges, explanation has held a privileged status in historical writing. !d. al 
628. Megill recognizes but criticizes the privileging of explanation in academic culture. 
See also EDWARD H. CARR, WHAT IS HISTORY? 113 (1964) ("The study of history is a study 
of causes."); Climo & Howells, Possible Worlds, supra note 158, at l ("Most historians 
would acknowledge causal statements to be indispensable to their work."); Jarle Simen-
sen, Counterfactual Arguments in Historical Analysis: From the Debate on the Partition of Africa 
and the Effect of Colonial Rule, 5 HJST. AFR. 169, 169 ( 1978) ("Historical analysis is preoc-
cupied with causes .... "). It would be an exceptional historical work that does not 
contain causal explanations, if such a work exists at all. See FISCHER, supra note 2, at 166 
("There are, of course, many modes of historical explanation which are noncausal in 
nature. But I have never read an extended historical interpretation which does not in-
clude causal statements, or cryptocausal statements, in at least a peripheral way."). 
160. See supra notes 64-85 and accompanying text; Anthony Fiew, History: Fact and 
Contrary-to-Fact, 56 PHIL 578,578-79 (1981). As Barrington Moore notes, "any explana-
tion of what actually Look place connotes an explanation of why something else failed lo 
occur." MooRE, supra note 157, at 377. 
161. WEBER, mpra note 18, at 177 -78; see also RAYMOND ARON, GERMAN SOCIOLOGY 80 
(Mary Bollomore & Thomas Botlomore trans., 1957) (discussing Weber's example). 
162. WILLIAM DRAY, LAws AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY 104 (1957); ELSTER, supra 
note 35, at 17 5-76; WILLIAM ToDD, HISTORY AS APPLIED SciENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
STUDY II, 156 (1972); WEBER, supra note 18, at I 64, 184; Flew, supra note 160, at 578-
79. As john Murrin has written, "To explain his data, [the historian] must ask whether it 
could have fallen together in some combination other than what actually occurred. Only 
by posing this question can he decide which of his verifiable 'facts' were decisive and 
which were peripheral in generating the larger 'events' he hopes to reconstruct." John 
Murrin, The French and Indian War, The Amm"can Revolution, and the Counte1jactual Hypothesis: 
Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson andjolm Shy, I REVIEWS AM. HIST. 307, 308 (1973). 
374 [VOL. 60:339 
Counterfactuals in the Law 
TIIE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
In addition to offering causal explanations, historians often evalu-
ate particular decisions or courses of qmduct in light of available 
alternatives. Such evaluative judgments also necessitate counterfac-
tual thinking because one cannot say that a particular policy was 
mistaken without believing that a plausible alternative policy would 
have worked out better.I63 
If all historians' counterfactuals remained implicit in their work 
they would be of little interest to us here. Some historians, how-
ever, have made their counterfactual suppositions explicit. I pro-
pose to examine the following three examples 164 of such work to see 
what lessons they might hold for legal decisionmakers: John Mur-
rin's consideration of the thesis ascribing causal primacy for the 
American Revolution to the British victory in the French and Indian 
War; 165 Murrin's discussion of the possible causal relationships be-
tween the Revolution and the rash of evangelical religious excite-
ment and revivals known as the Great Awakening that swept 
163. Robert W. Fogel, Historiography and Retrospective Econometrics, 9 HIST. & THEORY 
245, 256 (1970) (noting that banishing counterfactuals from historical writing would 
entail prohibiting historians from writing such statements as: "'Woodrow Wilson mis-
calculated the consequences of his failure to appoint a prominent Republican to the 
delegation that represented America at the Paris peace conference' or 'Andrew Johnson 
played into the hands of his enemies by suspending Stanton and making Grant ad interim 
Secretary of War'"); Murrin, supra note 162, at 307 ("Every time a historian evaluates a 
particular decision or policy option in terms of contemporary alternatives, he is thinking 
counterfactually because he has to, unless he is prepared to assert that real choices did 
not exist in the past or that, if they did, historians should ignore them."). 
164. My selection of these particular examples from among numerous counterfactual 
histories necessarily slights other thoughtful works, but my choices are not merely an 
arbitrary exercise of personal preference. My choices are partly pragmatic. Examples 
drawn from American history are more accessible to me and, I assume, to most of my 
audience. So too are traditionally written counterfactual histories (admittedly some-
thing of an oxymoron), as compared to the highly quantitative economic modeling of 
such cliometricians as Robert Fogel, Albert Fishlow, or John Meyer. See supra note 157. 
Moreover, the constructions of actual and alternative pasts required by legal factfind-
ing typically resemble conventional histories more closely than they do the 
cliometrician's mathematized model building, making Murrin's and McKitrick's works 
more germane to a legal audience than the cliometricians'. There are, however, certain 
kinds of cases, such as United States antidumping law, where legal decisionmakers must 
draw on models of market behavior, and where the modeling methods of the 
cliometricians may be especially apL See An Economic Analysis of Dumping, USITC 
Office of Economics Memorandum, EC-J-457 (Dec. 2, 1986), cited in MichaelS. Knoll, 
United States Antidumping Law: The Case for Reconsideration, 22 TEx. INT'L LJ. 265, 286 
n.l15 (1987). 
Finally, the Murrin and McKitrick examples are especially useful for several reasons. 
They limit our focus to two moments in American history, the Revolution and Recon-
struction. They are well-argued, and in Murrin's case expressly attuned to theoretical as 
well as empirical issues. They demonstrate a variety of counterfactual questions, and 
they use a variety of arguments to sustain their counterfactual assertions ranging from 
Murrin's use of historical analogies to McKitrick's reliance on dispositional statements. 
165. Murrin, supra note 162. 
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through the colonies in the li 740s; 166 and iEnic McKitrick's compari-
son between Andrew Johnson's theory ofreconstmction and the ap-
proach toward reconstmction that Abraham Lincoln might have 
adopted had he not been assassinated. 167 This examination wiH 
show that we can divide historians' countenactuals into two catego-
ries-those that test causal assertions and those that explore unreal-
ized alternative outcomes-and that their treatment wiH depend on 
the category they belong to. 168 It will also identify the ways histori-
ans craft counterfactuals and the kinds of argument that they mar-
shal to challenge or support counterfactual assertions. 
B. john Murrin and the Causes of the American Revolution 
Xn a pair of counterfactual inquiries, John Murrin has examined 
two explanations of the American Revolution that find its causes be-
neath the surface of the imperial crisis that began with colonial 
resistance to the Stamp Act in 1765. By examining the counterfac-
tuals suggested by these explanations; Murrin seeks to demonstrate 
the limits of their explanatory force. 
Xn The French and Indian War, The American Revolution, and the 
Counteifactual Hypothesis: Reflections on Lawrence Henry Gipson and john 
Shy, 169 Murrin examines Gipson's thesis that the Revolution re-
sulted from British success in the french and Indian War. 170 After 
th::~t w::~r. G,reat Britain facer! the t::~slc ::~no exnense of administerimr ~~~t n~-~ North Am~~ic;-~ t~rri~o;i~;-~~d-~d-by france and Spain i~ 
the Peace of Paris, while Americans no longer faced the threat of a 
hostile french Canada along their borders. Thus, Britain had to ask 
the Americans to share the burdens of an expanded Empire pre-
cisely when their dependence on Bri.tain for protection had largely 
disappeared. These changes, Gipsori argued, caused Americans to 
reconsider imperial relations, and eventually led to indepen-
dence .171 Gipson recognized the counterfactual implications of his 
166. John M. Murrin, No Awakening, No Revolution? More Counteifactual Speculations, II 
REVJEWS AM. HIST. 161 (1983). 
167. ERIC L. McKITRICK, ANDREW jOHNSON AND RECONSTRUCTION 101-10 (1960). 
168. These categories parallel the principal types oflegal counterfactuals: causation-
testers and alternative histories that measure remedial needs. See supra notes 28-34 and 
accompanying text. 
!69. Murrin, supra note 162, at 307. 
170. Although Murrin rightfully ascribes the argument to Gipson, he also notes that 
Gipson did not originate the idea. It "antedated the Revolution itself by at least one 
generation." !d. at 309. In American Revolution historiography, "the Canada cession 
has emerged as a major cause of the Revolution across the entire interpretive spec-
trum." Jd. Noteworthy examples include CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE CoLONIAL BACK-
GROUND OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 124-25 (rev. ed. 1931 ); GEORGE L. BEER, BRITISH 
CoLONIAL PoLICY, 1754-1765, at 172-73 (1907). For a very different analysis of the 
causal link between the French and Indian War and the Revolution, see Jack P. Greene, 
The Seven Years' War and the American Revolution: The Causal Relationship Reconsidered, in THE 
BRITISH ATLANTIC EMPIRE BEFORE THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 85-105 (Peter Marshall & 
Glyn Williams eds., 1980). For another explicitly counterfactual treatment of the Can-
ada cession, see MORTON BoRDEN & OTIS L. GRAHAM, jR., SPECULATIONS ON AMERICAN 
HISTORY 3-!5 (1977). 
171. L"'WRENCE H. GIPSON, THE CoMING OF THE REVOLUTION xi (1962). The Peace of 
Paris also brought additions to the Empire outside of North Ame;-ica. !d. at !. 
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thesis. "Had Canada remained French after 1763, he asked, 'would 
not Americans have continued to feel the need as in the past to rely 
for their safety and welfare upon British sea power and British land 
power, as well as upon British resources generally?' " 172 Murrin 
tests Gipson's thesis by examining this counterfactual. 
Murrin approaches the problem in a number of ways. First, he 
notes that Gipson assumes that the French threat discouraged colo-
nial resistance to Britain and that its elimination would stimulate co-
lonial resistance. 173 He tests these causal assertions by examining 
various instances of British-colonial relations prior to the French 
and Indian War in which sometimes the French threat was manifest 
and sometimes it was absent. 174 Although he acknowledges that the 
earlier political behavior sometimes corresponds to the Gipson the-
sis, he also shows that that history is rich with local examples of 
political crises and unstable imperial relations when the French 
threat was strong, and of colonial quiescence in its absence. 17 5 
We can express symbolically a modified version of the Gipson 
counterfactual quoted above as: 
If P in situation S then Q, where: 
P = presence of French threat; 
Q = colonial loyalty to the British Empire; 
and 
S = the actual circumstances surrounding the relationship be-
tween Britain and the colonies modified only as necessary to per-
mit ~he supposition of the counterfact P. 176 
Murrin draws two sorts of comparisons that he intends singly and 
jointly to undermine Gipson's explanation. First, he shows in-
stances of: P in situations S 1 ••• S 7 and not Q. 177 This showing 
172. Murrin, supra note 162, at 308 (quoting Lawrence H. Gipson, The American 
Revolution as an Aftennath of the Great War for the Empire, 1754-1763, 65 PoL. Sci. Q 65, 
103-04 (1950)). 
173. Jd. at 310. 
] 74. Cf Pork, supra note 80, at 66 (stating that "confronted with the probiem of justi-
fication of the counterfactual statement, historians usually intuitively try to find for a 
comparison some other real situation ... which in some important respect is similar to 
the possible situation reflected in the counterfactual claim"). 
175. Murrin, supra note 162, at 310. 
176. This formula is a modified statement of the Gipson counterfactual because it 
conftates two causal steps in Gipson's analysis. Gipson argued that elimination of the 
French threat diminished colonial military dependence on Great Britain. Diminished 
military dependence in turn caused American disloyalty to the Empire. Murrin's com-
parison to earlier British-Colonial relations looks only to the ultimate conclusion: were 
imperial relations strained? 
177. S 1 ••• S 7 do not refer to variations on S. They are instead the actual circum-
stances surrounding imperial relations at the time and place of each of Murrin's 
counterexamples. 
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demonstrates that elimination of the French threat was not a neces-
sary cause of strained imperial relations because these strains oc-
curred when the French threat was quite real. This showing alone, 
however, is not fatal to Gipson's thesis because Gipson makes no 
claims about necessary causes. 178 Murrin's counterexamples, how-
ever, cumulatively w.eaken our faith in Gipson's explanation by 
showing several instances where an immediate and obvious French 
threat did not check colonial political crises. The counterexamples 
provoke us to seek alternative causal candidates that better explain 
imperial instability and colonial disloyalty than does removal of the 
French threat. 
Of course, the strength of our resultant skepticism depends on 
our agreement that Murrin has described his counterexamples accu-
rately (both as to the presence of the French threat in each instance 
and as to a concurrent breakdown in Imperial relations) and on our 
willingness to accept his counterexamples as apt analogies. In other 
words, is S sufficiently similar to S 1 ••• S 7 not only to cause us to 
disbelieve that removal of the French was a necessary cause of colo-
nial crisis, but also to disbelieve that it was a necessary .cause of such 
crisis under the circumstances presenting themselve5 after 1763? 
Murrin further challenges Gipson's thesis by offering a counterex-
ample179 of stable imperial relations in Virginia between 1720 and 
1753, a p~riod when that colony perceived no threat at its borders 
and had no overriding need for British military protection. 180 
Although his first set of counterexamples attacked Gipson's thesis 
indirectly, by challenging the count~factual that thesis implies, this 
counterexample takes on Gipson's '~xplanation frontally. Murrin's 
178. Historians seldom do. Typically, a historian's statement that X caused Y does 
not purport to state that only if X then Y. Rather, the historian means that in the partic-
ular situation that I have chosen to discuss, if you removed X and left everything else the 
same, then no Y. William Dray writes that: 
Whether or not the historian concludes that the suggested cause was a nec-
essary condition of what he wishes to explain, his argument for the conclu-
sion he in fact reaches need not raise the question whether the condition in 
question was a generally necessary one for the events of the type to be ex-
plained; for the historian's explanatory problem is not to represent a partic-
ular causal connexion as an instance of a recurring one. He does not ask 
himself, 'What causes Y's?'; he asks, 'What is the cause of this Y?'-and he 
asks this about a Yin a determinate situation .... It is true that the historian 
must be certain that without X, Y could not have happened, if he is to say 
without qualification that X was the cause of Y. But there is no need to as-
sume that the only way he could arrive at such certainty is by knowing a law 
of the 'only if' form. 
DRAY, supra note 162, at 103-04; see also K. Marc-Wogau, On Historical Explanation, 28 
THEORIA 215, 226 (1962) (describing historical explanation in terms of identifying 
"'necessary condition[s] post factum'"); C. Behan McCullagh, Book Review, 12 HIST. & 
THEORY 435, 439 (1973) (reviewing. WILUAM TODD, HISTORY" AS APPLIED SciENCE: A 
PHILOSOYHICAL STUDY (1972)): . . 
179. Here, but: not in the. preceding paragraph, my use of the term "counterexample" 
follows Raymond Martin's discussion of "historical counterexamples." RAYMOND MAR-
TIN, Tf(E PAST WITHIN Us 127-40 (1989). Martin contends that an important form of 
historical argument is the historical counterexample. Historians use these "to show that 
\the causal explanations they oppose, or seek to supplement, express insufficient causes of 
what they explain." /d. at 129. 
180. Murrin, supra note 162, at 310. · 
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counterexample shows that the absence or removal of the French 
threat alone was not a sufficient cause of the Revolution. lsi 
As is evident above, Murrin's critique of Gipson's thesis does not 
depend wholly on an examination of its counterfactual implications. 
In addition to the arguments described above, he analyzes the evi-
dentiary basis for the thesis. 182 Finally, Murrin challenges Gipson's 
contention that the elimination of France from North America made 
the Americans secure enough to contemplate independence. 183 
Whether or not Murrin delivers a knockout blow to the Gipson 
thesis, he at least casts strong doubt on it. In so doing, he reorients 
our perceptions of the Stamp Act crisis and other crises of British-
colonial relations that preceded the Revolution. 184 
181. Just as they seldom make claims to have identified universally (rather than con-
tingently) necessary causes, historians seldom make claims to have identified sufficient 
causes. See McCULLAGH, supra note 81, at 176-78. 
Again, the strength of Murrin's argument is dependent on the accuracy ofhis descrip-
tion ofVirginia's isolation from hostile threats from without its borders and of his char-
acterization of the colony's relations with Britain as harmonious, as well as on the 
closeness of the analogy to the colonial situation after the Peace of Paris. 
182. One of the appeals of the Gipson thesis, Murrin writes, is the availability of 
highly quotable contemporary authorities who anticipated the destabilizing effect elimi-
nation of the French from North America would have, or who attributed such causal 
responsibility in retrospect. Murrin, supra note 162, at 309. Murrin counterposes to 
these sources other contemporaries who denied that elimination of the French would or 
did undermine colonial loyalty, thereby showing that eighteenth-century voices did not 
constitute a single chorus prospectively endorsing the Gipson thesis. Jd. at 310; see also 
ROBERT W. TUCKER & DAVID C. HENDERICKSON, THE FALL OF THE FIRST BRmSH EMPIRE: 
ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 45 ( 1982) ("The leaders of the colo-
nial revplt denied with virtually one voice that the removal of the French from Canada 
had in the slightest degree affected their loyalty to the empire .... "). Murrin notes that 
various British and colonial spokesmen saw a different connection between imperial dis-
cord and the French threat. "Thus while Gipson and his sources contend that elimina-
tion of the Gallic Peril had to generate an imperial crisis, these other writers perceived 
an opposite connection." Murrin, supra note 162, at 311. 
183. Murrin notes that although France was no longer a presence on the continent, 
the French Canadians were. Americans saw the Canadians as a threat and consequently 
wanted stable imperial relations and a British military presence on the continent. Ulti-
mately, "the Revolution erupted despite general recognition that it would almost certainly 
produce another Canadian War." Murrin, supra note 162, at 311. 
Murrin argues that the Revolution rekindled fears of France with a twist. Following 
James Hutson, he writes that the Continental Congress hurried to declare independence 
on July 2, 1776, because its members feared (incorrectly) that, unless the Americans 
quickly declared independence, Great Britain would enter into a treaty with France and 
Spain offering partition of North America in return for their military assistance against 
the rebellion. Jd. at 311-12 (citing James H. Hutson, The Partition Treaty and the Declara-
tion of American Independence, 58 J. AM. HIST. 877 (1972)). 
184. "Instead of pretexts for the manifestation of a selfish American nationalism, as 
Gipson saw them, these particular crises again emerge as causes of the Revolution. 
Without them there would have been no revolution and no American nation, at least not 
in the immediate future." Id. at 312. 
With the substitution of one causal explanation for another, Murrin necessarily also 
substitutes one constellation of implied counterfactuals and counterfactual questions for 
those implied by the Gipson thesis. Murrin recognizes this, and he asks one of the more 
interesting counterfactual questions suggested by his analysis: could Britain have pur-
sued a colonial policy that would have avoided the Revolution? In what amounts to a 
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Ten years later, Murrin took another look at the causes of the 
Revolution in an essay entitled No Awakening, No Revolution? More 
Counterfactual Speculations. 185 In that essay he attempts to. clarify the 
causal role of the Great Awakening. Murrin notes that the terms of 
the debate had been set by Alan Heimen's book, Religion and the 
American 11/Jind. 186 Heimert argued that after the Awakening, Ame:r:i-
can Protestantism split in two. On one side we:re the friends of the 
revival, the evangelicals, or Calvinists. On the other side we:re its 
opponents, the antievangelicals, o:r liberals. Although Heime:rt dis-
claimed an intent to diagnose the causes of the Revolution or to 
show that any event :resulted from the Awakening, he linked Calvin-
ism and the evangelicals to the Revolution. 187 By contrast, liberals 
supported the politicai and social status quo, and, in Murrin's para-
phrase of Heimert, they "either resisted the Revolution or em-
braced it awkwardly and with reservations. " 188 
Mu:r:rin adopts the strategy of "obliterat[ing] the Awakening [to] 
then try to discover what remains in its absence." 189 After eliminat-
ing the Awakening he asks three questions: 
l) Would colonial resistance to British measures after 1763 have 
reached the point of armed rebellion by 1775? 2) Ifitbad, would 
the Revolution have turned out differently with no Awakening to 
draw upon? 3) With no Awakening, would the republic of 1800 
have been significantly different from the one we now love and 
study?l90 -
The first question, which he answers affirmatively, need not detain 
mere "sketch of counterfactual possibilities," and of an argument for their plausibility, 
he suggests that Britain may have squandered the opportunity to capitalize on the good 
will that it had won in the war and to avert an imperial crisis because it failed to learn 
from the lessons of successful colonial relations during the years 1758-62. Instead, after 
the war, Britain reverted to older assumptions about imperial relations that proved to be 
inadequate to the Empire's post-war needs. /d. at 312-16. 
Murrin reaches the opposite conclusions from those of John Shy, who poses similar 
questions in an essay considering the range of politically acceptable policy options open 
to Great Britain before the Revolution. John Shy, Thomas Pownall, Henry Ellis, and the 
Spectrum of Possibilities, 17 63-177 5, in ANGLO-AMERICAN POUT! CAL RELATIONS, 167 5-177 5 
(Alison G. Olson & Richard M. Brown eds., 1970). Shy concludes pessimistically that 
"the range of historical possibilities was very narrow," id. at 181, and that "[t]he impulse 
that swept the British Empire toward civil war ... did not admit of any real choice," id. at 
186. 
185. Murrin, supra note 166. 
186. ALAN E. HEIMERT, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN MIND: FROM THE GREAT AWAK-
ENING To THE REVOLUTION (1966). 
187. fd_ at 2L 
188. Murrin, supra note 166, at 161. 
189. 1d. at 162. Murrin accomplishes the goal of suppressing the Awakening by elimi-
nating from the scene the three men most responsible for it, George Whitefield, 
Jonathan Edwards, and Gilbert Tennent, before certain critical moments in their lives. 
!d. at ! 62-63. He also temporarily neutralizes John Wesley to remove his influence on 
the Awakening. /d. at 163. In so doing, he may reveal an ulterior motive for his essay: 
"As should already be obvious, one of the forbidden delights that such counterfactual 
musings can provide to ,any suitably degenerate mind is the invention of proper circum-
stances for dispatching the ... 'three men." 1d. · 
190. /d. at 163-64. 
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us. 191 Murrin approaches his second question-"would the Revolu-
tion have turned out differently with no Awakening to draw 
upon?"-by asking two subsidiary questions: first, whether the col-
onies would have been able to agree upon independence by July 
1776, thereby thwarting the last remote chances of a negotiated 
peace; and second, whether they could have won the war. 192 His 
primary strategy is to ask whether evangelicals were situated where 
their support for the Revolution might be decisive. For the most 
·part he concludes that they were noL 193 But here, at last, Murrin 
finds some evangelicals who seem to be strategically located to make 
an historical difference. 
Regarding the decision for independence, Murrin finds his poten-
tially critical band of evangelicals in New Jersey. He concludes that 
New Jersey poses "a fairly unequivocal case of [evangelical] New 
Lights dragging their fellows into independence and a bracing re-
publican vision of the future." 194 But what does this correlation 
suggest about counterfactual possibilities? One might conclude, he 
suggests, that without the Awakening, New Jersey's continued oppo-
sition to independence would have hardened resistance to indepen-
dence in other Middle Atlantic colonies,· and thus postponed or 
even prevented the Continental Congress' declaration of indepen-
dence. He concludes, however, that elimination of the Awakening 
almost certainly would not have had this effect. 195 
How does he argue for his conclusion? His argument is terse (two 
sentences) and somewhat obscure, but he seems to take two tacks in 
making his case. First, he asserts that by the Summer of 1776 the 
course of events had attained such force that independence was vir-
tually inevitable; "the logic for independence would almost certainly 
have prevailed eventually." 196 In other words; he proposes an alter-
nate causal candidate to Heimert's, or asserts, at the very least, that 
the decision to declare independence was causally overdetermined 
191. If evangelicals were more likely to resist imperial policy and to be more militant 
in their resistance than liberals, we should see a strong correlation between .the geo-
graphical intensity of the Awakening and the centers of patriot resistance. Murrin finds 
no such correlation; indeed in some instances he finds a negative correlation. Having 
found no evidence of a causal connection between the Awakening and the Revolution, 
he need not explore further the counterfactual possibilities suggested by such an expla-
nation of the Revolution. !d. at 164-65. 
192. !d. at 165. 
193. !d. at 165-67. 
194. !d. at 166. In a colony where over one-third of the population were active loyal-
ists, patriot leadership was comprised largely of New Side Presbyterians from the 
Princeton area, home of the collegiate center of the Awakening. !d. at 165. 
195. !d. at 166. 
196. !d.; cf. PAULINE MAIER, FROM RESISTANCE TO REVOLUTION: CoLONIAL RADICALS 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 0PPOSmON TO BRITAIN, 1765-1776, at 266-70 
(1972) (contending that colonists' growing disillusionment with and disaffection from 
the English people led to act of declaring independence). 
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and would have occu:nred without the Awakening. Second, he bol-
sters his point by analogy to New Yodc.. 197 On July 2, 1776, when 
the Continental Congress voted on Richard Hemy Lee's resolutions 
caning for independence, the New York delegation abstained under 
instruction from the cautious and moderate New York Third Provin-
cial Congress. One week later, New York's Fourth Congress met for 
the first time and immediately declared independence. 198 Here, 
Murrin argues by positive analogy rather than negative analogy as 
he did when considering the causal force of the French and Indian 
War. 199 Murrin suggests that a New Jersey without an Awakening 
would have been enough like New York that the logic of indepen-
dence would have overcome the resistance of New Jersey conserva-
tives much as it did their New York counterparts. 
As to his second subsidiary question, Munin concludes that we do 
not know. enough to say conclusively whether the war would have 
ended differently without the Awakening. Once again, Murrin's pri-
mary approach is to look for concentrations of evangelicals in situa-
tions where they would have made a d;ifference.200 He does not find 
them performing this role in the Conti'nental Army, buthe raises the 
possibility that evangelicals served disproportionately in the militia 
and thereby played a critical role in the military stmggle.201 Here 
he discovers a question that requires more research, and hence he 
concludes that the counterfactual must remain open.202 But the 
counterfactual question helps to identify what we do not know and 
to set an agenda fo:r futu:re :research. 
Murrin disposes ofhis third question quickly. Nineteenth century 
America would have been dramatically different without the Awak~ 
ening, he argues. Indeed, it would be so different that 
197. Murrin, supra note ! 66, at 166. 
198. For discussions of the path to independence in New York, see CARL L. BECKER, 
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE PROVINCE OF NEW YORK, 1760-1776, at 253-
76 (2d prtg. 1960); BERNARD MASON, THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE: THE REVOLUTIONARY 
MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK, 1773-1777 (1966). 
199. See supra text accompanying notes 174-81. 
200. Murrin, supra note 166, at 167. The war, he notes, was "extremely brutal and 
draining." !d. Might the evangelicals have provided the "resiliency and stamina to en-
dure a struggle that the less righteous would have abandoned?" !d. 
Following Perry Miller, Heimerl expresses the belief that "a 'pure rationalism' might 
have declared the independence of the American people, 'but it could never have in-
spired them to fight for it.' " HEJMERT, supra note 186, at 18 (quoting Perry Miller. hom 
the Covenant to the Revival, in THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN RELIGION, 1 RELIGION IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE 363 (James W. Smith&: A. !Leland Jamison eds., 1961)). Murrin acknowledges 
the possibility that the exhortatory rhetorical styie and the "oral, face-to-face culture" of 
the evangelicals may have played a greater role than the more urbane and literary cul-
ture of the liberals in sustaining the morale necessary to continue the war effort, 
althqugh he also recognizes the difficulty of measuring evangelical culture's contribu-
tion. Murrin, supra note 166, at 168. For discussions of the differences between evan-
gelical and liberal rhetorical theory and style of preaching, see RICHARD L. BusHMAN, 
FROM PURITAN TO YANKEE: CHARACTER AND THE SoCIAL ORDER IN CONNECTICUT, 1690-
!765, at 178-81, 198-202 (1967); HEIMERT, supra note 186, at 208-36. 
20L Murrin, supra note 166, at 167. On the importance of the militia's role in the 
war, Murrin cites in particular the work of John Shy. ld. at 167-68 (citing joHN SHY, A 
PEOPLE NUMEROUS AND ARMED: REFLECTIONS ON THE MILITARY STRUGGLE FOR AMERICAN 
INDEPENDENCE 163-79, 193-224 (1976)). 
202. /d. 
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"[s]peculation about its behavior would be quite pointless."203 
I believe Murrin is right. Any attempt to describe antebellum 
America without evangelical Protestantism is fraught with uncer-
tainty and bound to fail. Why is that so? To begin with, Murrin's 
third question is different from his· other two. It has a quality of 
openness that they lack. It does not ask about the effect of the 
counterfactual antecedent on a specific event or set of events, or on 
a particular characteristic of antebellum culture or society. Nor 
does it call for a detailed description of a counterfactual world. 
Rather, the question as Murrin asks it-"With no Awakening, would 
the Republic of 1800 have been significantly different from the one 
we now love and study?"204-invites a limited range of answers: 
"yes, very," "no, hardly different at all," or, perhaps, "yes, different, 
but not as different as you might think."2°5 
Even if Murrin's question did not seek a description of such a 
counterfactual world, can we not give one anyway? The problem 
with any such description lies in the pervasiveness of the changes we 
would find in such a counterfactual world. Our ability to make sense 
of alternative histories in the examples described above depends on 
our ability to hold much of the world constant and to isolate a lim-
ited realm -of change. Where so much of the world changes, as 
Murrin rightly supposes would be the case in his third counterfac-
tual question, it is difficult to use analogy and induction because the 
background is ever shifting and ever influencing changes in the 
foreground. 
C. Eric McKitrick and Presidential Reconstruction 
In contrast to Murrin, Eric McKitrick is a most reluctant and mod-
est counterfactualist. Nevertheless, he indulges in a number of 
203. Jd. at 169. Murrin argues that the Revolution "liberated the spirit of the Awak-
ening," which had stagnated before the Revolution. Jd. This, in tum, set the stage for a 
new wave of evangelism, the Second Great Awakening, which not only reshaped Ameri-
can religious life, but also transformed American political culture. Its millennia) tone 
helped foster a flurry of reformist movements, including abolitionism, and imbued them 
with a perfectionist and immediatist temperament. He writes that: 
I d. 
[I]f we are determined to attribute a major political and military upheaval to 
revival fervor, we would do far better to choose the Civil War, not the 
Revolution. The Union Army, not the Continentals, sometimes marched to 
combat singing The Battle Hymn of the Republic,. whose millennia) tone has no 
counterpart among either Confederate or Revolutionary War songs. 
204. Jd. at 163-64. 
205. One might, of course, break Murrin's question down into a series of narrower 
questions that more closely resemble his first two, but as the list of questions lengthens 
the counterfactual exercise would become pointless, if not impossible. Moreover, Mur-
rin's question would not remain the same if it were broken into its supposed compo-
nents. His question is not intended as a shorthand for a series of counterfactual 
questions. It is, instead, another way of expressing the question: "Did the Awakening 
have a big historical impact on nineteenth century America or a small one?" 
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counterfactua]s in his book Andrew johnson and Reconstruction. 206 In a 
chapter entided "Reconstruction as a Pmblem in Constitutional 
Theory," McKitrick outlines five approaches regarding the constitu-
tional status of the Southern states advocated by various people dur-
ing and after the Civil War. 207 In his discussion of one of these 
approaches, President Andrew Johnson's constitutional theory, Mc-
Kitrick draws a sharp contrast between Johnson's approach and the 
way Lincoln likely would have dealt with post-War reconstruction 
had he survived.208 
Any contemporary discussion of Reconstruction had to consider 
the constitutional status of the Southern states. Were they still part 
of the constitutional compact, and entitled to full participation 
under its terms, or had they severed that relationship, so that they 
might better be regarded as conquered provinces, as Thaddeus Ste-
vens, House leader of Johnson's opponents, the Radical Republi-
cans, regarded them?209 Johnson held that the Southern states had 
never been outside of the Union, ~ecause secession was constitu-
tionally impossible. Thus, he believed the problem in the South was 
not the status of the states, but the insuJtTection of their officers. 
Their treason would have to be punished or pardoned, while of-
ficers who were loyal assumed government leadership in those 
states. Until legitimate governments were restored, the states re-
mained in a state of "suspended animation"210 and would temporar-
ily be governed by provisional governors appointed by the 
President. When the time came for full restoration, the President 
\would breathe the "life-breath" into the Southern states, and they 
would return to their animated state with full :rights under the 
Constitution.211 
When McKitrick wrote, the conventional interpretation of Andrew 
Johnson's presidency saw Johnson as a victim of the Radical Repub-
licans, who unreasonably and unremittingly vilified him for trying to 
carry out Abraham Lincoln's reconstruction prog:ram. 212 McKitrick 
206. McKITRICK, supra note 167. Because the book as a whole is intended as an eval-
uation of Andrew Johnson's stewardship during Reconstruction, the whole tone of the 
book is in a sense counterfactual. See infra note 214. 
207. Jd. at93-119. 
208. Jd. al 101-10. For a different counterfactual treatment of Reconstruction, see C. 
VANN WooDWARD, Reconstruction: A Counterfactual Playback, in THE FUTURE OF THE PAST 
183-202 (1989). 
209. Senator Stevens believed that "we have the rig-ht to treat them fthe Southern 
States] as we would any other provinces we might conq~er." See McKITRICCK, supra note 
167, at 99 n.IO. 
210. !d. at 102. 
211. !d. & n.l4. That would mean, for instance, that the Southern states alone would 
have the power to determine questions of suffrage. Johnson's insistence, on the one 
hand, that the Southern states were part of the Union, and on the other, that they were 
in a state of suspended animation and subject to presidential oversight of their internal 
affairs, left him susceptible to criticism from Southern and Republican critics alike. !d. at 
102-03. 
212. See, e.g., HoWARD K. BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR 30-32, 54-57 (1930); CLAUDE G. 
BowERS, THE TRAGIC ERA 11-12 (1929); GEORGE F. MILTON, THE AGE oF HATE 189 
(1930). Although William Dunning's assessment of Johnson was not as flattering as 
Beale's or Milton's, he also saw presidential reconstruction under Johnson as a continua-
tion of Lincoln's approach. W!LL!Al\1 .A ... DUNNING, REcoNSTRUCTiON, PoLITICAL AND 
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hardly sought to vindicate the Radical Republicans, and he acknowl-
edged that the outlines for Johnson's reconstruction policy for "the 
most part had been laid down by Lincoln himself."213 Nonetheless, 
he sought, in his terms, to reopen the case of Andrew Johnson, and 
to reconsider the prevailing portrayal of him chiefly as victim in the 
episode of reconstruction.214 In the background of any reevalua-
tion of Johnson's presidency looms "the shadow of Abraham Lin-
coln."215 Thus, in his discussion of Johnson's theory of 
reconstruction, McKitrick contrasts Johnson's approach to that 
which Lincoln likely would have pursued had he lived. 
McKitrick is conservative in his counterfactual claims. Indeed, he 
avoids the subjunctive voice and reminds the reader of the specula-
tive character of any assertions regarding what Lincoln would have 
done.216 Yet his argument at least suggests differences between 
Johnson's theory of reconstruction and that which we would expect 
Lincoln to have developed. 
McKitrick suggests that unlike Johnson, Lincoln would have pur-
sued a strategy of "practical flexibility and theoretical vagueness" in 
his approach to postwar reconstruction.217 He would not have con-
fined himself, in other words, to an inflexible constitutional theory 
regarding the status of the states, or to a course of conduct that such 
a theory, or that any theory for that matter, required. 
Essentially, McKitrick's argument relies on a contrast between 
Lincoln's andJohnson's personalities, as well as on the different in-
stitutional constraints that confronted each man. Specifically, he 
contrasts Johnson's intellectual rigidity and need for order with Lin-
coln's intellectual flexibility and tolerance for disorder. He suggests 
that Johnson, a former tailor, was never able to escape a tailor's 
mentality. Just as he prided himself on giving his customers "'a 
good snug fit,' " so too did he seek a snug fit between constitutional 
ECONOMIC, 1865-1877, at 35-37 (1907); cf. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1865-1877 xix-xx (1988) (describing reconstruction historiog-
raphy); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877, at 7-8 (1965) 
(same). 
213. McKITRICK, supra note 167, at 3. 
214. Jd. McKitrick wrote that: 
How Andrew Johnson threw away his own power both as President and as 
party leader, how he assisted materially, in spite of himself, iri blocking the 
reconciliation of North and South, and what his behavior did toward dis-
rupting the political life of an entire nation will form the subject of this book. 
!d. at 14. The evaluative tone of McKitrick's study casts the whole work in counterfac-
tual terms. In suggesting that johnson squandered an opportunity to effect a more suc-
cessful reconstruction of the nation, McKitrick invokes a realm of unrealized historical 
possibilities. 
215. !d. at 103. 
216. !d. 
217. /d. at 105. 
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doctrine and application. 218 His orderly habits, fastidiousness in 
mauers of dress, and constitutional strict construction were aH of 
one piece. 219 bnco!n, by contrast, was the opposite :in his personal 
habits; the executive office was cluttered, and his dress was slov-
enly.220 Such habits bespoke a willingness to tolerate conceptual 
untidiness, and imprecision and paradoxical constitutional theory. 
lLincoln's wartime conduct exemplifies these intellectual habits. Mc-
Kitrick notes that the bncoln administration sometimes character-
ized the war as a domestic insurrection and other times as a war 
against ail alien enemy, thereby giving the government the advan-
tages of being both a sovereign anda beHigerent. 22 i 
McKitrick's discussion of the sourtes of the differences in John-
son's and lLincoln's personalities supports the conclusion that bn-
co]n's approach to reconstruction would have differed from 
Johnson's. Underlying bncoln's humility was a "superior man's 
self-knowledge," which permitted public experimentation with ideas 
and policy alternatives and a willjngness, as he said in his last 
speech, to break bad promises.222 Johnson, on the other hand, was 
uncertain of his intellectual capacities and ever in need of the reas-
surance of public approvaL McKitrick writes of Johnson that: 
He tended to hesitate in full realization of his own shortcomings. 
At bottom, general rules were an easy substitute for concrete 
thinking; confronted with a difficulty, Johnson's mind searched in-
stinctively for such rules in order that it might once more dose 
itself and be at rest. He vvas not really capable of intellectual cour-
age until after he had made up his mind, and once he had, he 
would do anything rather than undergo the agony of further 
doubts.223 
For such a man, a politics based on strict adherence to constitu-
tional principles was very appealing. Johnson's experience and self-
perception as a social and political outsider also helped to shape his 
political personality. ~'Politics for Andrew Johnson was essentially a 
matter of principles that had to be defended rather than of a party 
organization that had to win elections. " 224 By contrast, "lLincoln 
could not imagine working without his party connections. " 225 Con-
sequently, lLincoln, unlike Johnson, brought to his office an acute 
political sensitivity and an ability to compromise. 
Finally, McKitrick infers from his knowledge of lLincoln as a 
master politician that he must have recognized the advantages to the 
218. !d. at 103. 
219. !d. at 87-88. 
220. !d. at 85, 87. 
221. !d. at I 03-04. As McKitrick notes, the Supreme Court also adopted the dual 
theory of the Civil War in the Prize Cases. /d. at 104 (citing Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 
876, 885 (1863)). 
222. /d. at 89. For Lincoln's statement that bad promises were better broken than 
kept, see VIII THE CoLLECTED WoRKS oF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 402 (Roy P. Blaser ed., 
1953). 
223. McKITRICK, supra note 167, at 89. 
224. !d. at 88. 
225. !d. 
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government of a dual theory of the war as both War and insurrection 
and understood that to take advantage of the dual theory he would 
have to maintain pragmatic flexibility at the level of policy and avoid 
or obscure issues of constitutional theory. McKitrick relies heavily 
in this argument not only on his inferences about what a politician 
with Lincoln's acumen would have done, but also on Lincoln's ac-
tions during the war. He shows that in his conduct and his state-
ments, Lincoln pursued an approach of practical flexibility and 
theoretical avoidance. 226 
McKitrick uses a two-pronged argument to support his belief that 
Lincoln's approach to reconstruction would have differed from 
Johnson's. First, by offering a causal explanation of Johnson's in-
flexibility that is grounded in Johnson's character and experience, 
he implies that someone lacking that character and experience (Lin-
coln, for instance) would have acted differently. Lincoln, in other 
words, would have acted differently because he was notJohnson, or 
enough like Johnson, under circumstances where being like Johnson 
mattered. Second, by describing certain relevant aspects of Lin-
coln's personality and some of the ways that they manifested them-
selves in his poiitical conduct, McKitrick is abie to predict something 
abou~ Lincoln's likely approach to reconstruction relative to the ap-
proach taken by Johnson. He argues inductively, in other words, 
from what he knows about Lincoln's character and past conduct. 
D. Lessons 
The story is told by someone about the man who was asked 
whether he believed in baptism by total immersion. "Believe in it?" 
he replied, "Why I've seen it with my own eyes!" This excursion 
into the writings of John Murrin and Eric McKitrick shows by con-
crete examples that it is possible to think at once counterfactually 
and intelligently. These examples ought to extinguish at least the 
most extreme versions of counterfactual dread. They show that as-
sertions that counterfactual inquiry can be used productively are 
based not merely in belief, but in fact. 
In reviewing Murrin's and McKitrick's writings, what have we seen 
with our own eyes? First, we have seen two different types of 
counterfactuals: those that focus on causation and those that focus 
on unrealized alternative outcomes. Viewed more closely, they are 
not so sharply dichotomous, but rather blur into one another. We 
cannot meaningfully say that q would not have occurred had p not 
occurred unless we have confidence in our ability to say something 
226. /d. al 105-07. 
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about what a not-p world would look 1ike.227 But the difference in 
emphasis is reat To use Professor Jarle Simensen's terms, 
countertactual statements are either "negative" or "positive. " 228 
Negative counterfactuals typicaUy take the form "if not A in a situa-
tion S then not B."229 Positive countertactuals often take the form 
"if not A in S then not B, but C-D-E, etc."23o 
We explore negative countertactuals to test assertions of causal 
responsibility. Murrin's counterlactual explorations fall mostly 
within this category. Starting with the proffered explanation of an 
historical event, he tests the counterfactyal implied by that explana-
tion.231 For example, to test Gipson's thesis that elimination of the 
French-Canadian threat unleashed the Colonies to pursue indepen-
dence, Murrin restores them in North America after 1763 and exam-
ines whether the Revolution still would have occurred. 
Ultimately, the negative counterfactual may either confirm or 
make us revise our notions of what caused a particular event, or our 
causal ranking of various factors contributing to the occurrence of 
that event. h can also help us to identify "suppressedhistorical al-
ternatives, " 232 and "possibilities and alternatives obscured or oblit-
erated by the deceptive wisdom of hindsight."233 In so doing, it 
reinforces our notions of historical contingency and choice in lieu of 
competing notions of fatalism and historical inevitability. 
Posit~ve c~:mnterf~ctuals, descriptions of ~ltemati_ve outcomes, are 
rarer histonograph1cal creatures than their negative counterparts, 
although both Murrin and McKitrick use them. Generally, histori-
ans approach positive counterfactuals hesitantly and with modest 
ambitions.234 Murrin and McKitrick qualify their positive 
counterfactual assertions and keep them vague and general.235 We 
see the contours of what might have been, but none of the detail: 
Lincoln would have adopted a more flexible and pragmatic ap-
proach to reconstruction than johnson, and deliberately would have 
kept its constitutional underpinnings vague; nineteenth century 
America in a world not having experienced the Great Awakening 
227. We may not have concluded much if we say "if not P then not Q." if instead of Q 
we get a near equivalent substitute. 
228. Simensen, supra note 159, at 172-73. Simensen credits Ottar Dahl for distin-
guishing negative from positive counterfactuals. !d. at 172, 173. 
229. Id. at 172. 
230. Id. at 173. 
231. Or in Gipson's case, the counterfactual expressly stated by Gipson as entailed by 
his explanation. See supra text accompanying note 172. 
232. See MooRE, supra note 157, at 377. One such exploration of suppressed alterna-
tives is Murrin's discussion of the possibility that had Britain adopted a more concilia-
tory policy toward the colonies, it could have averted the Revolution. See supra note 184. 
233. MooRE, supra note 157, at 376. 
234. See AnoN, supra note 161, at 79. My selection of examples exaggerates this point 
somewhat. 
235. See supra notes 203 & 216-17 and accompanying text. Murrin's assertion that 
even without its evangelical leadership, New Jersey's delegates to the Continental Con-
gress would have voted for independence is the one notable exception. See supra text 
accompanying notes ! 95-99. 
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would have been dramatically different. Indeed, McKitrick's de-
scription of the approach that Lincoln would have taken to recon-
struction is little more than the negation of his description of 
Johnson's. 
We also see an inclination to limit the scope of the counterfactual. 
More restrictive questions are less daunting and more manageable, 
perhaps because our mistakes are likely to conform to scale. Hence, 
Murrin is reluctant to elaborate on the lasting differences in an 
America that had not experienced the Awakening, other than to say 
that they would be pervasive.236 · 
Vagueness and restrictive scope are not simply a product of Mur-
rin's and McKitrick's care not to exceed their inferential powers. 
They are also a function ofthe questions they ask. Murrin and Mc-
Kitrick understand that their positive couhterfactuals should not ex-
ceed the scope of their questions. Murrin refrains from describing 
the detail of an un-Awakened nineteenth century America not sim-
ply because he doubts his ability to do so accurately-no doubt he 
could make many noncontroversial statements about such a world-
but because the detail does not matter given the question posed. 
Murrin and McKitrick are not interested in positive counterfactuals 
for their ·own sake; purely imaginary worlds are the province of sci-
ence fiction. The relevance of the positive counterfactual always re-
lates to the actual world. Its purpose is comparative and evaluative, 
to examine the consequences of real acts in the actual past in light of 
unrealized altematives.237 Sometimes, notably in economic history, 
that will lead the historian to pose questions that demand a detailed 
description of aspects of a counterfactual world.238 More often, such 
detail is unnecessary for the kind of comparisons the historian wants 
to make. 
We also have seen that many kinds of arguments may be used to 
resolve counterfactual questions. Many of these are conventionally 
empirical and do not differ from the factual analysis that historians 
236. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; if. ALEXANDER GERSCHENimON, Post-
script to Some lV!ethodological Problems in Economic History, in CoNTINUITY IN HISTORY AND 
OTHER EssAYS 55 (1968) ("[C]ounterfactual history should be essentially regarded as an 
instrument for the elucidation of relatively short-term changes .... Once the period 
under review lengthens, the number of unconsidered and nonconsiderable factors that 
bear on the outcome increases fast and the significance of the results diminishes even 
faster."); id. at 51 ("The degree of plausibility ... will vary with the magnitude of the 
problem and the length of the period under consideration."). 
237. One might liken the positive counterfactual in the hands of the historian to the 
economist's concept of opportunity costs. 
238. For instance, the historian may ask how much it would cost to ship various 
goods by alternative means in a railroadless United States or what British industrial out-
put would have been .in 1907 had the rate of growth in the value of British exports 
between 1872 and 1907 kept pace with the rate of growth for the period 1854 to 1872. 
See FISHLOW, supra note 157; FOGEL, supra note 157; MEYER, supra note 157. 
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generally engage in to validate their causal statements. For exam-
ple, Murrin questions the representativeness and reliability of the 
contemporary sources marshaled by Gipson to support his thesis 
and questions the accuracy of Gipson's description of the sense of 
security felt by colonial Americans after the Treaty of Paris removed 
the French from the continent. 239 Also, in discussing the possible 
relationship between the Awakening and the decision to declare in-
dependence in July of 1776, Murrin alludes to (really asserts the 
existence of) a better alternative C:il,usal explanation.240 None of 
these arguments are remarkable in their structure or in their con-
tent; they resemble countless other arguments that one might find 
in conventional historical writing. 241 _ 
I do not mean to suggest that there is nothing uniquely 
counterfactual about counterfactual history, that there is no analytic 
method or argument structure contained therein that cannot be 
found in plain vanilla historiography.242 Yet, even were that true, 
there is something to be gained in ~ometimes asking counterfactual 
questions. Identification of implied counterfactuals helps us to see 
what is at stake in our causal explanations. Count~rlactual ques-
tions focus our attention on the assumptions and implications of ac-
cepted explanations in ways that expose their weaknesses. 243 They 
call our attention to instances of causal overdetermination thereby 
239. See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text. Alexander Gerschenkron notes 
that often the refutation of a causal statement relies· not on counterfactual arguments 
but on factual arguments that either undermine the basis for believing the proffered 
explanation or show that an alternative explanation is better. He writes: 
If I make a causal statement, "The bear died, because I shot it through the 
heart," I am implying ... that the lethal event was not the result of any 
ailment or accident to which a member of the ursine family is susceptible and 
which may cause its sudden death. Again, an investigation can refute my 
statement. But it will do so not in any counterfactual fashion, but by estab-
lishing the fact that death was caused not by a bullet, but by a stroke of light-
ning or a heart infarct .... 
GERSCHENKRON, supra note 236, at 54. He adds that the refutation may be purely nega-
tive, proof that there is no bullet hole in the bear's body, or positive, proof establishing 
an alternative cause of death. !d. at n.l2. 
241. For that matter, these argument types should resonate familiarly for lawyers and 
legal decisionmakers. 
242. For a discussion of counterfactual method, see infra notes 246-52 and accompa-
nying text. Simensen, however, does conclude, at least with regard to negative 
counterfactuals, that there is no peculiarly counterfactual method. He writes that: 
Our material ... contains no example of a systematic use of counterfactual 
reasoning as an independent analytic device. What we have seen is that the-
ories about necessary and sufficient causes, arrived at by ordinary factual 
analysis, have been re-formulated into counterfactuallanguage for the pur-
pose of emphasis and illustration .... In general, it is difficult to see how a 
counterfactual argument in itself can ever validate a causal statement which 
is not already validated in other ways, empirical or logical. 
Simensen, supra note 159, at 174. 
243. For example, Murrin's discussion of the effect that elimination of the French had 
on the Americans' sense of security, see supra note 162 and accompanying text, or his 
examinations of whether concentrations of evangelicals can be found at centers of pa-
triot resistance, see supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text. 
Patrick Gardiner similarly notes that: "The implications of an historian's use of the 
word 'cause' in a particular connexion can frequently be illuminated by translating the 
explanation in question into a different grammatical form, the form of the contrary-to-
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causing us to reassess the importance that we assign to a causal can-
didate. They also reveal gaps in our knowledge and thereby help set 
a research agenda. 244 
Murrin and McKitrick do not limit themselves, however, to an-
swering counterfactual questions by factual proxy. They also explic-
itly explore counterfactual suppositions and attempt to resolve them 
directly. Even when they do, however, they rest on the historian's 
knowledge of the actual world.245 
When historians embrace a false antecedent and attempt to de-
scribe the consequent that follows from it, they naturally look to that 
which they know best to help them decide what inferences they may 
make within the scope of their supposition. They reason by analogy 
to other historic events.246 Like Murrin,247 they may use analogies 
to test the sufficiency or necessity of a purported cause under cir-
cumstances similar to those described by the counterfactual. His-
torians also use historical analogy to help construct positive 
counterfactuals. They fill in the consequent with reference to simi-
lar events.248 
Murrin draws his conclusions about how American colonists prob-
ably wouJd have behaved in a counterfactual setting by analogical 
inference. He has the advantage of knowing something about the 
behavior of reasonably comparable groups (inhabitants of particular 
colonies) under circumstances that allow for comparisons with his 
counterfactual. By looking at certain events, he suggests certain 
laws of behavior that would apply to comparable groups in other 
fact conditional." PATRICK GARDINER, THE NATURE OF HISTORICAL ExPLANATION 106 
(Oxford Univ; Press 1955) (1952). 
244. For example, Murrin notes the need for additional research regarding the com-
position of the colonial militia. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text. 
245. For this reason, David Fischer's argument that a statement cannot be 
counterfactual and factual at the same time, see supra note 2, is misleading. Fischer 
means that counterfactual statements differ from statements of fact because they are not 
verifiable or falsifiable in the manner of statements of fact. Hence, a statement is either 
factual or counterfactual, but not both. Yet the acceptability of a historian's counterfac-
tual will depend on its grounding in facl. Although the statement rests upon a 
counterfactual supposition, the strength of the assertions made within the supposition 
will depend on the empirical bases for the inferences that the historian makes. Thus, 
historians' counterfactuals, to be plausible or acceptable, must be both factual and 
counterfactual. Cf GERSCHENKRON, supra note 236, at 55 ("[A] mass of factual research 
must be carried out before counterfactual questions can begin to be raised."); WEBER, 
supra note 18, at 174 (contending that knowledge of historical possibilities· rests on our 
knowledge of facts, "ontological knowledge," and on our knowledge of rules of human 
behavior, "nomological knowledge"). 
246. See ARoN, supra note 161, at 79-80; Pork, supra note 80, at 66. 
247. See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text. 
248. See, e.g., ·FINKELMAN, supra note 157, at 324-36 (drawing on earlier Supreme 
Court slavery cases to predict course of Court's slavery jurisprudence had the Civil War 
not occurred). 
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similar circumstances. In this sense, Murrin's argument has a law-
like structure. 249 
McKitrick must construct his argument differently. Like Murrin, 
he must describe the effect that a counterfactual change of real 
events would have on the decisions of historical actors. He has no 
ready analogy to draw upon, however, and it would be silly (as his-
torians and at least some philosophers recognize) to attempt to ar-
ticulate general laws of presidential behavior to explain Johnson's 
approach to reconstruction. Inste.a,d, he must draw his inferences 
from his knowledge of Lincoln's and Johnson's political and private 
personalities ami from J:~i~ krJ.<:>wlegge of h11man b~havior. In both 
instances he must draw heavily on a part of what J.H. Hexter calls 
the historian's "second record"-:-'"his knowledge of the world and of 
human behavior. 25o 
McKitrick builds his argument on contrasting characterizations of 
Lincoln and Johnson. While Lincoln was flexible, Johnson was 
rigid. While Lincoln was undaunted by intellectual paradox or dis-
order, paradox and disorder terrified Jonnson. While Lincoln was 
pragmatic and politically sensitive, Johnson was politically dogmatic 
and therefore possessed a political tin ear.251 Dispositional state-
ments such as these help predict how their subjects would behave in 
a variety of circumstances. 252 They lead McKitrick to conclude that 
Lincoln would have been more flexible and pragmatic in his ap-
proach to reconstruction than Johnson was. 
By showing the genesis and effect of some of these traits, McKit-
rick bolsters his claim to have correctly characterized the two men. 
At the same time, his examples support his inferences regarding 
how Lincoln would have approached reconstruction by demonstrat-
ing other instances when Lincoln acted in much the same manner as 
he predicts Lincoln would have acted had he lived to preside over 
postwar reconstruction. 
McKitrick and Murrin draw on their knowledge of the past, about 
specific historical actors, and about human behavior in general to 
predict how events might have been under a counterfactual scena-
rio. This knowledge of history and of human behavior allows them 
to make coherent and plausible, if perhaps cautious, counterfactual 
judgments. What remains for us to consider is whether these meth-
ods and arguments can help the legal decisionmaker. 
249. By "lawlike" I am suggesting that his discussion is consistent with the positivist 
attempt to assimilate historical explanation to scientific explanation. See Carl G. 
Hempel, The Function of General Laws in History, 39 J. PHIL. 36 (1942), reprinted in THEORIES 
OF HISTORY 344 (Patrick Gardiner ed., 1959). 
250. HEXTER, supra note 132, at 80-109. Hexter defines historians' second record as 
"the reservoir of what they know, have learned, and are-on which they must draw to 
force from the first record an understanding of what happened in the past and what the 
past was like." !d. at 85. 
251. See supra notes 218-26 and accompanying text. 
252. See GARDINER, supra note 243, at 124-25. In his discussion of mental causation, 
Gardiner draws heavily on Gilbert Ryle's discussion of dispositions. !d. at 120-39 (citing 
GILBERT RYLE, THE CoNCEPT oF MIND (1949)). 
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Ill. Counterfactuals in Law Revisited 
A. ''And It Will Never Be History"253 
Are there lessons for lawyers in historians' use of counterfactu-
als? To decide, we must consider the differences between law and 
history. 
Certainly there are differences. Lawyers and legal decisionmakers 
follow different norms and work under different constraints on their 
factfinding than those experienced by historians.254 Historians and 
legal decisionmakers also have different standards for explanations 
or interpretations of past events.255 Finality is an important value 
underlying the norms of legal decisionmaking.256 Historians, by 
contrast, recognize that in writing history, they engage in an ongo-
ing dialogue with other historians, past and future. Historical expla-
nations and interpretations are, in other words, always provisional, 
always incomplete, and always a product riot only of the historical 
record, but also of their author's worldview.257 
Underlying many of these differences are the different reasons 
why we ask legal and historical questions and the obvious fact that 
253. I Have adapted this title from and with ·apologies to Lance Davis. See Lance E. 
Davis, "And It Will. Never Be Literature"-The New Economic History: A Critique, in 
QUANTIFICATION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 274 (Robert P. 
Swierenga ed., 1970). 
254. As Nicholas Rescher and Carey Joynt have noted, the primary goal of a trial is 
adjudicatory, not investigative. Rescher & Joynt, supra note 153, at 566. Although the 
historian's "primary obligation is to the truth," id. at 567, the purpose of a trial is truth 
finding only "secondarily, insofar as is necessary in the interests of reasonable adjudica-
tion," id. at 566-67. Moreover, legal institutions must balance their commitment to 
truth seeking against other values in ways that historians, who have no analog to sup-
pression hearings, discovery limits, hearsay objections, or rules of claim or issue preclu-
sion, are not obliged to do. /d. at 567-68. 
255. In law, typically, we use a preponderance standard applied to each element of a 
claim, and in certain types of cases we use the more rigorous clear and convincing or 
beyond a reasonable doubt standards. Historians tend to focus instead on whether a 
particular historical work provides a better, more plausible, account than its competi-
tors. MARTIN, supra note 179, at 30-31; Rescher &Joynt, supra note 153, at 564. Profes-
sor Allen argues that we should model our proof rules for civil trials on the way 
historians assess competing historiographical visions of historical events. Ronald J. 
Allen, The Nature of juridical Proof, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 373, 382, 388-91. 
256. Concern for finality manifests itself in various legal rules. Most notably, in the 
trial setting, statutes of limitation and repose, and doctrine·s of issue and claim preclu-
sion reflect the law's valuation of closure in legal disputes and a related concern to pro-
tect settled expectations. See, e.g., jACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.3 
(1985). 
257. This observation does not mean that there is not overwhelming consensus over 
many issues of historical fact. Nor do I mean that historians attempt to give less than the 
best possible account of their subject. Yet most historians would acknowledge that revi-
sion and reinterpretation is an intrinsic part of engagement with the past. Historian 
Robert Dallek has noted regarding his and Robert Caro's conflicting interpretations of 
Lyndon Johnson's career: "'I'm not a believer in definitive history or biography. No 
one's going to have the last word.'" Joseph A. Cincotti, "No One's Going to Have the Last 
Word," N.Y. TIMES, july 21, 1991, § 7 (Book Review), at 30. 
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the outcome of a legal dispute has very different consequences than 
the outcome of an historical debate. No one need pay money dam-
ages or surrender property because historians conclude that Law-
rence Gipson, John Murrin, or somebody else has best explained 
the American Revolution. Andrew Johnson's reputation may suffer 
at the hands of Eric McKitrick compared to earlier treatments of his 
presidency, but Johnson is, after all, long dead.258 Obviously, the 
stakes can be high in a legal dispute both for the parties to the dis-
pute and for society as a whole. Also, resolution of a legal dispute 
by a court or administrative agency implicates state power in the 
redistribution of wealth among the parties. Given these differences 
between legal disputes and historians' arguments, should we not be 
more cautious in our use of counterfactuals in the law? 
The argument for an affirmative answer rests on a misplaced com-
parison. The costs of faulty counterfactual thinking are no doubt 
lower in historiography than in law, but only because error costs will 
usually be higher in legal disputes than in historiographical ones, 
regardless of the means we adopt to resolve them and the kinds of 
error we commit. A more appropriate comparison }s- between the 
probable error costs of using counterfactual inquiry and the prob-
able error costs of avoiding it.259- We do not escape the costs of 
258. The stakes in a historian's arguments _may, nevertheless, be quite high. Cer-
tainly, what we teach our children as the "official" version of their past matters. See 
generally FRANCES FITZGERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE TWEN-
TIETH CENTURY (1979). Because of the importance of the version of the past that we 
teach our children, members of various religious organizations (as well as historians) 
have criticized the tendency of American history textbooks to write religion out of the 
American past. See Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 983-85 (S.D. 
Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987); O.L. DAVIS ET AL., LoOKING AT HISTORY: 
A REVIEW OF MAJOR U.S. HISTORY TEXTBOOKS (1986); George W. Dent, Jr., Religious 
Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 868-71 (1988); Paul Vitz, Religion and 
Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks, 84 PuB. INT. 79 (1986). The lesson that there 
is power in control of the reigning historical interpretation has not been lost on authori-
tarian regimes, as can be seen in the energy devoted over the years to revising Soviet 
history (including photographs from the October Revolution) to recast the roles of 
Trotsky, Bukharin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev, among others, or to expunge them alto-
gether. More recently, as a consequence of glasnost, Soviet schools cancelled history 
finals for their students because the Soviet textbook writers had not yet provided a new 
official history to supplant the old, repudiated version. See Esther B. Fein, Soviet Pupils 
Spared Exams While History is Rewritten, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1988, at AI. Nationalist 
movements, as well as groups historically excluded from power, also have recognized 
the importance of how history is told and have sought to ensure that their stories be 
included in the teiling of the past. See, e.g., Renate Bridenthal & Claudia Koonz, introduc-
tion to BECOMING VISIBLE: WoMEN IN EuROPEAN HISTORY I (Renate Bridenthal & Clau-
dia Koonz eds., I 977); CAROLL SMITH-RosENBERG, Hearing Women s Words: A Feminist 
Reconstruction of History, in DISORDERLY CONDUCT ll (1985). 
259. By the term "probable error costs," I mean the amount of overpayment or un-
derpayment (viewed from the perspective of governing substantive legal norms and our 
assumed omniscience) that would result from a faulty legal decision, discounted by the 
probability that the decisionmaker will err. It is a concept similar to the PL variables in 
the Hand formula. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, I 73 (2d Cir. 
194 7) (stating test of negligence in algebraic terms of "whether B < PL," with B stand-
ing for burden, P for probability of harm, and L for injury). Indeed, the comparison 
between the probable error costs of counterfactual inquiry and the probable error costs 
of alternative noncounterfactual approaches translates to the Hand Formula, with the 
probable error costs of alternatives taking: the place of the B (or burden of forgoing 
counterfactual inquiry) variable in the formula. We may not be able to quantify these 
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uncertainty and error simply by prohibiting counterfactual inquiry. 
Remedial abnegation to avoid framing a remedy that would require 
counterfactual speculation can have high costs, as was shown re-
garding denial of make-whole relief in bad faith bargaining cases. 260 
And denial of a claim or a remedy as "speculative" implicates the 
state in the distribution of wealth as inescapably as do decisions al-
lowing the claim or granting the requested relief. In deciding how 
to treat claims grounded on uncertain causal assertions, or whether 
to grant or deny speculative remedies, courts favor one activity over 
some other activity and thereby enrich the former at the expense of 
the latter.261 
The risk of counterfactual ~rtor matters, but there is no a priori 
basis for choosing between denying or limiting daims or remedies 
to avoid the costs and distributional effects of counterfactual error, 
or entertaining such claims or remedial requests to avoid the costs 
and distributional effects of circumscribed liability or remedy rules. 
As discussed further below, we can only justify a decision with 
broader reference to tolerable levels of risk of error, to the risk of 
error inherent in the alternative approaches, to our preferences re-
garding which party should bear the greater risk of error, and to the 
public cqnsequences of adopting one rule or the other.262 In other 
words, we need to make plain what we risk by engaging or declining 
to engage in a particular counterfactual inquiry. 
Aside from the dissimilar consequences of resolving legal and his-
toriographical disputes, history and law differ in the training and 
knowledge we expect of their practitioners. Few judges, jurors, or 
lawyers are also historians. 
Is counterfactual inquiry a peculiarly historiographical endeavor 
that would be a perilous undertaking for those lacking the training 
of an historian? Our everyday experiences should dispel this 
idea.263 Recall Weber's example of the mother and the cook.264 
Although Weber also relies on examples from history in his analysis, 
he readily uses an example from everyday life, a mother's explana-
tion of why she hit her child, as a proxy for historical reconstruction 
variables with great specificity in most cases, but by thinking about when courts ought to 
engage in counterfactual inquiry in these terms (at least partly), we can get a clearer, 
albeit rough, sense of the· risks and benefits of posing counterfactual questions. 
260. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text. 
261. The idea has been around at least since the legal realists. See, e.g., Robert L. 
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 PoL. Sci. Q 4 70, 4 70-
73 (1923). For a more recent expression of the same idea, see R.H. Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. I, 2 (1960). 
262. See infra notes 290-94 and accompanying text. 
263. Recall the examples of counterfactual statements that one might expect to hear 
in everyday discourse. See supra text accompanying note 11. 
264. See supra text accompanying note 161. 
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and explanation.265 The vaJue of the examples from Munin's and 
McKitrick's work is not that counterfactual thinking is peculiarly 
within the domain of historians, but rather that they are required by 
the standards of their craft to make their arguments and inferences 
more explicit in order to justify their conclusions. 
Surely, one might argue, there is more of a difference than that 
between an historian's ,and a nonhistorian's performance of 
counterfactual thinking. At the very least, the requirement that his-
torians make their assumptions and reasoning express and therefore 
susceptible to the criticism of their peers must sharpen their skill at 
counterfactual inquiry. Indeed, should we need a cautionart re-
minder of the pitfalls of amateur historical: thinking, we need only 
consider the misuse of historical analogies by policymakers and 
other lay analysts. 
Analogical thinking has produced some of marikind's great in-
sights. Drawing on the Aristotelian belief that the microcosm of the 
living organism paralleled the macrocosm of the universe, William 
Harvey considered the cosmological cyde of evaporation of water 
followed by condensation as rain f<;>llowed once again by evapora-
tion in conceptualizing the circulation of blood. 266 Nevertheless, in 
light of such disastrous examples of faulty analogical thinking as the 
French reliance on the Maginot line, and the misuse of Munich and 
Vietnam analogies in crafting recent American foreign policy, can 
we help but be chary about decisionmaking by analogy?267 
f:lvPn ~ rPrnr:-l nf ;n~nt ·:nnrl ~nPnt HC"P nf h~ctnr-ir':ll ~n":lln.r.--i.=co h-..r 
"-"" .. • ._ .... ..._... .-. .._.__.._ '-"'- ._, ..... .a.11.JL~y11.. Lll.ll..l'-'1 JlAA'-!-''- IUI.IJ"-- \..JJL. Jl.D.JI.L.JII...'-.J'.a 4 '-c..JLJI. Lli..D.JILli.Jt'.J5.l'-oJ J..J} 
policymakers, should v;e leave analogical argument to the histori-
ans? No, but we must distinguish among types of analogies. The 
vulnerability of analogical arguments like the ones that have led to 
such debacles as our involvement in the Vietnam War flows from 
the ahistorical use of historical examples. We are prone to err in such 
arguments if we are not sensitive to the differences between the his-
toric settings that we wish to compare, and if, because of such insen-
sitivity, we fail, in Peter Stearns' words to "test[] apparent, attractive 
similarities against situational change."268 Historical analogy often 
leads to folly not because we are incapable of reasoning by analogy, 
265. R.G. Collingwood discusses further the relationship between historical thinking 
and memory of one's own thoughts. CoLLINGWOOD, su;bra note 153, at 293-96. 
266. WILLIAM HARVEY, AN ANATOMICAL STUDY ON THE MOTION OF THE HEART AND 
BLOOD 70-71 (1628) (Chauncey D. Leake trans., 5th ed. 1970); see also Walter Pagel, 
William Haruey and the Purpose af Circulation, 42 Is1s 22, 23-24, 28-29 ( !951). On the wide-
spread adherence of sixteenth and seventeenth-century chemists and aichemists to a 
belief in the microcosm-macrocosm analogy between man and the universe, see ALAN G. 
DEBUS, THE CHEMICAL DREAM OF THE RENAISSANCE 15-16 (1968). 
267. See, e,g., FISCHER, supra note 2, at 248-51; ERNEST R. MAY, "LESSONs" OF THE 
PAST: THE USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1973); PETER N. 
STEARNS, Histo1y aud Policy Analysis: Toward Ivlaturity, 4 Pun. HISTORIAN 5, 15-16 (1982); 
Charles Krauthammer, Good Morning, Vietnam, WASH. PosT, Apr. 19, !991, at A23. 
268. Stearns, supra note 267, at 16. For a discussion of how policymakers can make 
better use of history, see generally RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & ERNEST R. MAY, THINKING IN 
Tn.m: THE UsES OF HISTORY FOR DECISION-MAKERS (1986). 
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but because those who 
ciently understanding 
resemblances. 
engage in such analogizing are not suffi-
of the past to see beneath surface 
Thus, the argument that our misuse of the Munich analogy, for 
example, shows that we cannot successfully argue analogically, is it-
self grounded in a faulty analogy. Indeed, legal decisionmakers 
should be especially well equipped to engage in analogical argu-
ment because much of law's logic comes down to reasoning by 
analogy.269 
B. Asking the Right Questions 
If we are to use counterfactuals successfully in law, we must ask 
the right counterfactual questions. We must state the antecedent in 
legally relevant terms and similarly restrict our consequent within 
the perimeters oflegal relevance. These are simple points, and gen-
erally courts have managed these issues well. Nevertheless, because 
courts and commentators have sometimes gone astray in this re-
gard, they warrant some elaboration. 
When we begin to change the past, t.l-te possible variations are 
endless. Is it any wonder, then, that some who have stared into the 
·abyss have been overcome by counterfactual dread? Surely, though, 
we commit ourselves to something less heroic than such a boundless 
journey. We limit our task by our choice of questions, most notably 
at the outset by our decisions regarding the antecedent. Eric McKit-
rick focuses his counterfactual considerations by narrowly specifying 
one among many possible counterfactual antecedents. He does not 
explore, for example, the likely course of reconstruction under a 
Hannibal Hamlin or William Seward administration or under any 
other imaginable set of counterfactual circumstances.270 John Mur-
rin similarly restricts his explorations by his choice of counterfactual 
antecedent. 27 1 In crafting their antecedents McKitrick and Murrin 
269. Judge Aldisert has stated: 
Analogies can be considered the most important aspect of the study and 
practice oflaw. Il is the method by which putative precedents are subjected 
to the acid test of searching analysis. It is the method. to determine whether 
factual differences contained in the case at bar and those of the case com-
pared are material or irrelevant. 
The importance of legal reasoning by analogy cannot be overstated. It is 
the heart of the study of law .... 
RUGGERO j. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 94-95 
(1989). 
270. Hannibal Hamlin was Vice President in the first Lincoln administration. See gen-
erally H. DRAPER HUNT, HANNIBAL HAMLIN OF MAINE: LINCOLN'S FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT 
(1969). William Seward, Lincoln's Secretary of State, was the preconvention favorite to 
capture the Republican party's presidential nomination in 1860. FINKELMAN, supra note 
157, at 323; DAVID M. PoTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861, at 422-29 (1976). 
271. He, for instance, imagines away the Great Awakening, but he does not consider 
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are guided by their perspectives, their sense of the plausibility of 
historical alternatives, and the questions posed by an ongoing his-
toriographical discourse. 272 
In law, our choice ofantecedent similarly should be circumscribed 
by the concerns of the governing substantive law. Robert Cole's ar-
gument that statements of causal necessity require us to ask broadly, 
"Had defendant not done x, what would he have done instead, and 
with what effect?" is wrong.273 Instead, we should frame the antece-
dent in terms of legally mandated conduct and ask questions such 
as: "Had defendant driven at a reasonable speed would he have 
collided with plaintiff?"2 7 4 As Richard Wright has shown, the point 
of the counterfactual inquiry is not to discover the next most likely 
scenario to the actual past, but to "determin[e] the causal effect of 
the tortious aspect of the defendant's conduct."275 Failure to frame 
the counterfactual antecedent in terms of the tortious aspect of the 
conduct has led some courts astray in cases involving the failure to 
obtain a license to engage in an activity. By mistakenly framing the 
antecedent as "U defendant had not engaged in the activity ... " 
rather than "If defendant had obtained a license ... /' they incor-
rectly identify the violation of a licensing law as a responsible cause 
of the accidenL276 The facdinder need not confront a limitless array 
of antecedents; the negligence inquiry (o:r the definition of the de-
fect in a strict products liability case) defines the tortious dement of 
the past that needs to be :removed in framing the antecedent. 
replacing it with a wildfire spread of Antinomian or Arminian heresies, or with an out-
break of liberal Protestant evangelism along the lines of the Second Great Awakening. 
272. Because the possibility of a Hamlin or a Seward administration in 1865 was re-
mote relative to that of the continuation of the Lincoln administration, there is little 
reason to care abom the approach that Hamlin, or even the far less obscure Seward, 
might have taken to reconstruction. Obviously, however, one's interest in such ques-
tions depends on the broader context in which one writes. A biographer of Hamlin or 
Seward might have a different perspective. The relative implausibility of the antecedent 
also affects our ability to resolve the counterfactual. Because many things would have 
had to be different about the world (besides the name of the President) for a Hamlin or 
Seward administration to have occuJTed, the counterfactual inquiry becomes much more 
difficult. This is the problem of cotenability with a vengeance. The historiographical 
value of counterfactuals with highly implausible, or even impossible, antecedents is the 
wpic of an interesting debate among Jon Elster, Brian Barry, and Steven Lukes. See 
Brian Barry, Supeifox, 28 PoL. STUD. 136 (1980); Jon Elster, The Treatment of Counterfactu-
als: Reply to Brian Barry, 28 PoL. STUD. 144 (1980); Steven Lukes, Elster on Counterfactuals, 
23 INQUIRY 145 (1980); see also Jon Elster, Reply to Comments, 23 INQUIRY 213, 220-23 
(1980). 
273. See Robert H. Cole, H'indfall and l7obability: .A Study of "Cause" in lVegligence Law 
(pl. 2), 52 CAL. L. REV. 764, 768-77 (1964). 
274. See HART & HoNORE, supra note 29, at 4ll-12. 
275. Wright, supra note 28, at 1806. For a convincing disposition of Robert Cole's 
argument that validation of statements of causal necessity requires such an inquiry into 
the whole array of hypothetical alternatives, limited somewhat by Cole's use of "neutral 
restrictions" on such alternatives, Cole, supra note 273 at 777-84, leading, in Cole's 
words, "to a pyramiding of conjectural possibilities," id. at 776, and an unmanageable 
"mass of contrafactual propositions," id. at 777, see Wright, supra note 28, at 1805-07. 
276. For a discussion of licensing cases, see HART & HoNORE, supra note 29, at lviii-
lxi, 117-21, 210-11; KEETON ET AL., supra note 29, at 223-24; MACKIE, supra note 81, at 
129-30. 
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We similarly bound the set of legally relevant consequents. Hav-
ing defined their antecedents, Murrin and McKitrick do not suc-
cumb to counterfactual free fall. Their choice of questions about 
their hypothetical pasts focuses their inquiry and limits the range of 
counterfactual possibilities that they will explore to those that are 
responsive to their interests and to the debate within the community 
of historians. Our legal rules, those defining remedies, for instance, 
set comparable limits on the counterfactual explorations of legal 
factfinders. 277 Sometimes those rules may be disputed or un-
resolved, but within the disputing camps there will be clarity as to 
the focus the counterfactual inquiry should take. We see an exam-
ple of such divisions in the debate over harmless error, where the 
debate centers on both the measure of certainty that we ought to 
satisfy before pronouncing trial error harmless, and on the defini-
tion of harm as either impairment of the truth-determining function 
of the trial or as encompassing broader interests than accurate 
outcomes.278 
Our screens of legal relevance make the counterfactual inquiry 
more manageable, but our choice of antecedent inevitably raises 
questions regarding relevant conditions or cotenability.279 Specifi-
cally, when a legal rule compels our choice of antecedent without 
regard to the likelihood of its occurrence, must we legitimate the 
antecedent by changing other aspects of the world to make its oc-
currence possible, or even likely? Must we follow Robert Cole in 
accounting for the possibility that had the defendant been disposed 
to drive at a reasonable speed, rather than at his actual unlawful 
speed, he might also have been disposed to be more attentive, to 
drive in a safer position on the street, or to be more careful in 
countless other ways that would not constitute the difference be-
tween negligent and nonnegligent conduct (and therefore not enter 
into our antecedent), but could change our counterfactual analy-
sis?280 Should we consider whether an employer who has commit-
ted unfair labor practices sufficient to warrant a Gissel bargaining 
277. As Professor Leubsdorf states: "Our picture of the hypothetical world must 
have a point of view and a purpose." Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 136 (noting, for exam-
ple, that although courts may craft broad remedies in school desegregation cases to 
undo some of the broad educational and social consequences of segregation, they will 
not attempt to put the owner of the candy store across the street from the school in the 
position he would have been in absent segregation, because any harms he may have 
suffered are beyond the concern of desegregation law). 
278. For an introduction to these issues, see generally RoGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE 
OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. 
REV. 988 (1973); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 
CoLuM. L. REV. 79 (1988). 
279. For a discussion of these concepts, see supra notes 118-19 and accompanying 
text. 
280. Cole, supra note 273, at 775-76. Cole's example demonstrates the difficulty of 
the cotenability problem. Should we assume with him that a person who commits one 
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order may have conducted his prerepresentation-campaign relations 
with his employees in a manner that helped generate interest in the 
union? If, in light of his precampaign dispositions and behavior, we 
cannot imagine him refraining from unfair labor practices during 
the campaign, must we legi6mate our counterfactual antecedent 
that he conducted a fair campaign by altering his precampaign dis-
positions and behavior as well and take account of those changes in 
resolving the counterfactual?2Bl · 
Philosophers of history disagree over the need to legitimate 
counterfactuals by showing the circumstances under which the ante-
cedent could have come' about.~82 Whether working historians 
bother themselves with the problem of cotenability depends on 
their reasons for exploring counterfactuals. Historians assessing a 
particular cause's importance would have less reason to concern 
themselves with cotenability than would those seeking to explore 
plausible suppressed historical alternatives. In our examples, Mur-
rin and McKitrick expend little energy on the problem of 
co tenability. 283 · 
Our response to the cotenability problem in law should likewise 
reflect our reasons for making the counterfactual inquiry. Often, we 
need not care if the defendaQt's dispositions are incompatible with 
the standard of behavior called· for by our legal rule and expressed 
negligent act (speeding) also would be careless in various other ways, or should we as-
sume that such a person, cognizant of the risks of speeding, would take extra care in all 
other matters while driving to accommodate his desire to speed? 
281. The Board currently does not engage in counterfactual analysis in determining 
whether to issue Gissel bargaining orders. Instead, it applies a rule of thumb that if all 
other conditions for issuance of a bargaining order are met, the Board will issue such an 
order if there was a demonstration of majority support at some time prior to the elec-
tion, and it will not issue such an order if the union cannot demonstrate prior majority 
support. For a discussion of Gissel bargaining orders, see supra notes 56-58 and accom-
panying text. 
282. Compare Toi>D, supra note 162, at 205 ("When I assert 'If A then B,' knowing that 
A did not occur or will not occur, certain conditions have to be satisfied for th~ sentence 
to be plausible enough to be interesting. . . . When we consider the counterfactual 
possibility of A's occurring, we usually assume that there are causal laws which, together 
with the occurrence of numerous past events, in fact brought about A's non-occurrence. 
Thus, in order to suppose that A occurred, we ... have to suppose that a whole range of 
events reaching into the past to an undetermined extent did not occur when we know 
that it did . . . . The hypothetical counterfactual then tells us that if the universe had 
been different enough to determine A's occurrence rather than non-occurrence, B would 
then have occurred.") with McCuLLAGH, supra note 81, at 191 (arguing that historian 
need not "attempt to construct an alternative coherent hypothetical world in the manner 
Todd suggested") and McCullagh, supra note 178, at 446 (describing historians' normal 
interpretation of counterfactual "If riot A then not B" as "If A had not been the case, 
and everything else (except B) had remained the same, then B would not have been the 
case"). 
283. Murrin does take the time to dispose of the principals in the Great Awakening, 
but he is motivated primarily by a spirit of mischief. See supra note 166. By contrast, 
Paul Finkelman, in his discussion of the direction that the Supreme Court's slavery juris-
prudence would likely have taken had secession riot occurred in 1860-61, takes pain to 
show how his counterfactual antecedent could have come about and that from the van-
tage point of the late 1850s it appeared quite plausible; Finkelman does this because the 
primary purpose of his counterfactual is to rebut the charge that Lincoln's statements 
regarding the threat of a nationalization of slavery were either cynical demagoguery or 
paranoid. FINKELMAN, supra note 157, at 320-24; see also MooRE, supra note 157, at 381-
97. 
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in the antecedent. For example, inability to conform to tort law's 
reasonable person standard will not, under most circumstances, ex-
cuse failure to do so. We expect the individual to break loose of the 
constraints of disposition or ability.284 In such cases, we select our 
antecedents on the basis oflegal norms, not on the basis of what was 
predictable or plausible given the background circumstances, and 
therefore, we need not struggle to reconcile those circumstances to 
our antecedent.285 Thus, we need not consider the possibility that 
had a driver been disposed to drive at the legal limit instead of 
eighty mil(!s an hour, he might also have been disposed to be more 
attentive and careful, although we must consider that driving at the 
lower speed would have pennitted the driver to be more attentive of 
his surroundings, including the child darting out from between 
parked cars.286 Similarly, we need not change anything about an 
employer's precampaign relations with his employees in imagining a 
world in which he conducted a fair campaign. 
Is Judge MacKinnon therefore correct in concluding in Tiidee Prod-
ucts that, given the employer's hostility toward the union, make-
whole relief is inappropriate because no contract would have been 
reached even if the employer had bargained in good faith?2B7 His 
analysis is only partly correct. He understands that to determine 
counterfactually what bargaining concessions the employer would 
have made had it bargained in good faith we ought to change it only 
enough to make it conform to the legal standard for good faith bar-
gaining. We are not licensed to change its hostility to the union or 
its reluctance to make bargaining concessions. He also recognizes 
that the NLRA permits hard bargaining and specifically states that 
the good faith bargaining requirement "does not compel either 
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a conces-
sion."288 Yet the employer faced with a Board order to bargain in 
good faith and a claim for make-whole relief would seem to encoun-
ter a dilemma. Given its current bargaining obligations, it is un-
likely that it can assert that it would have made no concessions had it 
previously bargained with the union without calling into question its 
current good faith. 289 Thus, the counterfactual calls for some revi-
sion of the employer's attitudes, not because the antecedent re-
quires further counterfactual excursions to make its occurrence 
284. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 493 (1837); OLIVER W. HoLMEs, 
THE CoMMON LAw, 108-10 (1881). 
285. We assume, in David Lewis' words, an "inconspicuous miracle" allowing the 
actor to conform to the legal standard, even though conformance defies his dispositions, 
or even the laws of a deterministic world. LEWIS, supra note 118, ·at 75. 
286. Wright, supra note 28, at 1806. 
287. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
288. 29 u.s.c. § 158(d) (1988). 
289. It is difficult to be more definite because of the law's mixed message on this 
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possible, bliP, because the legal definition of good faith requires that 
the parties come to the table with minds at least partly open. 
Judge MacKinnon's approach, whatever its flaws, was at least easy 
to use. Once we abandon it, we return to. the difficult task of imagin-
ing the outcome of bargaining that did not occur. Whether we can 
choose a better alternative to such conjecture is a topic of the next 
section, which takes up more generally the question of when we 
should use counterfactuals. 
C. Knowing When to Ask 
Whether in everyday conversation, in historical writing, or in legal 
discourse, we use cotinterfactuals selectively. We decide when to 
use them, and we then draw on our judgments of plausibility to 
choose among competing possibilities when we construct them or 
evaluate other people's counterfactuals. This section explores the 
choice of using or avoiding counterfactuals in the law. The next sec-
tion considers our choices and methods in constructing them. 
We should not engage in counterfactual inq1,1iry _unreftectively. 
Given our distrust of such inquiry and the disquiet it sometimes 
causes us, we also should not engage in such inquiry needlessly. We 
should, instead, make explicit the kinds of questions that we are ask-
ing and the demands that we are putting on such. inquiry and con-
sciously explore the costs and benefits of counterfactual inquiry and 
the possibility and consequences of its alternatives. 
A precise cost/benefit analysis of counterfactual inquiry is unreal-
izable. Any calculus of costs and benefits will be rough at best. We 
should, nonetheless, ponder what such an analysis would entail as a 
reminder of the factors that we should consider in deciding whether 
to engage in a particular counterfactual inquiry. It should begin by 
comparing probable error costs of counterfactual inquiry and its al-
ternatives.290 Yet only in extreme cases is such a comparison likely 
to be illuminating.291 In the hard cases, where we most want gui-
dance, the sources of uncertainty that make us uncomfortable with 
issue. Stubbornness or adamance in bargaining is not per se indicative of bad faith, yet 
after some point the Board and courts have been willing to infer bad faith from bargain-
ing intransigence. Compare NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) (hold-
ing that company's insistence on broad management rights clause and refusal of 
grievance arbitration demand not a per se violation of good faith bargaining require-
ment of the Labor Act) with NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (I st 
Cir. 1953) ("[I]f an employer can find nothing whatever to agree to in an ordinary cur-
rent-day contract· submitted to him, or in some of the union's related minor requests, 
and if the employer makes not a single serious proposal meeting the union at least part 
way, then certainly the Board must be able to conclude that this is at least some evidence 
of bad faith, that is, of a desire not to reach an agreement with the union."). See generally 
RoBERT A. GoRMAN, BAsic TEXT oN LABoR LAw: UNIONIZATION AND CoLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING 481-95 (1976) (noting that often only evidence of bad faith is substantive posi-
tions taken at bargaining table). 
290. See supra note 259. 
291. We might conclude, for example, that a no-speculative-remedy rule for a class of 
nontrivial harms would be such a case, but only if we were confident that a rule permit-
ting remedies would not produce erroneously large awards resulting in graver maldistri-
bution than the no-remedy rule. We might conclude in some instances that iqjunctive 
relief, restitutionary remedies, or specific performance might obviate any need for more 
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counterfactual thinking will typically also make it difficult for us to 
say much that is meaningful about error costs. Even where we know 
that the risks of counterfactual error are high, we may have trouble 
making meaningful comparisons. Our confidence in counterfactuals 
that build upon long sequences of contingent events "bound to 
their causes only by probability statements" should be quite low 
even if the probability of each step in the chain taken singly is quite 
high.292 For example, we ought to be skeptical of damages awards 
for death or disabling injury that project over many years, yet we are 
hard pressed to say that a pay-as-you-go alternative would be 
preferable. 293 
Obviously, there are ·additional variables that we ought to con-
sider in any cost/benefit analysis. If the choice of engaging in a 
counterfactual inquiry or of avoiding it in a particular class of cases 
makes a difference as to who bears the risk of factfinder error, or has 
incentive effects regarding future conduct in similar settings, our 
decision will have obvious soci£!.1 costs or benefits.294 Similarly, 
rules of thumb, whether they are rules that obviate certain inquiries 
by precluding the remedies that would require such inquiries, or 
whether they are presumptions, can simplify litigation and reduce 
the costs of factfinding, but the savings will vary with the nature of 
speculative, and error-prone, remedial inquiries. We also might rely on the private or-
dering of the parties in certain contractual settings, through, for example, liquidated 
damages clauses. 
292. Gould, supra note.l56, at 200 & n.l. 
293. A pay-as-you-go approach eliminates the uncertainty about future medical costs 
and the rate of inflation. It may even eliminate some of the uncertainty about the job 
history that the decedent or disabled plaintiff would have had (by providing more infor-
mation about the general state of the economy, i.e., identifying periods of recession, 
depression, or inflation, and about the particular industry and firm in which she was 
employed, i.e., was she a cooper who would have faced limited career choices when the 
craft became automated). It provides no additional information to eliminate most of the 
uncertainty regarding the hypothetical job history, however, because waiting will not tell 
us whether she would have been promoted or discharged or would have quit or been 
killed in an industrial accident at some point had she continued to work. · 
Moreover, it imposes different costs on the parties resulting from the uncertainty of a 
nonfinal judgment, the costs of periodically reopening litigation, and the risk to the 
plaintiff of the defendant's future insolvency. Such an approach may also adversely af-
fect an injured plaintiff's recovery, either by encouraging malingering, or by the delete-
rious psychological effects of prolonging her attention to her injury, which may retard 
the healing process. Finally, a pay-as-you-go approach imposes institutional costs of 
nonfinality that are different from and hard to compare to the costs of premature deci-
sionmaking. For a discussion of "waiting and watching" as a means of dealing with 
uncertainty, see generally Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at 143-47 (citing sources). 
Although I take my example from tort, similar problems arise in awards of front pay 
damages in employment discrimination cases. 
294. Do we, for instance, want to adopt in a particular category of cases a rule that 
says that a wrongdoer, whose act put us in the position of having to imagine a hypotheti-
cal past, should bear the risks of our mistakes in constructing such a past, or do we want 
to encourage "efficient breach" by sheltering the breacher from speculative damages? 
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the counterfactual inquiry foreclosed and the nature of the factfind-
ing necessary to determine whether the rule of thumb applies. Fi-
nally, there are important social costs if the parties and the public 
believe that legal decisions rest on unreliable factfinding or that the 
law repeat~dly denies remedies for certain types of wrongs because 
of the difficulty in resolving counterfactual questions. 
Short of attempting a cost/benefit analysis, we must consider our 
treatment of counterfaCtuals in any given class of cases in light of 
our willingness or unwillingness to undertake such inquiry else-
where in the law. By looking broadly at the problem of counterfac-
tuals in the law, and by attempting to reconcile their treatment in a 
particular class of cases with tlieiftrea'tment elsewhere, we will pro-
mote greater consistency in their use and diminish extreme and un-
justified reactions of bravado or dread. Such analysis must be 
sensitive to the distinctive problems and substantive goals of differ-
ent areas of the law, to the various uses to which counterfactuals can 
be put, and to the powers and li~itations of counterfactuals when 
put to such tasks. 
Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Article. Given the 
reach of counterfactual questions throughout the law, it can only 
emerge dialogically. A few observations may help advance that dia-
logue. First, it is helpful to keep in mind the distinction between 
negative and positive counterfactuals.295 Negative counterfactuals 
are causation testers. Typically, they neither give us pause, nor add 
to our understanding. Their assertion is merely an affirmation of 
our confidence in the causal statement that implies them, and we 
need not trouble ourselves to make them explicit. 
Negative counterfactuals can be helpful, however, in cases of 
causal overdetermination or uncertainty. As a purely rhetorical 
matter, statingthe issue in counterfactual "but-for" terms exposes 
causal overdetermination or uncertainty.296 It is not dear whether 
we see uncertainty or overdetermination as a result of asking the 
counterfactual question, or whether we merely use the counterfac-
tual to articulate an already drawn conclusion. At the very least, the 
habit of recognizing the counterfactuals implied by our causal asser-
tions should heighten our sensitivity to instances of overdetermina-
tion or uncertainty. 
That recognition of the implied counterfactual statement can help 
resolve causal Uncertainty is a more questionable claim. Counterfac-
tual restatement of the causal claim adds nothing to cure the prob-
lem of insufficient evidence of causation in these cases. Rather, as 
Murrin discovered in his consideration of the Awakening's contribu-
tion to the colonials' military success, it can reveal instances where 
we require more evidence.297 Sometimes we may assert confidently 
295. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text. 
296. For example, in the merging fire cases, see supra note 68 and accompanying text, 
asking the but-for question calls attention to the duplicative cause. It does not, however, 
resolve the substantive law question of how to treat a duplicative or uncertain cause. 
297. See supra text accompanying notes 200-02. 
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that a neglected safety precaution or missing safety device would 
have averted an accident even though we know little about how 
events actually unfolded.298 Yet here again, it is likely that the but-
for counterfactual less often guides the factfinder to its conclusion 
than it helps express an already formed causal judgment based on 
the factfinder's sense of the probabilities.299 
Typically less dispensable, and concomitantly posing harder ques-
tions, are positive counterfactuals. Here the factfinder must do 
more than describe and explain what happened in the past or imagi-
natively remove an element from its story about the past to test 
whether it was, under the circumstances, a necessary cause of the 
rest of the story. It must, instead, construct an unreal alternative 
story, more or less detailed depending on the legal questions driv-
ing the inquiry, that is grounded in the real past and articulates the 
factfinder's reasoned prediction of how things would have turned 
out had certain aspects of the past differed in specified ways. As 
noted above, this is typically thefactfinder's task when it determines 
a remedy. It is also the factfinder's task when it encounters ques-
. tions of causation that require consideration of unrealized se-
quences of events, such as claims alleging lack of informed consent 
to medical treatment,300 or failure to provide safety equipment 
where the question is whether the victim would have used the equip-
ment. 301 Indeed, depending on the rules one adopts for dealing 
with preemptive causes, the factfinder may need to engage in this 
sort of inquiry whenever the purported cause appears to have pre-
empted an alternative causal candidate. 302 
298. See, e.g., Rovegno v. Sanjose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 291 P. 848 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1930) (holding that jury could reasonably infer that having lifeguard sta-
tioned at pool would have averted drowning); City of Longmont v. Swearingen, 254 P. 
1000 (Colo. 1927) (holding that evidence was sufficient to justify finding that failure to 
post lifeguard was proximate cause of drowning). 
299. Where there is insufficient evidence of causation and no basis for concluding 
inductively from general experience what would have happened in the particular case 
(i.e., in most circumstances a trained lifeguard would be able to save a solitary swimmer 
from drowning in a pool, therefore had there been a lifeguard posted in this case, the 
plaintiff's decedent would not have drowned), we are thrown back on our burden of 
proof rules to determine outcomes. Whether or not Malone is right as a descriptive 
matter that we regularly decide these cases on policy grounds, we clearly sometimes 
relax the causation requirement for policy reasons. See generally Malone, supra note 19. 
300. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
301. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
302. Sometimes this inquiry will be quite simple and the task will differ little from the 
task of considering a causation-testing negative counterfactual. For example, a boy fall-
ing from a bridge might touch negligently charged electrical wires and be electrocuted. 
Under certain circumstances, if, for instance, the fall was from sufficient height and the 
surface below was an expanse of jagged rocks, we easily might conclude with certitude 
that the boy was doomed. to die, even had the wires not been charged. However, in the 
real case upon which I base my example, Dillon v. Twin States Gas & Electric Co., 163 A. 
Ill (N.H. 1932), the preempted sequence of events may have been far less clear, as the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court remanded for factual findings regarding whether the 
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Because negative counterfactuals are translations of our causal 
claims, their proof rests on the same evidence that supports the 
causal claims. Positive counterfactuals, having no such counter-
parts, rest on more elusive proof, but because they do not translate 
to something more palpable, our dependence on them is greater. 
Easy substitutes for positive counterfactuals, whether gross rules of 
thumb or blanket denials of certain types of claims or remedies, are 
often unattractive alternatives. Yet where we doubt our ability to 
resolve the counterfactual, we must consider possible substitute ap-
proaches. Thus, Professors Twerski and Cohen, in light' of their 
conclusion that decision causation in informed decisionmaking 
claims is norijusticiable, reconceptualize the claim in such cases to 
center on the harms resulting from the patient's exclusion from the 
decisionmaking process, rather than on the outcome of the treatment 
decision. 303 Similarly, we need not treat make-whole remedies in 
bad faith bargaining cases as restoring the wages and benefits that 
would have been obtained through good faith bargaining.304 In-
stead, we should follow ProfessorSt. Antoine's suggestion that the 
union's harm in such cases is really the loss of a chance to bargain, 
along the lines of claims asserting the denial of a chance to partici-
pate in a lottery or beauty pageant.3°5 Recasting the make-whole 
remedy in this way eliminates the need to decide what the outcome 
of bargaining would have been by shifting the focus to the value of 
tl1e lost opportunity. to barg-ain.306 So-recasted "'vve have replaced 
boy would have fallen back onto the bridge or down to the surface below, whether he 
would have been killed, or merely crippled by the fall, and, if he otherwise would have 
lived, the extent to which his earning capacity would have been diminished due to inju-
ries sustained in the fall, for purpose of comparison with the lost stream of income due 
to his electrocution. /d. at 114-15. 
303. See generally Twerski & Cohen, supra note 87. For a discussion ofTwerski & Co-
hen's approach, see supra note 92. 
304. See supra notes 107-22 and accompanying text. 
305. St. Antoine, supra note 109, at 1045-46. For examples of lost opportunity, see 
Mange v. Unicorn Press, 129 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (loss of chance to participate 
in contest); Wachtel v. NationafAlfalfaJournal Co., 176 N.W. 801 (Iowa 1920) (same); 
Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (C.A.) (lost opportunity to compete in beauty con-
test). There is considerable literature on loss of a chance claims. A good starting point 
is Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Tarts Involving 
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE LJ. 1353 (1981). 
306. That approach requires agreement on some formula for valuing the lost oppor-
tunity to bargain. Although there are several different formulas that the NLRB might 
use, once the choice of formula is made, valuing the harm would not be difficult. For 
discussions of possible approaches to the valuation problem, see St. .. A .. ntoine, supra note 
109, at 1045-47; Schlossberg & Silard, supra note 109, at 1079-80. Cf Phillip L. Martin 
& Daniel L. Egan, The Makewhale Remedy in California Agriculture, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 120, 124-30 (1989) (discussing make-whole remedy under the California Agricul-
tural Labor Relations Act). Proposed amendments to the NLRA styled as The Labor 
Reform Act of 1977 would have permitted a make-whole remedy to be calculated on the 
basis of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' compilation of the average annual wage gains in 
occupations covered by collective bargaining agreements. H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., I st 
Sess. § 8 (1977); see also H.R. REP. No. 637, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1977). 
The proposed use of the Bureau of Labor Statistics figures for average annual gains in 
wages and benefits in collective bargaining agreements to value the lost opportunity is a 
sensible one, so long as the figure is discounted by the percentage of first-contract nego-
tiations where, in the absence of bad faith bargaining, no contract is reached. The em-
ployer also should have a limited opportunity to show that the measure of damages 
using this formula is inappropriate, by showing either its inability to pay, or, perhaps, by 
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one counterfactual question with a new one: what value would the 
employees (or an imagined market if we want an objective standard) 
have assigned to the opportunity to bargain? But we also have fol-
lowed the historians' example by limiting the scope of our positive 
counterfactuals to questions resolvable with the evidence we 
possess. 307 
D. Constructing Assertable Counterfactuals 
As J.L. Mackie noted, "we use counterfactuals discriminat-
ingly."30B "[W]e want to say 'If this bit of potassium had been ex-
posed to air it would have burst into flame' but not 'If this bit of 
potassium had been exposed to air it would have turned into 
gold.' "309 But because counterfactuals are not verifiable, how do 
we choose one consequent over another, or decide whether some-
one else's choice is persuasive? 
We can begin with a small but important point. Whether our 
counterfactual performs its task adequately will depend partly on 
the definition of that task. A counterfactual statement that serves us 
-well as a causation tester may be woefully incomplete as a positive 
counterfactual.310 On the other hand, we often tolerate a level of 
vagueness regarding positive counterfactuals that is intolerable for 
our on-off causation questions.311 Just as we should take care that 
our counterfactuals respond to our questions, we also should refrain 
showing that its particular industry diverged significantly from the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics averages. 
307. See supra note 306 for a discussion of how we could go about doing this. We 
also will consider our counterfactual inquiry to be more successful if we follow the his-
torians' lead further in permitting a higher level of imprecision and approximation in 
our positive counterfactuals. For example, we ought to admit that we can only approxi-
mate the value of the opportunity to bargain. Similarly, we can justifY affirmative action 
remedies as attempts to create the circumstances of a counterfactual world without racial 
or gender discrimination. See Hardy Jones, Fairness, Meritocracy, and Reverse Discrimination, 
4 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 2ll, 2ll (1977). Obviously, however, our remedies will be 
wrong in the descriptions of individual outcomes, and we should strive rather for the 
broad contours of such a counterfactual world and accept that we can only get our reme-
dies "right" on a class-wide, and not an individual, basis. 
308. MACKIE, supra note 20, at 77. 
309. MACKIE, supra note 81, at 199. 
310. For example, our evidence might support the conclusion that had the plaintiff's 
doctor properly chosen what was under the circumstances a preferred mode of treat-
ment, the plaintiff would not have suffered the adverse effects of' the treatment selected 
in its stead. If our evidence does not additionally allow us to predict how successful the 
alternative treatment likely would have been in treating the underlying· ailment, and 
what would have been the likelihood of different adverse results of such treatment, we 
have not measured adequately the harms resulting from the improper medical decision. 
311. We may need to know, for instance, within a matter of a few inches, how far a 
lamppost would have penetrated a differently designed automobile, or whether the de-
cedent sunk so fast that having a life buoy on board ship would not have saved him. 
Speaking on remedies, Professor Leubsdorf suggests that we ought to shed our sense of 
guilt about our resort to estimation where we are unable to give a precise measure of the 
injured party's harm. Leubsdorf, supra note 19, at !58. I agree that often we should be 
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fwm pushing them beyond the scope of those questions. We win 
use counterfactuals better iJ we keep their purpose in mind. 
As we have seen, -when we think counterfactuaHy we reason from 
known facts and certain accepted generalizations (or laws) to unreal-
ized possibilities beyond those facts or the previously identified ex-
tension of those generalizations. We will consider presently that 
manner of thinking more fuHy, but we should not forget that we 
resolve certain causal questions without projecting our knowledge 
onto unrealized instances. We may sidestep temporarily a causal as-
sertion's implied counterfactuai by undermining the reasons to be-
lieve its causal claims, or by offering a better causal explanation. 
Murrin relies heavily on th:is technique in his two essays.312 his an 
important technique for legal factfinde:rs, also, as in the railroad 
crossing collision case, Thomas v. Baliimore & Ohio Railroad, 313 and in 
other cases involving proof of an alternative cause.314 Having dis-
covered enough to reject or replace the original causal candidate, 
we do confront the counterfactual ~tatement that it implied, but only 
to say, "even if events had transpired the way you say they ought to 
have (for example, even if defendant had acted reasonably), the 
harm would have occuned."3is 
What should we do when we cannot sidestep counterfactual ques-
tions in this manner? Mackie replies with a suppositionall account of 
conditionals, including counterfactuals. 3!6 According to Mackie, a 
counterfactual introduces a supposition-the antecedent-and then 
asserts something-the consequent-within the scope of the suppo-
sition.317 But this reframes the problem without telling us how to 
distinguish between proper and improper assertions within the 
scope of the supposition. How are we to decide whether the potas-
sium would have burst into flame or turned into gold had it been 
exposed to air? We choose our counterfactua] in this example with 
reference to certain laws of nature: potassium ignites when exposed 
to oxygen, and oxygen is a component of air. It is therefore reason-
able, if we suppose that we exposed a bit of potassium to air, to 
assert the consequent that it burst into flame. 318 Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to assert counterfactuals that rest on generalizations that 
we have confidence are extendible to unrealized cases. for Mackie, 
laws of nature are the paradigmatic case of such generalizations, and 
what distinguishes them from other statements that do not sustain 
counterfactuals is that they are supported by "good inductive evi-
dence," which permits the projection of the generalizations onto 
satisfied with our best approximations, but I do not detect the same strong currents of 
guilt. 
312. See supra notes 182-83 & 191-99 and accompanying text. 
313_ 310 k2d 186 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973). 
314. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text. 
315. For a discussion of "even if" statements, see GooDMAN, supra note 10, at 5-6; 
MACKIE, supra note 20, at 72-73, 93-94, 96-97. 
316. MACKIE, supra note 81, at 53-56, 199-203; MACKIE, supra note 20, at 92-119. 
317_ MACKIE, supra note 81, at 53-54. 
318. fd_ at 200. 
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"additional (contrary~to-fact) instances of the subject term."319 
Most historians' generalizations and many relied upon by legal 
factfinders are probabilistic and are not, therefore, extendible to any 
unrealized case with complete certainty.32° Consequently, they give 
weaker support to couriterfactual statements than do absolute laws 
of nature. Whether such generalizations support a legal counterfac-
tual adequately depends both on the strength of the underlying in-
ductive evidence and'on the applicable standard of proof. 
Legal questions about what might have been touch on so many 
aspects of ~ife that we necessarily draw on many kinds of arguments 
and evidence to answer them. My aim here is not a complete cata-
logue and analysis of these modes of argument and kinds of eviden-
tiary support, or a theory of inductive proof. My goal is, instead, to 
initiate a discussion of these questions by offering some preliminary 
observations and criticisms of how we construct counterfactuals in 
the law. 
·In inany instances we can resolve legal counterfactuals by relying 
on scientific laws;321 Such reliance, though imperfect given the in-
~ompleteness of our scientific !a10wledge and our continuing need 
to revise mistaken scientific theories,322 fulfills Mackie's criteria for 
assertable counterfactuals. We must note one distinction between 
. the scientific knowledge and generalizations that we often rely on in 
the law anc;I such laws of nature that are typified by Mackie's exam-
ple that potassium ignites when exposed to oxygen. Often, the sci-
entific laws that legal factfinders' rely on are probabilistic. We may 
know the probabilities both of success and of adverse consequences 
had the plaintiff's doctor chosen an alternative treatment, but we 
cannot be certain what would have happened in that particular case. 
Such scientific knowledge may meet the legal criteria of proof, but it 
does not permit absolute confidence in our counterfactual 
assertions. 
Where helpful scientific laws do not stand at the ready, we may 
319. MAcKIE, supra note 20, at· 118. Mackie argues that "[t]he sustaining of 
counterfactuals by laws or 'nomic universals' is nothing more than the projective force 
of inductive evidence in a new guise." Id. Accidental generalizations, such as "All the 
coins in my pocket are shiny," by contrast, do not sustain counterfactuals because the 
counterfactual supposition that some other coin is in my pocket undermines our reason 
to retain the generalization. /d. at 114-16; MACKIE, supra note 81, at 200-01. 
320. Often the probabilistic nature of these generalizations remain unexpressed, or 
they may be stated in qualitative, not quantitative terms. See McCuLLAGH, supra note 81, 
at 51-52. 
321. By contrast, few historians would be interested in counterfactual questions that 
were resolvable with reference to ·scientific laws, and the historiographical model says 
little to these cases. 
322. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 374-77 (discussing uncertain or questionable 
science in the Benedectin cases, the Agent Orange litigation, and the line of tort actions 
asserting that as a result of the cuts or bruises sustained by plaintiff due to defendant's 
negligence, plaintiff subsequently developed cancer in that area). 
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look to analogous events for our counterfactual-sustaining general-
izations and for~ evidence that supports our drawing of inferences 
from one event or set or events to an analogous hypothetical occur-
rence. As we have seen, historians :rely heavily on arguments by 
analogy in their counterfactual explorations, both to challenge other 
historians' causal explanations and to suggest unrealized historical 
alternatives. Analogical argument is especially helpful in analyzing 
group behavior; where we have little access to the thoughts and feel-
ings of the individuals comprising the group and therefore often are 
unable to draw inferences from what we know with particularity 
about their thoughts or personalities. For the same reason it is 
helpful when we attempt to draw on knowledge about patterns of 
group behavior to sustain a counterfactual relating to a member of 
that group. Arguments that rely on statistical evidence to support 
their counterfactual claims are closely :related to analogical argu-
ment.323 They seek to extend generalities about group experience 
to a particular hypothetical :instance, based on the subject's mem-
bership in the group. · 
Such arguments abound in law. We ground our a~tempt to deter-
mine damages in a wrongful death o:r disabling injury case on such 
arguments for predictions of such things as the victim's life expec-
tancy and stream of income absent the injury, as well as a prediction 
of the future rate of inflation. The read and heed presumption in 
products liability failure to warn cases projects from a generalization 
about group conduct to an unrealized and counte:rfactual instance 
of individual conduct.324 Elsewhere, the law excludes such argu-
ments, but we might :revise it to permit their use. For instance, the 
NLRB could abandon its rule of thumb approach toward Gissel bar-
gaining orders, under which the union must demonstrate prior ma-
jority support as a. prerequisite for a bargaining order, in favor of 
analyzing the counte:rfactual question whether the employees would 
have selected the union in a fair election.325 
Such generalizations must :rest on a strong empirical base to sus-
tain legal counte:rfactuals. Here again, we see an instance where 
asking the counte:rfactual question :reveals how much we need to 
learn. For instance, we still have much to learn about what deter-
. ' (' • . 1 . .-1 "] mmes tne outcome or unwn representatiOn e.ectwns, an,_. unt1. we 
do, any counte:rfactual judgments that we make in the Gissel setting 
323. For a discussion of statistical and analogical arguments in history, of the rela-
tionship between the two, and a skeptical treatment of analogical argument, see McCUL-
LAGH, supra note 81, at 45-73, 85-90. 
324. Similarly, one might interpret the decision in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772 (D.C. Cir.), mt denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972), holding that the plaintiff in an in-
formed medical consent case must show causation "on an objective basis: in terms of 
what a prudent person in the patient's position would have decided if suitably in-
formed," id. at 791, as reflecting the idea that we can best resolve the counterfactua) 
problem posed by such cases by assuming that in most cases the plaintiff would have 
acted just like most other people. The court does not justify its decision in quite these 
terms, however. Also, by speaking of "a prudent person in the patient's position," the 
court modifies the objective approach to take account of the patient's idiosyncrasies. 
325. For a discussion of Gissel, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. 
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will be unsound.326 As the historians' arguments demonstrate, we 
also must search for possible counterexamples that might under-
mine the generalizations that we advance.327 
Some additional caution is necessary regarding the law's use of 
analogical argument. As previously noted, some of man's most dra-
matic intellectual blunders have been the product of bad analogical 
thinking. Many of these blunders resulted from the misuse of his-
torical analogies-the reliance on apparent similarities without any 
attention to context or historical flow. Given the law's-indeed 
modern American society's-devaluation of the past, the risk of mis-
use of historical analogies in the resolution of legal counterfactuals 
326. See Thomas F. Reed,·Do Union Organizers Matter? Individual Characteristics and Rep-
resentation Election Outcomes, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. I 03 ( 1989). 
Much has been written on. the subject, beginning with the Getman-Goldberg-Herman 
study of representation elections, which downplayed the effects of campaign election 
tactics (legal and illegal) on the employees' ultimate vote. See juLES GETMAN ET AL., 
UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAw AND REALITY (1976). The study has spurred 
considerable criticism. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN &jAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS 
Do? 233-39 (1984); William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification 
$lections: Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 560 (1983); Patricia 
Eames, An Analysis of the Union Voting Study From a Trade-Unionists Point of View, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 1181 (1976); Robertj. Flanagan, The Behavioral Foundations of Union Election Regula-
. tion, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1195 (1976); Thomas A. Kochan, Legal Nonsense, Empirical Examina-
tion and Policy Evaluation, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1115 (1976); James E. Martin, Employee 
Characteristics and Representation Election Outcomes, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 365 (1985); 
Thomas F. Phalen, Jr., The Demise of Hollywood Ceramics: Facts and Fantasy, 46 U. CIN. 
L. REv. 450 (1977); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Right to Self-Organiza-
tion Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1784-85 (1983); Raymond Goetz & Edward 
L. Wike, Book Review, 25 KAN. L. REv. 375 (1977); Cornelius Peck, Book Review, 53 U. 
WASH. L. REv. 197 (1977); Myron Roomkin, Book Review, 27 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 1056 
(1977). Getman, Goldberg, and Brett have defended their study in Stephen B. 
Goldberg et al., Union Representation Elections: Law and Reality - The Authors Respond to the 
Critics, 79 MicH: L. REv. 564 (1981); Stephen B. Goldberg et al., The Relationship Between 
Free Choice and Labor Board Doctrine: Differing Empirical Approaches, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 721 
(1984). A study by Professor Laura Cooper supports some of the Getman, Goldberg, 
Herman conclusions. See Laura Cooper, Authorization Cards and Union Representation Elec-
tion Outcome: An Empirical Assessment of the Assumption Underlying the Supreme Courts Gissel 
Decision, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 87 (1974). 
Other studies have identified other factors affecting election success. See William N. 
Cooke, Determinants of the Outcomes of Union Certification Elections, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REv. 402 (1983),JohnJ. Lawler, The Influence of Management ConsultanLr on the Outcome of 
Union Certification Elections, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 38 (1984); Cheryl L. Maranto & 
Jack Fiorito, The Effect of Union Characteristics on the Outcome of NLRB Certification Elections, 
40 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 225 (1987); Reed, supra. 
Yet for all of the debate and studies, it is not clear that we have learned to predict 
representation election outcomes. As an antidote for uncertain behavioral assumptions, 
Professors Roomkin and Abrams have proposed that the NLRB create an empirical re-
search unit. See Myron Roomkin & Roger I. Abrams, Using Behavioral Evidence in NLRB 
Regulation: A Proposal, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1441, 1459-73 (1977). 
As previously noted, the read and heed presumption in products liability failure-to-
warn cases rests, at best, on an unstated empirical base and fails to distinguish between 
categories of products or consumers, for which it might be more or less sound. See supra 
note 150. 
327. See supra notes 174-81 and accompanying text. 
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is small.328 ]Lawyers do not attempt to establish future damages in a 
tort action by relying on actuarial tables from the l880s.329 Yet 
even if our counterfactual-supporting analogies do not flounder be-
cause of distances i.n time, they will tend to mislead if we are not 
sensitive to differences in context and between comparison 
groups.330 
The probabilistic character of the generalizations supported by 
these analogies is further ground for caution. As previously noted, 
counterfactuals built upon long sequences of probabilistic infer-
ences become implausible after several steps along the chain of in-
ferences.331 Also,we will have greater confidence in counterfactuals 
built on probabilistic inferences if those counterfactuals are meant 
to represent an average of many instances rather than a singular 
occurrence. 
Finally, we must recognize that analogical argument to :resolve a 
counterfactual is often only the opening move and is susceptible to 
rebuttal by mo:re particularized evidence that· distinguishes an indi-
vidual case from what one would predict from group experience. 
For example, particularized evidence can destroy the basis for the 
read and heed presumpl:ion.332 Such particularized evidence will 
often support inferences about individual behavior ,pnder 
counterfactual circumstances, which brings us to those arguments 
that rest on an understanding ofan individual's thoughts and dispo-
sitions, the final category of counterfactual-sustaining argument. 
Many of the law's counterfactuals :revolve around questions of in-
dividual choices or conduct under changed circumstances.333 U sci-
entific laws are our usual source of support for counte:rfactuals 
328. This brash assertion is certainly an oversimplification of a complex issue. After 
all, legal actors look to precedent to understand law and to decide cases. Indeed, in our 
use of precedent, we often demonstrate a second attitude toward the past that is differ-
ent from disregard: a willingness to use the past without acknowledging its pastness, 
suggesting that we do misuse historical analogies in the law, although not typically to 
support legal counterfactuals. I offer as my inadequate foundation for this assertion 
only the following anecdote: A friend tells me that the federal district court judge for 
whom he clerked would shoo him from chambers if he brought the judge old authority 
for a proposition that the judge wanted to assert, saying something to the effect of: 
"He's dead. Don't bring me opinions written by dead judges." 
329. Nor should one expect to see the argument over issuance of a Gissel bargaining 
order in the 1990s framed in terms of the patterns of election outcomes in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, the heyday of union density. 
330. The academic literature discussing the misapprehensions that result from im-
posing a male (or upper middle-class white Protestant male) model of "reasonableness" 
in constructing the law's reasonable person in areas such as the definition of self-de-
fense, or of sexual harassment demonstrates one such instance. See, e.g., Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Dolores Donovan 8c Stephanie Wildman, Is the 
Reasonable Man Obsolete: A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 LoY. L.A. L. 
REV. (1981); Lucinda M. Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts 
Course, YALE J.L. 8c FEMINISM 41, 57-65 (1989); Howard A. Simon, Ellison v. Brady, A 
"Reasonable Woman" Standard for Sexual Harassment, 17 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 71 (1991). 
331. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
333. For example: would the plaintiff have used safety equipment had his employer 
supplied it; would the plaintiff have opted for an alternative mode of treatment had the 
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about objects, and arguments from analogy our usual source of sup-
port for counterfactuals about groups or their members, disposi-
tional statements drawn from an understanding of a person's 
experience and personality are the likeliest source of support for 
counterfactuals about individuals. Such statements license our pre-
dictions about a person's behavior in unrealized instances. 
We derive these dispositional statements from many sources. In 
part, this is argument from analogy in another form. We draw upon 
the acts of other people and the psychological generalizations that 
we construct from observation of those acts. We look to our sub-
ject's acts in similar situations, or in situations that would implicate 
similar traits of personality, and reason analogically from them. 
And we plumb our own experiences and relive our responses for 
clues to help us predict our subject's responses. Although disposi-
tional statements represent patterns of behavior, we go beyond the 
outer shell of observed conduct in forming such statements. These 
behaviors are, after all, the product of someone's thoughts, desires, 
and purposes. Often.we can penetrate observed acts to understand 
the thoughts, purposes, and feelings that lie beneath.334 Our gener-
alizations about human behavior inform that act of understanding, 
but they are also subject to revision on account of it. 
That counterfactual-sustaining dispositional statements require 
both knowledge of patterns of human and individual behavior and 
an understanding of the glue that holds those patterns together-
the thoughts, purposes, and feelings of the actors-suggests that we 
ought to think of the factfinder's inquiry in these cases in broad 
terms. We should interpret our discovery rules and our rules re-
garding the admissibility of character evidence liberally and expand 
their scope where they interfere with this inquiry.335 More impor-
tant, we must reconceive the factfinder's inquiry as not simply an 
defendant adequately informed him of the risks and alternatives; what sort of job per-
formance would the plaintiff have given and what future promotions would she have 
earned had she not been denied promo.tion because of her race. 
334. The literature on this approach to historical understanding is quite rich. For a 
good introduction, see COLUNGWOOD, supra note 153: LOUIS 0. MINK, HISTORICAL UN-
DERSTANDING (Brian Fay et aJ. eds., I987) 
335. Most jurisdictions preclude the circumstantial use of character evidence in civil 
cases. See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, 105-08 (I978) 
(describing limitations on admissibility of character evidence and rationales for those 
limitations); see also FED. R. Evm. 404 advisory. committee's note (discussing rule and 
rationales for its restrictive scope). Moreover, when courts permit the introduction of 
character evidence they restrict the methods of proof. See LILLY, supra, at II O-I2; FED. 
R. Evm. 405. 
Although these restrictions advance important values, described in the sources noted 
above, courts should balance against those values the often high probative value of char-
acter evidence for counterfactual inference drawing. Perhaps, in a considerable number 
of cases courts already do this. An exception to the general rule that bars character 
evidence in civil trials permits imroduction·of character evidence where character is "an 
element of a ... claim, or defense." See FED. R. Evm. 404 advisory committee's note; see 
1992] 413 
investigation of what happened, but an attempt to understand how 
what happened fit into the experience of the parties, and to under-
stand the parties wen enough to imagine their responses under 
counte:rfactual circumstances. 
Thus expressed, we see an ideal that usually will be beyond the 
:reach oflegal factfinding, and with it we see the limits of the histori-
ographical model's applicability to law. What distinguishes Eric Mc-
Kitrick's task from the legal factfinder's is less a difference between 
historians and legal factfinders or between the ways that they think 
about the past than it is one of context of inquiry and available evi-
dence. McKitrick did not begin his study of Andrew Johnson from 
scratch. He entered into an ongoing debate and built upon the 
achievements of that debate, even though he rejected the interpreta-
tions of his predecessors. Moreover, he could draw on historical 
works dealing generally with nineteenth century American politics 
and culture and with the Civil War and Reconstruction, as well as on 
prior interpretations of Lincoln's and Johnson's lives and careers, to 
enrich his understanding ofJohnsnn. Legal factfinders do not have 
the benefit of an equivalent intergenerational discourse.336 
More important, the kinds of evidence available to McKitrick and 
to legal factfinde:rs are different. McKitrick could not put Johnson 
on the witness stand.337 JBut because the subject of his study was a 
public figure, whose deeds and words are well documented, he has a 
kind of access to Johnson's thoughts and feelings that the legal 
factfinder in a products liability failure to warn case will not have.338 
also LILLY, supra, at 103-04. Examples include the competence of a driver in a negligent 
entrustment of an automobile action, and the character of a plaintiff in a defamation 
action. Read broadly, this exception would capture the use of character evidence to 
support legally relevant counterfactuals. For example, character is in issue in determin-
ing the stream of income that a decedent in a wrongful death claim would have earned, 
and character evidence relating to the likelihood of promotions or dismissal ought, 
therefore, to be heard. It seems likely that in many cases courts do regard such charac- _ 
ter evidence to be admissible. 
336. Some litigation is protracted, either because of its complexity or because of the 
delaying tactics of one of the parties. A notorious example is the case involving Darling-
ton Manufacturing Company's decision to close its plant after the Textile Workers 
Union won a representation election among its employees. The plant closed in Novem-
ber of 1956. The United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in the case in 1965, 
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), which remanded to 
the court of appeals with instructions lO remand to the NLRB. The NLRB rendered its 
decision in 1967, but the NLRB General Counsel and Deering Milliken (Darlington's 
parent) did not reach a compromise backpay settlement until 1980, 24 years after the 
closing of the mill. See DoUGLAS L. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAw: PRo-
CESS AND PoLICY 290 (2d ed. 1985) (describing history of Darlington litigation). Partici-
pants in the legal system and outsiders generally agree that such examples of protracted 
litigation are both anomalous and instances of institutional failure. 
337. Obviously, some historians can talk to the participants in the events they choose 
to study. 
338. The important distinction here is not between historical study and legal factfind-
ing. It is between the subject of study of some historical work and a lawsuit. Much histor-
ical writing focuses on the lives of people who left little or no record of their words or 
deeds. Although, with great ingenuity, some historians have revealed much about the 
thoughts, beliefs, and feelings of such anonymous people, they can tell us little about 
individuals except as members of larger groups. Examples abound. For three arbitrar-
ily chosen ones, see EuGENE D. GENOVESE;, RoLL, jORDAN, RoLL: THE WoRLD THE SLAVES 
MADE (1974); LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, BLAcK CuLTURE AND BLACK CoNscrousNEss: AFRo-
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Legal factfinders simply will not know enough about the parties to a 
dispute to understand them and make dispositional statements 
about them with the same depth and assurance as McKitrick does. 
We nonetheless should strive to meet the demands of this model, 
but we should not be disappointed· if our efforts fall short. 
To this point I have spoken of legal counterfactuals in terms akin 
to a painful medical procedure: they may be necessary in light of 
the alternatives, but hardly something gleefully experienced. Yet 
they offer us more than just a way of resolving certain legal ques-
tions. They enrich the law. They do so first by the demands that 
they sometimes put on legal factfinders and decisionmakers to pene-
trate other people's deeds in order to reach a level of empathetic 
understanding. With that understanding comes a recognition of 
how law is perceived and experienced by people unlike oneself, of 
the law's meaning for others, and with that recognition we enhance 
the possibilities of doing justice as well as law.339 
The value of counterfactual thinking in the law extends beyond its 
educating legal factfinders and decisionmakers to be more adept at 
empathetic understanding and beyond the legal change that may re-
sult from such understanding. To think and speak counterfactually 
is to engage in the language of possibilities and "alternates."340 
Counterfactuals, George Steiner writes, "make up a grammar of 
constant renewal. They force us to proceed afresh in the morning, 
to leave failed history behind."341 It is our ability to think 
counterfactually that allows us to get off "the treadmill of the pres-
ent ... to gainsay or 'un-say' the world, to image and speak it other-
wise."342 Legal counterfactuals enable us to see the possible as well 
as the actual in the law. By consciously embracing counterfactual 
thinking in the law, we will better come to see within it its transform-
ative-indeed its utopian-possibilities. 
Conclusion 
Can we know what might have been? The question misleads. 
Vlhatever we may say about vvhat might have been, l'Je cannot kno\V 
AMERICAN FoLK THOUGHT FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (1977); SEAN WILENfZ, CHANTS 
DEMOCRATIC: NEW YoRK CITY AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1790-
1865 (1984). 
339. Much has been written on empathy and law. For a good introduction, see Lynne 
N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574 (1987); Linda R. Hirshman, 
Bronte; Bloom, and Bork: An Essay on the Moral Education of judges, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 177 
(1988); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989). 
340. GEORGE STEINER, AFTER BABEL: ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE AND TRANSLATION 216, 
217 (1975). Steiner's discussion ofcounterfactua1s rests heavily on the thought ofErnst 
Bloch. 
341. /d. 
342. /d. at 218. 
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it in the way that we know facts. As Jon Elster has noted, 
"counterfactual propositions are law-users and not law-confirmers. 
If, on the basis of a certain generalization, a counterfactual proposi-
tion is asserted, this does not constitute further proof of the gener-
alization. " 343 Our assertion of a particular consequent within the 
scope of a counterfactual is not an instance of that consequent's 
occurrence. 344 
We can and do make intelligible and well-supported assertions 
about what might have been, however. Counterfactual thinking is 
necessary to legal factfinding. It has been this Article's purpose to 
show that we can make our use of legal counterfactuals more consis-
tent and sensible by recognizing them for what they are and examin-
ing their use in law and in history. Only then can we make reasoned 
decisions about when and how to use them. That examination 
should encompass the broad sweep of legal doctrines and sub-
specialties, and it therefore must emerge dialogically. I hope to 
have begun that dialogue. 
343. ELSTER, supra note 35, at 219 n.3. In this regard, Elster recounts Karl Popper's 
story about an exchange with JI.Jfred Adler: 
Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me did not seem particu-
larly Adlerian, but which he found no difficully in analysing in terms of his 
theory of inferiority feelings, although he had never seen the child. Slightly 
shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. "Because of my thousandfold 
experience," he replied, whereupon I could not help saying: "And with this 
new case, I suppose, your experience has become thousand-and-one fold." 
/d. (quoting KARL PoPPER, CoNJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNowLEDGE 35 (1963)). 
344. Our asking of counterfactual questions nonetheless can contribute to our knowl-
edge. First, and perhaps trivially, such questions can further our self-knowledge. Ask-
ing such questions can make us confront the depth of our belief in various 
generalizations. More important, such questions help us recognize the potential that 
inhered in different moments and events. We can know that within those moments and 
events lay various unrealized possibilities as an aspect of our empirical knowledge about 
real events. 
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